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Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT TZAV

By Rav David Silverberg

In Parashat Tzav, the Torah outlines the laws concerning utensils in which sacrificial meat was cooked: "An earthen vessel in which it was boiled shall be broken; if it was boiled in a copper vessel, [the vessel] shall be scoured and rinsed in water" (6:21). The Gemara (Pesachim 30b; Avoda Zara 34a) explains that taste absorbed by the walls of earthen utensils can never be completely emitted. Therefore, since an earthen utensil used for cooking sacrificial meat will always contain taste particles of the meat, it may never be used again and must be broken. (The Rambam surprisingly rules in Hilkhot Ma'aseh Ha-korbanot 8:14 that this applies only to meat of a korban chatat – sin offering, but not to other sacrificial meat. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume the standard position, that this applies to all sacrificial meat.) Metal utensils, by contrast, can be purged of any absorbed taste; the Torah therefore allows scouring metal utensils used for cooking sacrificial meat before using them again.

The question arises, why did the Torah not allow reusing these utensils? What violation would be committed by eating sacrificial meat cooked in these utensils the following day?

The most obvious answer, which Rashi adopts in his commentary to Masekhet Avoda Zara (76a), is that we deal here with the issue of "notar" – the prohibition against eating sacrificial meat past the designated timeframe for its consumption. Since the taste absorbed by the walls of the utensils becomes "notar" once the given timeframe elapses, any food cooked in the utensils will absorb forbidden substance, and will thus itself become forbidden. The Torah therefore required expunging the forbidden particles from the utensil before using it again. When this is not possible, namely, when sacrificial meat was cooked in an earthen utensil, which can never completely emit absorbed taste, the utensil must be broken so that it is never used again.

Several writers, however, including Rabbenu Eliyahu Mizrachi, in his work on Rashi's commentary, and the Ri, cited in "Moshav Zekeinim," questioned this explanation. A famous halakhic principle establishes that if a taste of forbidden food is emitted into permissible food, it renders the permissible food forbidden only if contributes a favorable taste. When, however, the taste is spoiled, it does not render the mixture forbidden. According to one view in the Gemara, if a utensil absorbed taste, already the next morning the taste becomes spoiled and will have a negative impact on any food into which it is emitted. The question thus arises, why does the Torah forbid reusing a utensil in which sacrificial meat had been cooked? After all, the earliest point at which sacrificial meat becomes "notar" is the morning after the day of its offering, and by that point, at least according to one view, the taste in the walls of the utensil can no longer render other food forbidden!

Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi suggests, quite simply, that since the meat becomes "notar" at the exact same moment as the taste spoils, we cannot implement the "spoiled taste" rule. The taste becomes "notar" at daybreak, since it had not become spoiled before the onset of the "notar" prohibition. And once the "notar" prohibition takes effect, the Torah thus requires scouring or breaking the utensil, despite the fact that the taste will momentarily become spoiled and thus will be unable to render other food forbidden.

It is hard to understand, however, why the Torah requires scouring or breaking the utensil just because the "notar" prohibition took effect. Still, once the taste becomes spoiled, there appears to be no reason to forbid using the utensil, since the food subsequently cooked in the utensil cannot become forbidden by virtue of these spoiled taste particles. This answer, therefore, seems unsatisfactory.

The "Moshav Zekeinim" suggests a different solution, that eating sacrificial meat that had absorbed a spoiled taste violates the requirement that sacrificial meat be eaten at a high standard of dignity and nobility. The Torah requires that one partake of the meat of korbanot in a dignified, regal manner, and it therefore could not allow cooking it in a utensil containing spoiled taste.

Other Rishonim, however, suggested that the scouring and breaking are required not to prevent one from eating "notar," but rather to fulfill the obligation of destroying "notar." Later in Parashat Tzav (7:17), the Torah requires destroying any sacrificial meat that became "notar." The Ramban (in Pesachim), Meiri (in Pesachim) and Ran (in Avoda Zara) argue that this obligation applies as well to the taste of sacrificial meat absorbed in the utensils. The Torah therefore required expunging the taste absorbed by metal utensils by scouring them. When it comes to earthen utensils, however, there is no possibility of expunging the "notar" taste. The Torah therefore required destroying the utensil. Although this obviously does not eliminate the actual taste particles, it is the method that most nearly resembles "destruction," in the sense that the utensil is no longer usable, and therefore serves to fulfill the obligation of destroying "notar."

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Yesterday, we discussed the verse in Parashat Tzav (6:21) that presents the guidelines concerning utensils used to cook sacrificial meat. The Torah requires expunging the taste of sacrificial meat absorbed in metal utensils by scouring them; earthen utensils, however, must be broken. The Gemara (Pesachim 30b; Avoda Zara 34a) derives from this verse a fundamental principle concerning earthen utensils: they are incapable of fully emitting taste absorbed in their walls over the course of cooking. Therefore, whenever an earthen utensil absorbed forbidden taste, it may never be used again.

