The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash
Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion
PARASHAT TZAV
by
Rav David Silverberg
In Parashat Tzav, the Torah briefly discusses the halakhot concerning utensils used to cook meat of korbanot chatat (sin offerings), and it distinguishes in this regard between earthenware utensils ("kelei cheres") and metal utensils (see 6:21). Earthenware utensils must be broken, whereas metal utensils may be reused if they undergo the procedure of "merika u-shetifa" – immersion in boiling water followed by rinsing in cold water.
A fundamental debate exists between the Rambam and the Ra'avad concerning the application of these laws. In Hilkhot Ma'aseh Ha-korbanot (8:14), the Rambam writes that generally, all utensils – both metal and earthenware - used for sacrificial meat are "kashered" (made reusable) through the process of merika u-shetifa. The rule mentioned in the Torah requiring that earthenware utensils be broken applies specifically to utensils used to cook meat of a korban chatat. Only regarding meat of the sin offering does the Torah preclude the possibility of kashering and demand the utensil's destruction. Kelei cheres used for the meat of other sacrifices, however, may be reused after merika u-shetifa. The Ra'avad considers this ruling "an error," and claims that earthenware utensils can never be kashered.
Indeed, the Ra'avad's position appears, at first glance, very compelling. For the Rambam's ruling seems to contradict one of the basic rules of kashering – rules which become particularly relevant this time of year, as Pesach approaches. The Gemara says in Masekhet Pesachim (30a), "The Torah testified about earthenware utensils, that the prohibited material does not ever leave its walls." Utensils used for cooking non-kosher food may not be then used for cooking kosher food because the taste of the cooked food is absorbed into the wall of the utensil over the course of cooking. This taste will then be extracted when the utensil is next used, thus rendering the food it cooks non-kosher. Therefore, these utensils may be used again only after undergoing the process of kashering, which is intended to expunge any previous particles from the walls of the utensils. Based on the Torah's requirement to break any earthenware utensils used for cooking meat of a chatat offering, the Gemara deduces that absorbed particles in earthenware utensils can never be expunged. This is precisely why the Torah allows for merika u-shetifa only for metal utensils, and does not allow for the kashering of earthenware utensils. Therefore, as we know from the laws of Pesach, earthenware utensils cannot be kashered for use on Pesach. (Similarly, an earthenware utensil used for cooking dairy foods may never be used for cooking meat.)
This basic principle would appear to entirely negate the Rambam's ruling. How can the Rambam allow merika u-shetifa for earthenware utensils used with sacrificial meat? Did not the Gemara establish that we have no means by which to extract all particles absorbed into the walls of an earthenware utensil?
Rav Chayim of Brisk suggested that the Rambam distinguishes between two cases: "hetera bala" and "issura bala" – meaning, between instances when the particles were permitted for consumption at the time they were absorbed, and when they were forbidden. The case discussed in the Torah is one of "hetera bala" – the utensils were used for cooking sacrificial meat permitted for consumption, and at that moment they absorbed particles from the meat. The particles become forbidden only later, when the time allotted for the consumption of the sacrificial meat ends, at which point the meat becomes forbidden for consumption – a prohibition called "notar." But at the time the utensil was used to cook the meat, the meat was permitted for consumption and hence the particles were absorbed in a state of "heter" (permissibility). If, however, one would cook non-kosher food, the utensil absorbs particles from forbidden food – "issur bala." This distinction will affect the status of earthenware utensil after kashering. In the Rambam's view, kashering an earthenware utensil accomplishes a partial extraction of taste from its walls. What remains in an earthenware vessel after kashering is a "ta'am kalush" – a slight flavor of the food previously cooked in the utensil. Now the halakhic status of a "ta'am kalush," Rav Chayim explains, depends on the circumstances. If this taste had already been forbidden, then reducing it to a "ta'am kalush" will have no effect; it will retain its forbidden status. If, however, a utensil absorbed taste of permissible food, and only after the taste was reduced into a "ta'am kalush" did the given prohibition set in, the prohibition would not affect the "ta'am kalush." Therefore, since one performs merika u-shetifa on the utensil before the sacrificial meat becomes notar (according to the Rambam; not all Rishonim agree on this point), the onset of the prohibition of notar cannot affect the "ta'am kalush" that remains after kashering.
