The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash

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Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT PEKUDEI

By Rav David Silverberg

Parashat Pekudei tells of the fashioning of the bigdei kehuna (priestly vestments), in fulfillment of the instructions conveyed in Parashat Tetzaveh. We read that the efod, or apron, worn by the kohen gadol contained two precious stones, one on each shoulder strap. Curiously, the Torah, both here (39:7) and in Parashat Tetzaveh (28:12), refers to these stones as "avnei zikaron" – " stones of remembrance." In what way do these stones serve as a "remembrance"?

Rashi (28:12) writes that the names of the twelve tribes of Israel, which are engraved on the stones, "reminded" the Almighty of the piety of Yaakov's twelve sons. In their merit God will accept the high priest's service and grant Benei Yisrael atonement. Seforno follows this approach, as well.

Rav Meir Simcha Ha-kohen of Dvinsk, in his "Meshekh Chokhma," presents an entirely different explanation. He suggests that the stones serve as a "remembrance" not for God, but for Benei Yisrael. The fact that their names appear on the kohen gadol's apron as he performs the service in the Mishkan means that they are being represented in the presence of God, that each day, they, through the agency of the kohen gadol, appear before the Almighty. In this sense, the stones remind Benei Yisrael to maintain a high standard of conduct. Knowing that each day their case is brought before God, they will ensure to win His favor by following His rules and obeying His commands. The Meshekh Chokhma mentions in this context the famous Midrashic passage that tells of Yosef beholding his father's image just as he prepared to succumb to the advances of his master's wife. The Midrash tells that this vision enabled Yosef to restrain his impulses and avoid sin. How? The Meshekh Chokhma explains that Yosef realized at that moment that should he commit this sinful act, he will never be able to look at his father again. This awareness gave him the strength and resolve he needed to resist temptation. Similarly, once we understand that we appear before God each day in the Beit Ha-mikdash, we are more likely to overcome the obstacles to proper Torah observance that we often confront in daily life.

This insight of the Meshekh Chokhma can easily be applied to the substitute for the Temple service in the post-Temple era – prayer. The institution of daily prayers forces us to stand before the Almighty three times each day. Ideally, if we approach prayer with the proper perspective and an awareness of what it means, our standard of conduct throughout the day would be at a rigorous and high level. How could one disobey God if he knows that in just several hours he will stand before Him and beg for his life? Daily prayer denies us the luxury of pushing God away from our consciousness and ignoring Him for even a short period of time. Our regular "meetings" with our Creator help ensure a sense of dread and fear that will hopefully help us maintain the proper standards of conduct and obedience.

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Parashat Pekudei tells of Moshe's assembly of the Mishkan, after all its various components and appurtenances were completed: "Moshe erected the Tabernacle, placing its sockets, setting up its planks, inserting its bars, and erecting its posts" (40:18). The Gemara in Masekhet Menachot (99a) cites this verse as a source for the halakha of "ein moridin" – that we may not bring about a lowering in the sacred status of an item. In order to understand this halakha and how it is extracted from this verse, let us first examine the context of the Gemara's discussion.

The Mishna (99b) records that two tables – one gold, the other marble – were placed outside the heikhal (sanctuary) in the Temple, in addition to the shulchan (table) inside the heikhal, where the lechem ha-panim ("show bread") was placed. After the bread was baked, it was placed on a marble table outside the heikhal to cool off, before being brought onto the shulchan inside. And when the old bread was removed from the shulchan, it was brought onto a gold table outside the heikhal. The Mishna explains that since the shulchan was plated with gold, it would be inappropriate to place the bread on a marble table after removing it from a gold table, given the rule of "ein moridin." It was therefore necessary to have a table made specifically from gold outside the heikhal, in order not to lower the status of the bread, which had just been removed from the shulchan – a gold table. By the same token, the table used before placing the bread onto the shulchan was made from marble, in accordance with the principle of "ma'alin ba-kodesh" – requiring that we reflect the concept of elevation. We must therefore ensure that the bread rises in sanctity as it proceeds from a marble table to a gold table.

The Gemara derives the first of these two halakhot, namely, "ein moridin" – the prohibition against lowering an item's status, from this verse in Parashat Pekudei, which tells of Moshe erecting the Mishkan. It is very unclear, however, where in this verse the Torah gives any indication of this halakha.

