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Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT VAYIKRA

By Rav David Silverberg

            Parashat Vayikra begins by outlining the laws governing korbenot nedava, voluntary offerings that one chooses to bring to God in the Mishkan.  God introduces this section by stating, "Adam ki yakriv mi-kem korban le-Hashem" – "A person among you who offers a sacrifice to the Lord…" (1:3).  Rashi, citing the Midrash (Vayikra Rabba 2:7), comments that the use of the word adam ("person") in this context is intended as a subtle reference to Adam Ha-rishon, the first human being.  God here tells Benei Yisrael, "Just as Adam Ha-rishon did not offer [a sacrifice] from stolen property, because everything belonged to him, so should you not offer [sacrifices] from stolen property."

            On the narrowest level of interpretation, the Midrash here seeks to convey the halakha disqualifying stolen goods for use as sacrifices to God.  The author of this passage may be expressing his preference for this verse over the other Biblical sources cited by the Talmud for this provision requiring rightful ownership over an animal (or grain) offered as a korban.

More generally, the Midrash perhaps underscores the message found repeatedly in the exhortations of the Nevi'im warning against the disproportionate focus on sacrificial rites at the expense of ethical values.  It appears from the Nevi'im that when the Midkash stood there were many who frequently brought sacrifices in the hope of earning expiation, while shamelessly engaging in ethical corruption.  The sacrificial rites offered Benei Yisrael the precious opportunity to draw inspiration and connect more deeply with the Almighty, but also posed the risk of displacing ethics and humble spirituality as the focal point of religious life.  This phenomenon is manifest most strikingly in a situation where an unrepentant sinner steals an animal to offer a sacrifice for the alleged purpose of connecting with God.  The Midrash draws upon this scenario to highlight the hypocrisy that can result when the Temple rituals are given priority over elementary ethics.  (See Rabbi Meir Tamari's Jewish Values in Our Open Society, Parashat Vayikra.)

We may suggest yet another explanation of this comment by the Midrash.  The Torah here introduces the institution of voluntary offerings, sacrifices that one is given the option to bring, while bearing no obligation to do so.  The parallel to Adam Ha-rishon is perhaps intended to instruct that voluntary measures of devotion must not come at the expense of anyone other than the one undertaking these measures.  A person who wishes to sacrifice to God must ensure to "sacrifice" only of himself, and not of others.  The clearest example of this message is Adam Ha-rishon, who enjoyed ownership over the entire earth; there was nobody who could suffer at all on account of his voluntary gestures.  When, however, a person lives among other people, there are situations where his religious devotion comes at the expense at those around him.  Time, energy and money expended in one area necessarily diminish from the resources available for one's other responsibilities.  The Midrash perhaps warns that when it comes to voluntary measures, one must ensure to sacrifice only from himself, and not from his responsibilities to others.  If these measures detract from his meeting his responsibilities to his family, neighbors and community, then he is not sacrificing from his own resources, but from those of other people.  "Just as Adam Ha-rishon did not offer [a sacrifice] from stolen property, because everything belonged to him, so should you not offer [sacrifices] from stolen property."  Beyond our strict obligations, we must never allow our religious devotion to interfere with our responsibilities towards other people, for if we do, then we sacrifice from "stolen property," and not from our own resources.

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            Towards the end of Parashat Vayikra, the Torah introduces the obligation of asham me'ilot, the guilt-offering required of someone who unknowingly misuses property belonging to the Temple treasury (5:14-16).  Rashi, commenting on the term me'ila used in reference to this violation, writes, "Ein me'ila be-khol makom ela shinuy" – "In all instances, me'ila means 'deviation'."  In this context, me'ila refers to the "deviation" of the hallowed property, which was designated for sacred purposes but is used for one's mundane needs.  Likewise, the term is often employed in reference to theft, where an object undergoes a "change" from one person's possession to that of another.

            Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi, in his work on Rashi's commentary, claims that the text of this comment by Rashi must be emended; specifically, he suggests omitting the phrase be-khol makom – "in all instances."  Not in every instance of the term me'ila does it denote "deviation" or "change."  Later in this parasha (5:21), this expression is used in the context of asham gezeilot, the guilt-offering required in certain cases where one falsely denied having somebody else's property in his possession.  These cases include those of tesumet yad, a loan, and oshek, unpaid salary.  If a borrower or employer falsely denies on oath owing the debt or salary, upon confessing he must pay the funds and bring an asham gezeilot.  In these instances, Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi observes, no property has unlawfully "changed" hands.  As opposed to situations of theft or a borrowed item, where the denier causes a "change" in the item's possession, in the cases of loans or salary one owes money that has never belonged to the other party.  Thus, if the Torah employs the term me'ila in reference to these cases, this word must bear a meaning other than "change" or "deviation."  Hence, Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi contends, Rashi could not possibly have written that in "all instances" me'ila means "deviation."

            The Panim Yafot dismisses this contention of Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi.  The Gemara in Masekhet Bava Metzia (48a) cites Rav Chisda as explaining the cases of tesumet yad and oshek as referring to situations where the borrower or employer designated a certain article in his possession as the means of payment.  It is not cash that the borrower or employer falsely denied owing, but rather a specific object that the parties agreed would serve in lieu of cash payment of the debt or salary.  If so, then his false oath indeed resulted in a "change" of ownership, as the item which should belong to the lender or employee is instead in the possession of the borrower or employer.  Accordingly, the Panim Yafot argues, Rashi's comments as they appear in prevalent editions are indeed correct in asserting that me'ila always has the connotation of "deviation," even in the context of tesumet yad and oshek.

            However, Rav Meir Ha-kohen of Warsaw, in his work Imrei Kohen (Warsaw, 5699), refutes this challenge advanced by the Panim Yafot.  The Torah here issues the demand that in cases of asham gezeilot the guilty party must return the item in question ("He shall return the stolen object that he had stolen…" – 5:23), but, as the Gemara there observes, the Torah makes no mention in this context of the case of a loan.  In this instance, the borrower who had falsely denied owing anything to the lender is not required to give the lender the item designated in lieu of payment.  (Obviously, he is still required to repay the borrowed sum.)  The reason, the Gemara explains, is that the lender never took possession of that item, as it has remained all throughout in the borrower's property.  It thus never became owned by the lender, and the borrower therefore is not required to relinquish it.  In the case of tesumet yad, the borrower must bring an asham gezeilot to atone for his false oath, but he is not required to surrender the designated article because it never came under the ownership of the lender.  Thus, Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi is correct in noting that the term me'ila cannot be interpreted in terms of "deviation" in the context of tesumet yad, since in this case the guilty party's denial did not result in the unlawful "deviation" of property.

            In defense of the Panim Yafot, the Imrei Kohen suggests that he (the Panim Yafot) followed Rashi's reading of the relevant passage in Bava Metzia, in his Talmud commentary, from which it appears that he understood the Gemara differently.  According to Rashi's reading, the Torah does not speak at all in this context of a simple case of tesumet yad, where a borrower falsely denies having an article designated as payment to a lender.  In such a case, not only is the borrower not required to surrender the article to the lender, he is not even required to bring an asham gezeilot.  When the Torah speaks here of tesumet yad as a case requiring an asham gezeilot, it refers strictly to a case where the borrower had given the item to the lender, who then either lent it back to the borrower or gave it to him for safekeeping.  But if the borrower had never given the designated item to the lender, then no asham gezeilot is required, because this case does not entail the unlawful possession of somebody else's property.

            Accordingly, the Panim Yafot is indeed correct in his challenge against Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi, as in this context, too, the term me'ila is used to mean "deviation," the attempt to unlawfully keep an item that rightfully belongs to another person.