In summary, the Rambam maintained that kashering an earthenware utensil has the effect of weakening the taste absorbed by the walls of the utensil. The resulting weak taste will retain its previous status: if it had already been forbidden before kashering, it remains forbidden; if it was permissible at the time of kashering, it cannot become forbidden afterwards, even if the given prohibition sets in at that point.
One problem, however, remains. If Rav Chayim's analysis is correct, then we should be allowed to kasher earthenware utensils for use on Pesach. Since the kashering takes place before the prohibition of chametz sets in, the chametz particles in the walls of the utensils should not become forbidden once Pesach begins, since they had already been reduced to a "ta'am kalush" through kashering. Why, then, according to the Rambam, may we not kasher earthenware utensils for Pesach?
Tomorrow we will iy"H address this question.
David Silverberg
*****
As we discussed yesterday, the Torah mentions in Parashat Tzav (6:21) that an earthenware utensil used for cooking the meat of a korban chatat (sin offering) must be destroyed. Metal utensils, by contrast, may be reused once they undergo "merika u-shetifa" – immersion in hot water followed by rinsing in cold water. The Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim (30a) explains that the Torah here establishes a generic principle that when an earthenware utensil is used for cooking and thus absorbs some taste of the cooked food, that taste can never be extracted. Therefore, once sacrificial meat is cooked in an earthenware utensil, that utensil can never be used again, since the meat becomes forbidden for consumption once its allotted time for consumption expires, and there is no method of removing all the taste from the utensil. Likewise, then, an earthenware utensil used for cooking non-kosher food may never be used again, and an earthenware utensil used for cooking meat may never be used for dairy (and vice versa). Finally, earthenware utensils may not be "kashered" for Pesach, for the same reason: the taste of chametz can never be fully removed from the utensil.
The Rambam, however, as we discussed, appears to contradict this rule established in the Gemara. Yesterday we presented the explanation given by Rav Chayim Brisker, who claimed that in the Rambam's view, kashering an earthenware utensil in fact does release the absorbed taste, but only partially, leaving behind a "ta'am kalush" ("weak" taste). Although forbidden taste will thus remain forbidden even after kashering, permissible taste cannot become forbidden when a given prohibition takes effect after kashering. Therefore, according to the Rambam, one may kasher earthenware utensils used for sacrificial meat (with the exception of meat of a chatat, to which special rules apply), because by the time the prohibition of "notar" sets in, the taste in the utensil has been reduced to a "ta'am kalush."
We were left, however, with one important question. According to Rav Chayim's theory, the Rambam should allow kashering earthenware utensils for Pesach. After all, if one kashers the utensil before the onset of Pesach and before chametz becomes forbidden, the chametz taste in the walls of the utensil reduces into a "ta'am kalush," which should not be susceptible to the prohibition of chametz. Why is it, then, that according to all views earthenware utensils cannot be kashered for Pesach?
Rav Soloveitchik zt"l answered by demonstrating a fundamental distinction between kashering utensils generally and kashering utensils for Pesach. In his discussion of the laws of kashering non-kosher utensils, the Rambam (Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Asurot 17:4) writes that non-kosher utensils used with hot water are kashered through immersion in hot water – "hag'ala." Nothing more is required. In the context of hilkhot Pesach, by contrast, the Rambam requires for these utensils not merely immersion in hot water, but also shetifa – rinsing in cold water after immersion. This requirement does not apply to kashering generally, and pertains only to the laws mentioned in Parashat Tzav, regarding utensils used with sacrificial meat.