Rashi suggests three different explanations. His first approach claims that the Gemara focuses on the word "va-yakem" ("erected"), which the Torah employs at either end of this verse. The fact that in the verse's formulation the Torah did not wish to "lower" its description of Moshe's work, but rather continued its use of the term, "he erected," alludes to the need to maintain, rather than decrease, an item's status. In his second approach, Rashi explains that Moshe himself continued performing all the work involved in the Mishkan's assembly, without enlisting the help of anyone else. The Gemara infers from this that after Moshe began the assembly, the involvement of others would have lowered the Mishkan's status, and Moshe therefore proceeded to personally complete the process. Finally, Rashi suggests, the Gemara perhaps interpreted the verse to mean that Moshe first lifted the cloths of the Mishkan and then held them up as he set in place the beams that supported them. He did not want to lower the cloths after having first raised them, due to the principle of "ein moridin." Clearly, however, according to all these approaches, the derivation of the "ein moridin" rule from this verse remains very unclear.

The difficulty in understanding how this verse provides a source for this halakha perhaps lends support to the theory advanced by the Torah Temima, that this derivation was intended merely as an "asmakhta" – a subtle allusion in the text, rather than an actual source. The Torah Temima observes that the Talmud Yerushalmi never extracts the principle of "ma'alin ba-kodesh ve-ein moridin" from a textual source, perhaps suggesting that it was conveyed through oral tradition and has no textual basis in the written law. What more, in Masekhet Berakhot (28a), the Gemara tells that the Rabbis did not want to depose Rabbi Elazar Ben Azarya from his post as head of the Sanhedrin, because "gemiri, ma'alin ba-kodesh ve-ein moridin." Generally, the expression "gemiri" is used in reference to a halakha transmitted through oral tradition, that has no Scriptural source. This, too, would perhaps suggest that the derivation of the halakha from this verse in Parashat Pekudei was not intended to establish an actual source, and should rather be viewed as an "asmakhta."

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The end of Parashat Pekudei tells that after Moshe finally erected the Mishkan, "the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle" (40:34). This phenomenon appears to signify the fulfillment of the very purpose for which the Mishkan was to be erected: "They shall make for Me a Sanctuary, and I shall dwell in their midst" (25:8). Now that the Mishkan is built and standing, God's "glory" descends and takes residence, as it were, therein. This description also brings to mind the drama of the Revelation at Sinai, when "the glory of the Lord abode on Mount Sinai" (24:16).

The question arises, to what exactly does the "glory of the Lord" refer?

This term, "kevod Hashem" ("glory of the Lord"), became the subject of considerable debate among the Medieval Jewish philosophers. One school, represented by Rav Sa'adya Gaon, the Rambam, and Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, claimed that the "glory of the Lord" was some substance or "light" that God created to represent the spiritual significance of a given location or setting. In his "Books of Beliefs and Opinions" (2:12), Rav Sa'adya Gaon writes, "God has a special light which He creates and makes manifest to His prophets in order that they may infer therefrom that it is a prophetic communication emanating from God that they hear." In this vein he interprets the term, "kevod Hashem." Similarly, the Rambam, in his "Guide to the Perplexed" (1:64), defines this term in the contexts of the Revelation at Sinai and the Mishkan as "'the material light,' which God caused to rest on a certain place in order to show the distinction of that place." Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, in his "Sefer Ha-kuzari" (4:3), presents the following definition of "kevod Hashem: "the ethereal entity controlled by God's will to appear in an image before a prophet."

The Rambam extended this theory to explain as well the term "Shekhina" with which Chazal often refer to God's presence. According to the Rambam, the Shekhina was some visible substance that God created to represent Him.

The Ramban, by contrast, in his commentary to Parashat Vayigash (Bereishit 46:1), strongly disagrees. He writes, "Heaven forbid that the entity called 'Shekhina' or 'kavod' ['glory'] is created external to the great Name, may He be blessed, as the rabbi [the Rambam] thought." The Ramban found it unthinkable that these terms – "Shekhina" and "kevod Hashem" – refer to some substance other than the Almighty Himself. In his view, when the Torah speaks of the "glory of the Lord" residing in the Mishkan, and when Chazal speak of the presence of the "Shekhina," they refer to God Himself, not to something external to God.