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            The Torah instructs towards the beginning of Parashat Vayikra (1:3) concerning one who volunteers to bring an ola offering, "to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting shall he bring it, by his will."  Rashi cites the Torat Kohanim as interpreting the term yakriv oto ("he shall bring it") and li-rtzono ("by his will") as referring to two opposite concepts.  On the one hand, yakriv oto can be read to mean that a third party brings the individual, thus indicating that the authorities can exert force upon a person to compel him to fulfill his vow to bring an offering.  At the same time, however, the offering must be brought "by his will," and not through coercion.  This is accomplished, Torat Kohanim explains, by exerting force until the person declares, "Rotzeh ani" ("I want" to bring the sacrifice), expressing his desire to comply with the Halakha and bring his sacrifice.

            The Chatam Sofer suggests an additional interpretation of this phrase, based upon the connotations of yakriv oto and li-rtzono presented in Torat Kohanim.  According to the Chatam Sofer, these two terms may be reconciled differently, by explaining them as referring to two distinct stages.  Chazal comment that a korban ola is brought for "minor" transgressions, such as failure to perform a mitzvat asei or thinking improper thoughts.  We can perhaps imagine the sense of "coercion" such a person feels as he begins making his way towards Jerusalem.  After committing a minor offense, he must now take leave of his family and profession to travel to Jerusalem, spend a considerable sum of money for a suitable animal, and perhaps even face the humiliation of explaining to people why he must make this pilgrimage.  The Torah describes this stage of the process with the term yakriv oto, which, as Torat Kohanim explained, refers to begrudging and reluctant compliance.  But then, when the individual arrives in the Beit Ha-mikdash, he will likely be inspired by the presence of the Shekhina and the sight of the kohanim performing the avoda.  The uplifting experience of visiting the Beit Ha-mikdash will, in retrospect, give the person a sense of satisfaction over having taken the trouble and making the sacrifices involved in bringing the korban.  Thus, although the process begins with a feeling of yakriv oto, with a sense of compulsion and reluctance, in the end, he will bring the offering li-rtzono, with great joy, enthusiasm and gratification.

            Of course, this is true in all areas of religious life, including both Torah study and mitzva observance.  The initial steps often entail a sense of yakriv oto, of burden and hardship.  But once an individual struggles through the early stages and begins to see his growth and development, he is more likely to experience a profound feeling of li-rtzono, of joy and contentment seeing the results of his sacrifices and realizing the immense value of the tasks he has undertaken.

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            The Ramban, in his commentary to Parashat Vayikra (1:9), famously cites and rejects the Rambam's approach towards understanding the reason behind the Torah's sacrificial rite.  According to the Rambam, in his Guide for the Perplexed (3:46), God established the institution of sacrifices not due to their intrinsic value, but rather because Benei Yisrael had grown accustomed to such practices as a form of religious worship, as a result of their exposure to pagan custom in Egypt.  The Ramban objects, preferring the explanation that an animal sacrifice symbolizes the punishments a sinner deserves but is granted the opportunity to "transfer" onto the animal.  Later in this passage, the Ramban makes reference to a sod ne'elam ("hidden secret"), a Kabbalistic notion that underlies the institution of korbanot.  Of course, many other explanations have been suggested as well throughout the centuries.

            Among the more recent theories proposed to explain the reason behind the sacrifices is an idea presented by Rav Yehuda Gershuni, in his work Sha'arei Tzedek.  Rav Gershuni suggests that slaughtering and burning an animal on an altar symbolizes not what should have occurred to the individual himself, as the Ramban claimed, but rather the general notion of destruction.  In particular, it represents the destruction of the physical world.  The Torah sought to impress upon us the destructive quality of sin, that if people fail to meet their religious responsibilities, then the world loses its value and ought to be reduced to ashes.  Indeed, among the primary lessons of the story of the deluge is the earth's dependence on man's conduct.  If mankind becomes corrupt, the earth must be destroyed.  Since the entire earth was created solely for the spiritual progress of mankind, man's failure in this regard renders the physical world useless.

            A sinner brings a sacrifice not as an expression of what should or potentially could have happened to him, but rather to demonstrate his recognition of his having potentially "destroyed" the world through his wrongdoing.  Of course, this message conveyed to the violator is not intended to cause him despair and depression.  To the contrary, it is meant to drive him to repent and commit himself to improve, whereby he can contribute towards the ongoing progress, building and development of the world, rather than its demise.