What this demonstrates, Rav Soloveitchik explained, is that the laws of kashering for Pesach differ from the halakhot of kashering generally. Normally, kashering is required only to extract any forbidden taste that the utensil had absorbed. When it comes to Pesach, however, Chazal imposed an additional requirement when one wishes to use on Pesach pots that had been used with chametz. Beyond the practical need to eliminate all absorbed chametz, Chazal added a separate rule requiring chametz utensils to undergo a formal process before they can be used on Pesach. They decreed that we should treat chametz utensils before Pesach just as we would utensils used for sacrificial meat, where the Torah requires not only the elimination of absorbed taste, but also a separate, formal process, signified by the obligation of shetifa – rinsing in cold water. This rinsing has no physical effect upon the pot as does hag'ala, but is part of the formal process of "kashering" required by the Torah for utensils used for sacrificial meat, and which the Sages required for chametz utensils in preparation for Pesach.
On this basis Rav Soloveitchik explained why even the Rambam does not permit kashering earthenware for Pesach. Although, as we saw, in the Rambam's view, kashering earthenware utensils will prevent the chametz prohibition from taking effect upon the chametz taste embedded in the utensil's walls, it will not satisfy the second halakha – the formal process of kashering instituted by Chazal. Since the taste of chametz remains absorbed in these earthenware utensils, the utensil has a formal halakhic status of a "chametz utensil," and must therefore undergo the process of kashering. Given the impossibility of ever divesting an earthenware utensil of its chametz status (since at least a "ta'am kalush" of chametz will always remain), these utensils cannot be kashered for Pesach.
(Taken from Rav Menachem Genack's "Gan Shoshanim," 13)
David Silverberg
*****
Among the laws concerning sacrifices presented in Parashat Tzav involves the duration of time within which sacrificial meat may be eaten. The Torah writes that when a person offers a voluntary shelamim offering, he may partake of the meat for the remainder of that day and through the following day (7:16). The Torah introduces this rule in the context of its discussion of the korban toda (thanksgiving offering), which has the status of a shelamim offering but differs from other shelamim in that it must be eaten only that day and night, not the following day.
The Torah formulates the general rule concerning shelamim sacrifices as follows: "If the sacrifice he offers is a votive or freewill offering [as opposed to a korban toda], it shall be eaten on the day that he offers his sacrifice, and what is left of it shall be eaten on the morrow." The Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim (as understood by Rashi) asserts that the word "im" ("if") in the phrase, "Im neder o nedava" ("If… a votive or freewill offering") is superfluous, and must therefore come to allude to an additional offering to which this halakha applies. It therefore claims that this halakha, permitting the consumption of a shelamim for two days, applies as well to "chagigat yud-dalet" – the chagiga ("celebration") offering brought together with the korban pesach on Pesach eve. Unlike the korban pesach itself, which may be eaten only that night, the accompanying chagiga may be eaten through the following day, as well. This position in the Gemara runs in opposition to the minority view of Ben Teima (recorded in Pesachim, 70a), which equates the korban pesach and the accompanying korban chagiga. According to Ben Teima, just as one may not eat the meat of the korban pesach after the night of Pesach, so may the accompanying korban chagiga be eaten only that night.
The Gemara there notes that the halakha derived from this verse, permitting the consumption of this korban chagiga for two days, will affect our reading of a different verse, in Parashat Re'ei. There, in the context of the laws of korban pesach, the Torah writes, "none of the flesh of what you slaughter on the evening of the first day shall be left until morning" (Devarim 16:4). It appears from the simple reading of this verse that it refers to the korban pesach itself and forbids leaving over any of its meat past dawn. The Gemara, however, explains that "until morning" refers not to the morning of the 15th of Nissan – the first day of Pesach, but rather the morning after that – the morning of the 16th. This verse discusses not the korban pesach, but rather the accompanying korban chagiga, and permits partaking of its meat even past dawn on Pesach morning, throughout the first day of Pesach.