Rav Menachem Kasher, in his "Torah Sheleima" (vol. 16, appendix 35), elaborates on this dispute and explains the fundamental issue at hand. The Rambam and his camp extended the precept of divine incorporeality – which the Rambam lists as the third of his thirteen articles of faith – to exclude the possibility of God assuming any physical form. Since God possesses no physical quality, he cannot be said to ever exist in any physical sense. The Ramban, by contrast, felt that the logical inconsistency involved in an incorporeal entity assuming a physical form does not preclude the possibility of the Almighty doing so. Since He invented the physical world, He has the power to take on a physical form. We have no reason, therefore, to consider the Shekhina merely a representation of God; it was God Himself, who assumed a physical form when He wanted to "appear" to Benei Yisrael. Rav Kasher cites excerpts from a rare document entitled, "Ketav Tamim" by Rav Moshe Bar Chasdai, a contemporary of the Rambam, who strongly disputes the Rambam's position and insists that God has the power to assume a physical form. He argues that one denigrates God by claiming that His incorporeal nature denies Him the ability to take on a physical shape or form when He so desires.

One might question, however, the extent to which we can truly consider this an actual philosophical debate. For once one accepts the belief that God is an entirely non-physical being, which the Ramban and Rav Moshe Bar Chasdai explicitly do, than it would seem that any physical form God assumes should be seen as a "creation" of sorts. If God has no physical qualities, then we certainly cannot identify any physical form He assumes as God Himself, but rather something He brought into existence to represent Him. Seemingly, then, even the Ramban and those who follow his approach must perceive His "glory" and "Shekhina" as some sort of "creation" external to the Almighty Himself. One might argue, then, that this dispute involves more semantics than actual philosophical beliefs.

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Parashat Pekudei opens with a detailed accounting of all the material donated towards the construction of the Mishkan. The Torah introduces this accounting with the words, "Eileh fekudei Mishkan ha-eidut" – "These are the statistics of the Sanctuary of Testimony…"

Interestingly, as Rav Yehuda Henkin observes in his "New Interpretations on the Parsha," the word "pekudei" appears elsewhere, as well, in reference to a statistical accounting – the census of Benei Yisrael. The term is used repeatedly throughout the first several chapters of Sefer Bamidbar, which record the statistics of Benei Yisrael's population, as well as in chapter 26 of that sefer, when Benei Yisrael are once again counted. Similarly, in the opening section of Parashat Ki-Tisa (30:11-16), which we read this week as the maftir reading for Shabbat Shekalim, the verb "p.k.d." is used in reference to the census taken of Benei Yisrael. This syntactical resemblance perhaps reflects an association the Torah seeks to draw between the counting of Benei Yisrael and the counting of the materials donated towards the building of the Mishkan.

This association is reinforced by the method by which Benei Yisrael must conduct the population census, as described in the Shekalim reading. Rather than conducting a direct headcount, Benei Yisrael must instead make a donation to the Mishkan – a half-shekel of silver for each member of the nation. (Towards the beginning of Parashat Pekudei (38:27-28), the Torah informs us of how the silver revenue from the first census was used in the construction of the Mishkan.) In this sense, the Torah not merely draws an association between the counting of Israelites and the counting of donations, but actually equates them, by requiring that the former take place through the means of the latter.

The explanation, of course, as Rav Henkin writes, involves the importance of substance and quality over quantity in assessing the power and strength of Benei Yisrael. Our nation's strength and capacity for survival and success is determined not by the number of people, but by the number of donations to the Mishkan – the extent to which we prioritize and devote ourselves to the service of God. The Torah therefore describes the population census as "pekudei" – the same term used to describe the accounting of materials donated to the Mishkan – for the statistics of these donations provide a far more accurate picture of Benei Yisrael's condition than do their actual numbers.

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The Torah in Parashat Pekudei describes the completion of the construction of the Mishkan and its appurtenances: "All the work of the Tabernacle of the Tent of Meeting was completed; the Israelites did so, just as the Lord had commanded Moshe – so they did" (39:32). A number of commentators addressed the seemingly unnecessary repetition towards the end of the verse – "kein asu" ("so they did"). Seforno explains that this brief phrase emphasizes Benei Yisrael's meticulous and precise compliance with God's commands regarding the Mishkan, stressing that they neither added to nor detracted from the Almighty's instructions.

Others, however, explained that this concluding clause stresses particularly the point that Benei Yisrael did not add onto the guidelines concerning the Mishkan, and did not fashion anything in addition to that which God specifically ordered. The Netziv, in his "Ha'amek Davar," explains that given Benei Yisrael's enthusiasm and intense desire to bring the Shekhina into their midst, one might have anticipated that they would endeavor to go beyond God's specific instructions. In a similar vein, Rav Gavriel Zev Margolis, in his "Torat Gavriel," suggests that the Mishkan's function as a means of atonement for the sin of the golden calf might have led Benei Yisrael to add onto God's guidelines and build more than He had mandated. The Torah therefore emphasized that Benei Yisrael followed these guidelines with meticulous precision, and made no attempt to exceed the limits set on the Mishkan's size or contents.