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            One of the sacrifices described in Parashat Vayikra is the korban oleh ve-yoreid, or "the fluctuating sacrifice" (5:1-13), which is required in three instances of transgression: when a potential witness refuses to testify and falsely denies having relevant knowledge, one who mistakenly violates a vow or swears falsely, and a person who mistakenly transgresses the laws of tum'a, such as by entering the Temple unaware of his state of impurity.  This korban is termed "oleh ve-yoreid" ("fluctuating") because the offering depends on the violator's financial status.  The basic law requires a sinner in these situations to offer a sheep or goat as his sacrifice, but one who cannot afford such an offering brings instead two pigeons or turtledoves, one as a sin-offering and the other as an ola (burnt offering).  An especially destitute sinner, who cannot afford even the cost of two birds, brings a simple meal offering and thereby earns atonement.

            Ibn Ezra (5:7) raises the question of why an underprivileged sinner is required to bring two small offerings, both a chatat and an ola.  In standard cases, the violator brings but a single animal as a chatat (sin offering).  But when the Torah offers a dispensation to a needy person and allows him to bring a less costly sacrifice, it nevertheless requires that he bring an ola in addition to a chatat.  Why?

            Ibn Ezra suggests that the ola offered in this case corresponds to the offering of the eimurin in the standard case of a korban oleh ve-yoreid.  The eimurin are the parts of an animal that were placed on the altar as part of the sacrificial process.  However, when a bird is brought as a chatat, no part of the bird is burnt on the altar; its blood is sprinkled on the altar, but the bird itself is burnt outside the Mikdash.  Therefore, when a sinner brings a bird chatat in place of the more expensive sheep or goat, he must bring an additional bird as an ola, which is burnt upon the altar, to take the place of the eimurin.

            Ibn Ezra also cites a different interpretation in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak.  (Asher Weiser, in his annotation to Ibn Ezra's commentary in the Torat Chayim edition of the Chumash, claims that Ibn Ezra refers here to Rabbi Yitzchak Gaon, one of the earlier Geonim of Sura.)  Rabbi Yitzchak explains that when a person comes upon a situation where he must bring this korban, and he realizes that he can afford only a second-rate offering, he is reminded of his difficult financial situation.  This grim reminder may cause him to entertain thoughts and feelings and resentment towards God, who appears to have condemned him to a life of hardship.  Therefore, in addition to the sin-offering required to atone for the misdeed he committed, he must bring as well a korban ola, which, as Chazal famously comment, serves to atone for improper thoughts and feelings.

            Rabbi Benjamin Yudin ("Misfortune or a Fortunate Miss," http://torahweb.org/torah/2003/parsha/ryud_vayikra.html) compares this insightful explanation of Rabbi Yitzchak with a similar theory proposed by the Ramban, in his commentary later in Sefer Vayikra (14:18).  The Ramban seeks to explain why a metzora must bring both a chatat and an asham (guilt offering) as part of his purification process.  He suggests that the asham serves to atone for the sin on account of which he was stricken with tzara'at, whereas the chatat atones for his having questioned divine justice during his period as a metzora.  Recall that a metzora must reside in isolation outside his city, an experience which is both disruptive and humiliating.  The emotional distress that one likely suffers during this experience may drive him to blasphemy or to question the fairness of God's judgment.  The metzora atones for these feelings by offering an additional sacrifice, a korban chatat, as part of his purification process.

            The message, of course, that emerges from the extra bird offering in the case of a korban oleh ve-yoreid, and from the chatat of the metzora, is the importance of remaining steadfast in one's faith even during periods of hardship.  One must endeavor to recognize the Almighty's kindness in granting him what he has even when he has less than he desires, and overcome the natural tendency to feel resentful when confronting difficult challenges in life.