Returning to Parashat Tzav, the preceding verse establishes (as we mentioned) that a korban toda, unlike other shelamim offerings, may be eaten only the remainder of that day and that night. The Gemara in Masekhet Zevachim (36a) notes that the verse employs a seemingly peculiar phrase in referring to the korban toda: "zevach todat shelamav." For some reason, the Torah here emphasizes the fact that a korban toda classifies as a shelamim. It seems awfully strange that the Torah would place such emphasis on the toda's status as a shelamim specifically in a verse that establishes the toda's distinction from regular korbanot shelamim. The Gemara therefore explains that the word "shelamav" in this verse indicates that other types of korbanot shelamim also feature this irregular characteristic, that they may be eaten for only that day and that night. One of the korbanot mentioned by the Gemara is "shalmei pesach." What does "shalmei pesach" mean? Rashi, in his commentary there in Masekhet Zevachim, explains that this refers to the korban chagiga brought with the korban pesach. It thus turns out that according to this Gemara – as opposed to the aforementioned Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim – the chagiga accompanying the korban pesach resembles the korban pesach, and may be eaten only that day and that night.
At first glance, we might immediately associate this Gemara, as understood by Rashi, with the position of Ben Teima mentioned earlier. In other words, according to Rashi, the Gemara in Zevachim which forbids eating the chagiga after dawn on Pesach morning, follows the view of Ben Teima, who holds that the halakhot of the korban pesach apply to its accompanying chagiga, as well.
However, as Tosefot contend in Masekhet Pesachim (71b), it is difficult to explain the aforementioned Gemara in Zevachim as following Ben Teima's position. For as we noted, Ben Teima's view forbidding eating the chagiga after daybreak Pesach morning is but one application of a much broader theory. Ben Teima believes that Halakha equates the laws of the korban pesach and those of its accompanying chagiga. As a result of this equation, the time limitation on the consumption of the korban pesach applies to the korban chagiga, as well. But according to Rashi's reading of the Gemara in Zevachim, the Gemara derives this specific halakha restricting the consumption of the chagiga to one night from a verse in Parashat Tzav. This is not Ben Teima. Ben Teima has no need for a particular limud (extrapolation) to forbid eating the chagiga after dawn Pesach morning, for this evolves naturally from the general theory he espoused.
Tosefot therefore explain the Gemara in Zevachim differently. "Shalmei pesach" refers not to the chagiga, as Rashi explains, but rather to "motar ha-pesach," meaning, animals that were consecrated for use as a pesach offerings but for one reason or another were not offered for the korban pesach. Halakha requires that these animals be offered as korbanot shelamim. According to Tosefot, the Gemara in Zevachim establishes that the meat of these shelamim offerings, unlike standard shelamim offerings, may be eaten only until dawn of the following day.
How might we explain Rashi's understanding of the Gemara in Zevachim? Which position does it follow? It can't follow Ben Teima, for it requires a specific limud to extract the prohibition against eating the chagiga past dawn Pesach morning, and it most certainly can't follow the majority position, which allows eating the meat of the chagiga the following day, as well. Indeed, Rashi's explanation appears difficult to explain, and iy"H tomorrow we will discuss his view further.
David Silverberg
*****
Yesterday, we began discussing the debate recorded in the Gemara (Pesachim 69b-70a) between the Chakhamim and Ben Teima concerning the sacrifice known as "chagigat yud dalet" – the chagiga (or "celebration") offering brought together with the korban pesach on the 14th day of Nissan. According to the majority view of the Chakhamim, this chagiga offering, like most korbanot shelamim ("peace offerings"), may be eaten for the remainder of that day and through the following day. Ben Teima, by contrast, maintains that this chagiga shares the same halakhic properties as the korban pesach it accompanies. As such, the time frame allotted for its consumption is the same as that of the korban pesach, and thus this korban, like the korban pesach, may be eaten only during the night of Pesach, and not the following day.