In a similar vein, Rav Margolis explains an otherwise perplexing narrative in Parashat Vayakhel. The Torah tells (36:3-7) that the artisans assigned to build the Mishkan and its furnishings complained to Moshe, "The people are bringing more than is needed for the tasks entailed in the work that the Lord has commanded to be done." Moshe immediately responds by issuing a formal proclamation throughout the Israelite camp, "Let no man or woman make further effort toward gifts for the sanctuary!" The overall tenor of this narrative is one of anxiety and urgency; the artisans seem alarmed at the excess supply, and Moshe finds it necessary to act at once to prevent the arrival of more materials. Rav Margolis explained that the artisans were troubled by the people's seemingly exaggerated enthusiasm. They feared that perhaps Benei Yisrael were trying too hard to earn expiation, and to that end sought to build even more than what God had commanded.

This approach reminds us that Torah observance means doing what God instructs, and not what we decide. One who "builds a Mishkan" – who engages in religious pursuits – based on his own instincts and decisions, rather than in accordance with God's laws, in effect serves himself, rather than the Almighty. The Torah therefore emphasizes that Benei Yisrael built the Mishkan precisely as God had instructed, without allowing their enthusiasm to dictate how the Mishkan should be built.

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The opening verse of Parashat Pekudei describes the Mishkan as "Mishkan ha-eidut" – literally, "the Tabernacle of testimony." To what particular aspect of the Mishkan does this term refer?

Many commentators, including Ibn Ezra (Peirush Ha-katzar), Ramban, Chizkuni and Seforno, explain that this description refers to the Mishkan's containing the "luchot ha-eidut," as the two tablets given at Sinai are often called (e.g. Shemot 31:18). Ibn Ezra, in his commentary to Parashat Teruma (25:16), explains that the Torah calls the tablets by this name because they serve a similar function to a "shetar eidut" – a document verifying a given transaction. The tablets given to Benei Yisrael at Sinai testify to the pact they made with the Almighty and contain the basic terms of the agreement they accepted. In any event, according to many commentators, the description of the Mishkan as "Mishkan ha-eidut" stems from the luchot, which are contained inside the Mishkan.

Rashi, however, understood the phrase differently, claiming that the Mishkan serves as testimony to the forgiveness Benei Yisrael earned for the grave transgression of the golden calf. The fact that God agreed to reside among them provides clear proof of the fact that He forgave them and agreed to continue the unique relationship He had forged with them before the sin.

The classic works on Rashi's commentary address the question as to why the "luchot sheniyot," the second set of luchot given to Moshe after the sin of the calf, did not serve this function. As mentioned earlier, the luchot served as testimony to the pact established between the Almighty and Am Yisrael at Sinai. Appropriately, Moshe destroyed the original luchot upon witnessing the nation's betrayal of God through the worship of the calf, indicating that this pact had been breached. Seemingly, then, the presentation of a new set of luchot sufficiently demonstrates the full restoration of the previously broken relationship. Why does Rashi speak of only the Mishkan as the ironclad proof to the atonement granted to Benei Yisrael?

Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi writes that the tablets proved only that the basic relationship between God and Israel would be maintained, but not that they earned atonement. Indeed, an explicit halakha establishes that a Jewish idolater retains his status as a Jew; in fact, even a gentile who converts to Judaism and then reverts back to idolatrous worship remains a Jew. Likewise, Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi suggests, the fact that Benei Yisrael received a new set of tablets means only that the basic arrangement has not been annulled, that they retain their basic status as God's people, like the Jewish idolater. This does not, however, amount of forgiveness and expiation. Only the Mishkan, in which God resided, so-to-speak, proves that Benei Yisrael had been forgiven.

In a generally similar vein, the Maharal of Prague, in his "Gur Aryeh," explains that the mitzva obligation represented by the luchot cannot be equated with the situation of hashra'at ha-Shekhina – the Almighty's representative residence in the people's midst. A husband and wife can remain formally married, and hence retain their mutual obligations towards one another, without enjoying intimacy and a close, personal relationship. Similarly, the Maharal suggests, only the Mishkan, which represented God's "residence" among the people, could herald the full restoration of the state of affairs that had existed before the golden calf.