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            Yesterday, we discussed the sacrifice known as korban oleh ve-yoreid (Vayikra 5:1-13), which a person must bring in three situations:

1)   Shevu'at bituy – One mistakenly swore falsely, or uttered a vow which he neglectfully violated.

2)   Shevu'at ha-eidut – One falsely denied on oath having knowledge that qualified him to serve as a witness.

3)   Tum'at Mikdash u-kodashav – One mistakenly transgressed the laws of tum'a with regard to entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial meat.

What is unique about this sacrifice, as we discussed yesterday, is that the content of the offering depends on the individual's financial status, and for this reason it is referred to as oleh ve-yoreid, or "fluctuating."  The Torah issues the basic command, that a violator in these cases must bring a sheep or goat as a sin-offering, but then proceeds to allow underprivileged sinners to bring less expensive offerings.  This "fluctuation" is unique among all instances of sacrifices brought to atone for wrongdoing; we find a similar arrangement only in the cases of a woman after childbirth (12:8) and a metzora (14:21), who may likewise bring a less expensive offering if they cannot afford the basic korban.  Why did the Torah make this dispensation particularly in the cases of these transgressions?

            The Sefer Ha-chinukh (121) explains that the Torah allowed the poorer classes to bring a less expensive offering in these cases because they occur frequently, or at least more frequently than the other situations that require a sin-offering.  Given the relative frequency of these transgressions, the Torah wished not to overburden the poor and therefore allowed them to bring an inexpensive offering through which to earn atonement.  As for tum'at Mikdash u-kodashav, the intricate, complex system of halakhot that govern the realm of tum'a and tahara makes observance of these laws somewhat difficult.  It was not uncommon during the times of the Mikdash for a person to forgetfully tread on the area of the Temple or partake of sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, given the many detailed laws that apply in this regard.  With regard to shevu'at bituy, the Chinukh claims, sins involving speech are transgressed far more easily than sins committed through action, as people very often speak without first giving proper thought to what they wish to say.

            In particular, the Chinukh writes, the sin of shevu'at ha-eidut is (or was) quite common.  In addition to the fact that witnesses are always needed in every case brought before a court, many people fail to recognize the importance of testifying and the gravity of falsely denying having relevant knowledge.  When a person observes a certain incident, he sees himself as an innocent, unrelated third party who bears no responsibility towards the execution of justice.  Why, he likely asks himself, should he bear any obligation to inconvenience himself by rendering testimony, if he never volunteered to get involved in this affair to begin with?  Thus, the Sefer Ha-chinukh writes, it was common for witnesses to absolve themselves of this duty and justify false denial of knowledge, even under oath.

            The situation of shevu'at ha-eidut thus underscores the de facto state of mutual responsibility that each Jew bears towards one another.  Indeed, rendering testimony in a Rabbinical court constitutes a mitzvat asei (Rambam, Sefer Ha-mitzvot, asei 178; Chinukh, 120).  The Torah casts responsibility upon even "innocent bystanders" who never chose to become involved in the given dispute.  A person who has information with which he is capable of assisting his fellow – or is in any kind of situation where he can assist his fellow – must come forth, and cannot absolve himself of this duty by considering himself an unconnected third party.

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            In our last two editions of "S.A.L.T." we discussed the topic of korban oleh ve-yoreid, a sacrifice described in Parashat Vayikra (5:1-13) which is required in certain instances of Torah violation.  This korban is unique in that it demands a different offering for people of different economic classes.  The basic halakha requires offering a sheep or goat, whereas a poor person brings two pigeons or turtledoves.  A destitute sinner, who cannot afford even this sacrifice, brings a meal offering as his korban.

            The Sefer Ha-chinukh, in his discussion of this mitzva (121), states the universally accepted rule that if a person can afford a sheep or goat but chooses to nevertheless bring one of the cheaper korbanot, he does not fulfill his obligation.  Even though a poor man can satisfy his requirement with one of the lower-tier sacrifices, one who can afford a sheep or goat fulfills the mitzva only with the standard-level offering.