Towards the end of yesterday's discussion, we noted the comment of the Gemara in Masekhet Zevachim (36a), commenting on a verse in Parashat Tzav regarding the korban toda (thanksgiving offering). The Torah (7:15) asserts that whereas most shelamim offerings may be eaten for two days, the toda, which generally falls under the category of korbanot shelamim, must be eaten by the morning after its offering. Based on the peculiar wording in this verse ("zevach todat shelamav"), the Gemara establishes that a number of other shelamim offerings also feature this peculiarity, among them "shalmei pesach." Rashi, as we saw, interprets this term as a reference to the chagiga accompanying the korban pesach. In other words, according to this Gemara in Zevachim, this chagiga may be eaten only until the following morning. Though instinctively we might claim that this Gemara follows the view of Ben Teima, this is not the case. Ben Teima holds that in all respects, the korban pesach and its accompanying chagiga are halakhically equivalent, and for this reason the chagiga may not be eaten after dawn on Pesach morning. But according to Rashi's reading of the Gemara in Zevachim, the Gemara deduces this halakha from the wording of a verse in Parashat Tzav. It thus turns out, seemingly, that the Gemara follows neither Ben Teima nor the Chakhamim!
One possible explanation for Rashi emerges from the Tosefta in Masekhet Pesachim (5:3), which introduces a middle position, in between those of Ben Teima and the Chakhamim. The Tosefta rules that any food that was served together with the korban pesach, including meat of the korban chagiga, must be burned together with the meat of the korban pesach at the end of the night. According to this position, intrinsically, the korban chagiga may be eaten throughout the following day, as well. However, a separate halakha requires that no food served together with the korban pesach may be leftover after dawn, so as to avoid confusion. Due to the concern that some meat of the korban pesach might be mistaken for meat of the chagiga, Chazal required destroying in the morning all meat – and in fact all food – served on the table together with the korban pesach. This halakha is codified by the Rambam (Hilkhot Korban Pesach 10:14). Now the Meiri, in his commentary to Masekhet Chagiga (7b), cites those who interpret the aforementioned berayta in Masekhet Zevachim in a similar vein. According to this approach, the berayta cited in Masekhet Zevachim, which Rashi interprets as limiting the consumption of the chagiga until Pesach morning, establishes this halakha as a precautionary measure. One may not eat the korban chagiga after the morning of the 15th only due to the concern that one may eat at that point meat of the korban pesach misidentified as meat of the korban chagiga. The Meiri suggests that those who espouse this reading of the berayta maintain that its reading of the verse in Parashat Tzav constitutes an "asmakhta" – a subtle allusion in the verse, rather than its primary reading. In other words, the prohibition against partaking of the chagiga after dawn is not a Torah prohibition, but rather a rabbinic ordinance to which Chazal found a subtle allusion in the Biblical text.
Perhaps this is how Rashi understood the Gemara in Zevachim. Fundamentally, the Gemara follows the view of the Chakhamim, that eating of the korban chagiga may continue throughout the first day of Pesach. But the berayta cited in this Gemara maintains – similar to the Tosefta in Pesachim – that Chazal forbade eating the meat of the chagiga after dawn out of concern for confusion. The berayta does not actually extract this halakha from the verse in Parashat Tzav, but rather invokes this reading as an "asmakhta." We might even claim that the Chakhamim would agree with this berayta. They perhaps argue with Ben Teima only on the level of Torah law, while agreeing that as a practical matter, the korban chagiga may not be partaken of after dawn.
In truth, however, it is difficult to ascribe this approach to Rashi, in light of his commentary to the Chumash. Commenting on the verse cited by the Gemara in Zevachim, Rashi adopts the Gemara's reading as his understanding of the verse (and here, too, he interprets "shalmei pesach" to mean the accompanying chagiga). Now if, we as we suggested, Rashi understood the Gemara's extrapolation of this halakha from the verse as an "asmakhta," as a secondary reading which the Torah likely never intended (a famous debate exists as to what "asmakhta" really means), it is hard to imagine that he would adopt this reading as his interpretation of the verse. Much has been and will be written regarding what Rashi means when he writes in several places in his commentary that he follows only the "peshat" (straightforward) reading, rather than the Midrashic reading. But in any event, it seems very unlikely that he would invoke an "asmakhta" reading of the Gemara as his primary interpretation of the verse in his commentary. Therefore, if Rashi includes in his commentary to Parashat Tzav the Gemara's reading of this verse, he presumably understood the Gemara as in fact deriving a Torah prohibition from this verse. According to this Gemara, then, this verse introduces the prohibition against partaking of the korban chagiga past dawn.