This explanation perhaps sheds some light on our condition nowadays, with the absence of a Beit Ha-mikdash. We indeed have the "luchot" – a Torah and mitzvot to which we are bound, and which connect us to the Almighty. But this situation resembles the situation of a husband and wife described above: the formal obligations are in place, but the relationship is cold and distant. We anxiously await the day when the Temple will be rebuilt, thereby proclaiming to the world that we, like Benei Yisrael at Sinai, have achieved forgiveness.

Another work on Rashi's commentary, the "Nachalat Yaakov" (written by Rav Yaakov Selnik of Cracow, a disciple of the Rema), suggests a much simpler reason why the luchot do not provide sufficient proof to Benei Yisrael's forgiveness. Quite simply, there was no proof that God presented the tablets to Moshe. After all, unlike the original tablets that Moshe destroyed, the second set of luchot was given to Moshe in private, with no witnesses. Hence, the second tablets are incapable of supplying proof to God's acceptance of Benei Yisrael's teshuva. Only the Mishkan, which contained some visible manifestation of God's presence (see the parasha's final verses), clearly demonstrates the full restoration of the unique bond between Israel and the God of Israel.

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Yesterday, we discussed Rashi's approach in understanding the term "Mishkan ha-eidut" (literally, "Tabernacle of testimony") used in the first verse in Parashat Pekudei. Today, we will address Rashi's comments concerning the Torah's usage of the word "eidut" ("testimony") towards the end of the parasha. In describing Moshe's assembly of the Mishkan, the Torah writes, "He took the 'eidut' and placed it in the ark" (40:20), which expresses the fulfillment of God's command back in Parashat Teruma, "You shall place in the ark the 'eidut' which I will give you" (25:16).

Surprisingly, Rashi defines the expression "eidut" differently in these two verses. Commenting on God's command in Parashat Teruma, Rashi explains that He refers to the original Sefer Torah, which was placed inside (or alongside; see Rashi to Devarim 31:26) the ark. Although this Sefer Torah was written only years later, just prior to Moshe's death, God commands him already at this point to place that Torah scroll inside the aron. Here, however, in Parashat Pekudei, Rashi writes that Moshe took not the Sefer Torah, but rather the luchot (tablets), which are at times called the "luchot ha-eidut" (see yesterday's devar Torah). How might we account for this discrepancy in Rashi's commentary?

The Maharal of Prague, in his "Gur Aryeh" (in Parashat Teruma), explains that Rashi felt compelled to interpret the verse in Parashat Teruma as referring to the Sefer Torah, because of the phrase, "the 'eidut' which I will give you" – which implies that God will give the "eidut" to Moshe. Now Rashi is of the opinion that the instructions concerning the Mishkan were conveyed to Moshe after the sin of the golden calf. Clearly, then, had this verse been referring to the luchot, it must be referring to the second set of tablets, which were received after Moshe earned expiation on behalf of the nation for the sin of the calf. Unlike the original luchot, this second set of luchot was not divinely produced; Moshe himself was commanded to carve them from stone (see Shemot 34:1). Therefore, the Maharal argues, God could not refer to the tablets as something "which I will give you" – since Moshe himself produced these tablets, they cannot be said to have been given to him by the Almighty. This verse must therefore refer to the Sefer Torah, which was indeed given to Moshe by the Almighty.

But in Parashat Pekudei, where the Torah tells that Moshe placed the "eidut" inside the ark, it obviously cannot refer to the Sefer Torah, which is not written until much later, on the day of Moshe's passing. Rashi therefore explained this verse as speaking of the luchot ha-eidut, rather than the Sefer Torah.

The Maharal's approach, however, leaves unanswered the question of why Moshe placed the luchot inside the ark if God had instructed him only to place there the Sefer Torah. If the command in Parashat Teruma refers to the Sefer Torah, on what basis did Moshe decide to place the luchot in the aron?

The "Levush Ha-ora" therefore suggests a different approach to resolve the inconsistency in Rashi's commentary, arguing that the term "eidut" should be interpreted in a generic sense, as denoting any authentic, written record of God's laws. Hence, it refers to both the luchot as well as the original Sefer Torah. In his commentary to Parashat Teruma, Rashi sought to explain why Moshe before his death ordered that the Sefer Torah be placed in the ark, once he had already – some thirty-eight years earlier – placed the luchot there. Rashi therefore explained that "eidut" could also refer to the Sefer Torah. Since "eidut" means any authentic record of divine law, in the context of Parashat Teruma it should be understood as a reference to both the luchot as well as the Sefer Torah. Here, in Parashat Pekudei, Moshe obviously could place in the ark only the tablets, since the Sefer Torah had yet to be written. Accordingly, Rashi here defines "eidut" as referring specifically to the luchot.