More surprisingly, the Chinukh asserts that the converse is also true: if a poor person is at a level of poverty that allows him to bring one of the inexpensive offerings, and he instead brings a sheep or goat, he has not fulfilled his obligation.  To explain the reason underlying this startling rule, the Chinukh suggests that the Torah thereby conveys the importance of spending within one's means.  The Torah disqualifies a korban that is more expensive than required because it does not wish for people to put themselves in difficult financial straits, even for the purpose of observing mitzvot.  All the more so, then, must one exercise care in spending generally, to ensure that he always has enough for his basic necessities.

            The Minchat Chinukh, along with many others, disputed this position of the Chinukh, arguing that a poor man who brings a sheep or goat as his korban oleh ve-yoreid has indeed fulfilled his obligation.  This is, in fact, the explicit ruling of the Rambam in Hilkhot Shegagot (10:13).  Furthermore, the Mishna in Masekhet Nega'im (14:12) writes that in the case of a metzora, whose purification process similarly requires offering a sacrifice that depends on his financial status, a poor metzora who brings the standard-level sacrifice has fulfilled his obligation.  In fact, the Rash Mi-Shantz, in his commentary to this Mishna, writes that such a metzora is to be commended for this selfless gesture (tavo alav berakha).  How, then, could the Chinukh rule that a poor person does not fulfill his korban oleh ve-yoreid obligation with a standard-level sacrifice, in direct contradistinction to the Mishna's ruling in Masekhet Nega'im?

            Rav Yerucham Perlow, in his work on Rav Saadia Gaon's listing of the mitzvot (asei 144), suggests explaining the Chinukh's comments to mean merely that a poor man should be discouraged from intensifying his financial straits by purchasing a costly sacrifice.  The Chinukh would certainly agree that a poor person satisfies his obligation with a standard-level sacrifice; he meant merely that the Torah frowns upon putting oneself unnecessarily in financial straits, even for the purpose of purchasing an expensive korban.  This reading of the Chinukh would reconcile his position with the Mishna in Nega'im, and would result in a debate between the Chinukh and the Rash Mi-Shantz as to the desirability of offering a more expensive korban than one can afford.  It should be noted, however, that this reading is quite difficult to impose upon the Chinukh's words: "If he is poor and brought a sheep or goat, he has not fulfilled his obligation."  This remark clearly implies that even after the fact, a poor person does not satisfy his requirement with an expensive korban.

            The Chatam Sofer (Shabbat 132a) defends the Chinukh's position by suggesting that the ruling of the Mishna in Nega'im refers only to the case of the metzora, and not to all instances of a "fluctuating" sacrifice.  As the Chatam Sofer notes, the Torat Kohanim infers this halakha, that an impoverished metzora can fulfill his obligation with a standard-level sacrifice, from a verse in Parashat Metzora (14:32).  That Chazal felt compelled to extract this halakha from a textual inference suggests that otherwise, a poor person would fulfill his obligation only through the sacrifice prescribed for people of his financial status.  Hence, in the cases of violations that require bringing a korban oleh ve-yoreid, where no such textual inference is made, a poor violator does not fulfill his requirement by bringing a standard-level sacrifice, as the Chinukh held.

            The question remains, however, as to why this should be the case.  Why would the Torah accept the standard-level korban of an impoverished metzora, but reject a similar gesture made by a sinner who must bring a korban oleh ve-yoreid?

            The Sefat Emet (Yoma 41b) explains that this distinction stems from the different natures of the dispensation given the poor in each of these cases.  A poor metzora brings the same three categories of sacrifices as a wealthy metzora – a chatat, asham and ola – the only difference being that for the chatat and asham he brings birds, rather than sheep.  In the case of a korban oleh ve-yoreid, by contrast, a poor sinner brings an entirely different korban: he is required to bring two birds as a chatat and ola, whereas a wealthy individual in this case brings a single animal as a chatat.  Hence, since a poor person requires both a chatat and ola, he cannot fulfill his obligation by bringing the standard-level sacrifice, with consists of only a chatat.