It would appear, therefore, that we have no choice but to explain that Rashi viewed this Gemara as presenting a third view. Unlike the Chakhamim, this view forbids partaking of the chagiga after the night of Pesach. But unlike Ben Teima, this view does not draw a halakhic equation between the korban pesach and its accompanying chagiga. Rather, a separate halakha derived from the phrase "zevach todat shelamav" in Parashat Tzav introduces this prohibition.
David Silverberg
*****
The Torah in Parshiyot Vayikra and Tzav describes the various categories of korbanot, including both mandatory korbanot (those required under certain circumstances), and voluntary offerings. The two primary groups of voluntary offerings are ola and shelamim. The korban ola was entirely burnt upon the altar, whereas the shelamim is divided between the altar, the kohen and the ba'alim (person or persons who bring(s) the offering).
Interestingly enough, we find conflicting sources regarding the relationship between these two types of korbanot. Rabbenu Bechayei, in his commentary (to 6:2), claims that the korban ola represents the highest stature among the korbanot. Instinctively, this is perhaps what we might have expected. The korban ola, which one offers entirely to God, retaining for himself no portion whatsoever, most sharply captures the essence of korbanot – the symbolic giving of oneself to the Almighty. Understandably, the korban shelamim, from which the individual actually receives the lion's share (the altar receives only the fats, and the kohen receives only the chest and right leg), represents a lower level of "sacrifice."
Surprisingly, however, the Zohar writes just the opposite. The first verses of Sefer Iyov mention as an example of Iyov's piety the fact that he would offer ola sacrifices to God to atone for his sons, in case they entertained blasphemous thoughts. (Chazal derive from this verse that the ola offering atones for inappropriate thoughts – Vayikra Rabba, 7:3.) According to the Zohar, it was precisely for this reason that the Satan was granted license to torment Iyov – because he offered ola sacrifices, rather than shelamim offerings. Why does the Zohar perceive the korban shelamim as a greater form of service to God than the ola offering? The Zohar cryptically explains, "He [Iyov] did not offer a sacrifice that would include it, as would have been proper." "It" here refers to the Satan, or, in Kabbalistic terminology, the "sitra achara" (literally, "other force," the force of evil in the world).
In the Zohar's view, the korban shelamim is of a higher spiritual quality than the korban ola specifically because it includes "it," it pacifies, as it were, the physical and base instincts of the human being. Whereas the korban ola rises entirely to God and in no way enhances a person physically, the shelamim brings a sense of peace and harmony between the physical and spiritual.
This
comment of the Zohar brings to mind a famous passage in the Ramban's commentary
(Vayikra 16:8) regarding the "se'ir ha-mishtalei'ach" – the Yom
Kippur sin-offering which is sent away to the wilderness and cast off a
cliff. The Ramban writes that on Yom
Kippur, God instructs us to bring an offering to the "other force." Although, as the Ramban stresses, clearly we are
to perform this ritual strictly to obey God's will, His command in this regard
resembles a king's order to offer a gift to one of his officers. On Yom Kippur, two special sin-offerings were
brought – one whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh ha-kodashim (innermost
sanctum of the
The Zohar appears to take a similar approach with regard to the korban shelamim. The greatness of the korban shelamim lies in the balance it strikes between the physical and the spiritual. It is often easier to bring a korban ola, to devote oneself entirely and exclusively to sanctity, denying oneself all forms of physical gratification, than to bring a korban shelamim – to partake of the physical world within the context of spirituality. In one sense, Rabbenu Bechayei is indeed correct: the ola offering signifies a higher level, for it involves total rejection of the physical and the mundane. Ultimately, however, it is the korban shelamim that best represents the practical aspirations of a Torah Jew: to walk along the fine line between indulgence and asceticism, gluttony and self-denial, excess and deprivation.
(Based on an a devar Torah by Professor Shalom Rosenberg)
David Silverberg
*****
The haftara reading for Shabbat Ha-gadol (the Shabbat immediately preceding Pesach), taken from the very final chapter of the Prophets (Malakhi 3), warns of the "great, awesome day of the Lord" (3:23), or Day of Judgment (see 3:5). The Almighty here famously promises that this otherwise frightening day will be preceded by the arrival of Eliyahu the Prophet, whose job it will be to prepare Benei Yisrael for judgment by inspiring them to perform teshuva: "He shall return the hearts of parents with the hearts of children, and the hearts of children with the hearts of parents, so that when I come, I do not strike the whole land with utter destruction."
During
Eliyahu's original stay on earth, he was unable to attain this goal. Eliyahu lived during one of the darkest
periods in Am Yisrael's spiritual history, when Achav, king of the
In our haftara, Malakhi foresees the day when Benei Yisrael will finally be ready for Eliyahu. The centuries of exile and oppression will gradually cleanse the Jewish people and prepare them for the arrival of Eliyahu. Only once we are prepared for him will he arrive to prepare us for the Day of Judgment.
Earlier, we mentioned the haftara's final verse, which describes Eliyahu's role upon his final return: "Ve-heishiv lev avot al banim ve-lev banim al avotam." Literally translated, this verse means, "He shall return the hearts of parents onto children, and the hearts of children onto parents." In our translation above, we followed the approach taken by several commentators (see Ibn Ezra, Radak) who interpret "al" ("onto") in this verse to mean "with." In other words, Eliyahu will inspire both parents and children to perform teshuva. Rashi, citing "Rabbi Menachem" (probably referring to the famous grammarian, Menachem Ben Saruk), explains differently, claiming that Eliyahu will have fathers bring their children to teshuva, and have children bring their parents to teshuva.
According to either interpretation, the question arises as to the significance of the parent-child relationship in this teshuva process. Why must the prophet emphasize that this process will affect parents and children together, or that it will involve the mutual impact of parents and children?
Rav Kook zt"l explained that "parents" and "children" in this verse represent two streams that invariably exist among the nation in every generation, each of which is potentially legitimate in its own right (though in practice often crosses the line of legitimacy), but is constantly at odds with the other. "Parents" symbolizes the conservative trend, the stubborn insistence on maintaining norms and traditions of the past and the resistance to change. "Parents," the older generation, usually frown upon innovation and reform. The "children," by contrast, seek to shake themselves free from the chains of the past and promote new ideas, tread uncharted territory, and introduce revolutionary theories. In Rav Kook's thought, each approach has merit and plays an important role in the spiritual development of the Jewish nation. While we obviously must passionately preserve the ancient laws and traditions of Sinai, we have always found ways to apply those ancient teachings to our current setting. The "children's" approach of creativity and ingenuity is to be encouraged, so long as it serves to perpetuate the teachings of the "parents," rather than oppose them.
When Eliyahu Ha-navi arrives, Rav Kook writes, he will show us how, once and for all, to unite and combine these two approaches. Throughout Am Yisrael's history, the "children," the innovators, have always sought to detach themselves from their heritage and distort it, rather than find new ways and venues to preserve it, promote it, and strengthen it. We therefore anxiously await the arrival of Eliyahu, who will help us find that delicate balance between preservation and innovation, and will reunite the "parents" of Am Yisrael with their "children."
David Silverberg
*****
The Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim (108a) brings two views concerning the obligation of heseiba (reclining). According to one position, a person is required to recline while drinking the first two cups of wine, for it is at this point of the seder when we commemorate – or relive – the onset of freedom. Appropriately, then, we must recline as a demonstration of freedom and royalty specifically while drinking these two cups. The second position maintains that to the contrary, we specifically should not recline until after the point where freedom has been finally established. Therefore, according to the second view, we must recline only while drinking the final two cups, which we drink after the point of achieving our freedom. In conclusion, the Gemara comments that no final decision has been made on this matter, and we therefore recline while drinking all four cups.
The Rishonim raise the question of why the lack of a conclusive decision warrants this stringency, of requiring heseiba for all four cups. Generally, when faced with an irresolvable doubt concerning a chiyuv de-rabbanan (obligation instituted by Chazal), we follow the lenient option. In this case, then, we should be allowed to recline for either the first two or last two cups. Why did Chazal impose this stringency, given that reclining constitutes only a chiyuv de-rabbanan?
The Ran discusses this issue and cites one answer from earlier sources. Very simply, this answer contends that since reclining does not involve much effort and exertion, the Gemara felt it appropriate to act stringently in this instance, despite the rule of safeik de-rabbanan le-kula (that we may act leniently when faced with a doubt concerning a rabbinic enactment).
The Ran himself, however, suggests a different explanation. In his view, the rule of safeik de-rabbanan le-kula does not apply in this case. At first glance, if we would apply this principle here, the Gemara would require reclining for either the first two or last two cups. But since it reached no definitive conclusion on this matter, on what basis will it decide which two cups require heseiba? As such, applying the rule of safeik de-rabbanan le-kula would dictate that we should not perform heseiba at all. For the moment we prepare to drink any one of the four cups of wine, a question arises regarding the obligation of heseiba. In each instance, therefore, we should apply this principle and absolve ourselves from the obligation to recline. Since this would do away with the entire institution of heseiba, the Gemara did not apply to this case the standard rule of safeik de-rabbanan le-kula.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in his chiddushim, raises an objection to the Ran's explanation, claiming that we can, indeed, apply the rule of safeik de-rabbanan le-kula in this case without eliminating heseiba altogether. True, when drinking the first two cups of wine, a doubt arises concerning the obligation of heseiba, and the safeik de-rabbanan rule allows us to follow the lenient position. But once we conclude birkat ha-mazon and prepare to drink the third cup of wine, we are now undoubtedly obligated to perform heseiba. For if Halakha follows the view that the final two cups require heseiba, then obviously one must perform heseiba at this point. And even if the correct position is the one requiring heseiba for the first two cups, once a person neglected to observe the heseiba obligation for the first two cups, he must do so for the final two. Thus, Rabbi Akiva Eiger contends, the Ran's question remains: why didn't Chazal apply the safeik de-rabbanan rule, which would exempt us from heseiba for the first two cups, while obligating us to recline while drinking the final two?
The Steipler Gaon zt"l, in his "Kehilat Yaakov" (Berakhot, 1), suggests the following answer. (The Steipler reads this approach into the Ran; for the sake of simplicity, we will present it independent of the Ran's comments.) A famous halakha that appears many times in the Talmud involves a scenario of two parallel roads, one of which contains a source of tum'a (such as a corpse). It is unknown, however, along which of these two paths the tum'a source is located. If two people walk along the two roads – each along a different road - and then want to know if utensils they touched subsequently must be considered tamei, the halakha depends on how they pose the question. If each person comes independently seeking halakhic guidance, we may consider each of them tahor, given the situation of doubt. If, however, they come together for guidance, we must consider them both tamei. Since we must determine the statuses of both people simultaneously, and we have no basis at all to consider one tahor instead of the other, we have no choice but to declare them both tamei.
The same rule, the Steipler claims, will apply in our situation. With the onset of Pesach eve, all mitzvot of the seder take effect simultaneously. At that moment, a decision must be made whether one must recline during the first two cups or during the last two. Since we have no reason to prefer one pair over the other, we have no choice but to require reclining for the drinking of all four cups, similar to the case of the two people who walked along the two paths and come together for a simultaneous halakhic ruling.
David Silverberg
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