Tosefot (Pesachim 30b; Zevachim 96a) question how the Gemara arrived at a general halakhic principle on the basis of this verse. After all, who is to say that the Torah required destroying an earthen utensil because it cannot emit absorbed taste? Perhaps the Torah here presents a "gezeirat ha-katuv" – a divine decree with no easily accessible rationale – forbidding subsequent use of an earthen utensil in which sacrificial meat had been cooked? What evidence does the Gemara have that this law is based upon some unique characteristic of earthenware? Tosefot answer, quite simply, that the distinction drawn by the Torah between earthenware and metal utensils strongly suggests that the difference in physical properties underlies these halakhot. It stands to reason, then, that the Torah forbade the reuse of earthen utensils because they cannot completely emit absorbed taste.

The Taz (Y.D. 93:1) raises a different question concerning the Gemara's deduction. This verse here appears in the context of sacrificial meat; it deals with utensils used in cooking korbanot. On what basis does the Gemara apply the guidelines established in this context to regular foods, as well? Perhaps the unique stringency regarding earthen utensils applies only within the realm of kodashim (sacrificial food), but not when dealing with chulin (non-sacred food)?

The Taz claimed that this question led the Ba'al Ha-itur (a work by one of the Rishonim) to conclude that indeed, according to Torah law, even earthenware utensils can be "kashered" – meaning, can emit forbidden taste through scouring. The provision requiring the destruction of earthen utensils with absorbed taste applies only to utensils used to cook sacrificial meat. With regard to other prohibitions, however, even an earthen utensil can be kashered according to Torah law. It was Chazal who later extended the unique stringency regarding kodashim to all prohibitions, and for this reason we may not generally kasher earthen utensils.

The Taz postulated this theory in order to explain a controversial ruling of the Ba'al Ha-itur regarding an earthen, meat pot in which one mistakenly boiled milk. According to the Ba'al Ha'itur, if it can be determined that the absorbed meat taste amounted to less than one-sixtieth of the quantity of milk, then after twenty-four hours one may use the pot for either milk or meat. The Taz explains that in the Ba'al Ha-itur's view, the entire concept that an earthen pot cannot be kashered is rabbinic in origin. Likewise, according to all views, the prohibition against using a dairy pot for meat (or versa) after a twenty-four-hour waiting period is also a decree enacted by Chazal. In our case, then, where the person would have to discard the utensil, and in any event we deal with two rabbinic decrees combined together, we may rule leniently, and use the pot for cooking either meat or milk.

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Over the last two days, we have discussed the principle that the Gemara (Pesachim 30b; Avoda Zara 34a) derives from a verse in Parashat Tzav (6:21) regarding earthen vessels. Namely, any taste absorbed by an earthen utensil through cooking can never be fully expunged thereafter. Therefore, if an earthen utensil absorbed forbidden food, it may never again be used for cooking; by the same token, an earthen pot used for cooking meat can never be used for cooking milk, and vice-versa. Yesterday, we presented the novel theory of the Taz, which he ascribed to the Ba'al Ha-itur, claiming that this entire provision constitutes a rabbinic enactment. According to Torah law, only with regard to sacrificial meat do we assume that absorbed taste cannot be expunged; when it comes to other forbidden foods, however, it is only Chazal who forbade subsequent use of an earthen utensil with absorbed forbidden taste.

Rav Shemuel Eliezorov, in his "Devar Shemuel" on Masekhet Pesachim, raises a fairly obvious difficulty against the Taz's theory. How can the Torah distinguish between different areas of Halakha with regard to the physical properties of an earthenware vessel? Once it is determined that an earthen utensil does not fully emit taste it absorbed from sacrificial meat, how can we claim that it can fully emit taste absorbed from regular meat?

Rav Eliezorov explains that according to the Taz, although an earthen utensil cannot fully emit absorbed taste, whatever taste is not expunged as a result of scouring will not be emitted thereafter, either. Therefore, as far as Torah law is concerned, an earthen utensil that absorbed forbidden taste may be used after "kashering." In our parasha, where the Torah requires destroying earthen utensils that absorbed the taste of sacrificial meat, it does so for a different reason entirely: the obligation to destroy "notar." As we discussed two days ago, several Rishonim claim that one must destroy the earthen utensil because the Torah requires destroying all sacrificial meat left over past the specified timeframe in which it may eaten. The Torah applied this obligation even to the taste of sacrificial meat absorbed in the walls of the utensils in which it was cooked. Although obviously one cannot actually destroy the absorbed taste, the Torah required either expunging the taste through the "kashering" process, or, in the case of earthenware, destroying the utensils, which in some sense eliminates the absorbed taste, as well. Of course, all this should have no effect on other forbidden foods whose taste has been absorbed by an earthen utensil. In these cases, there should be no reason at all to forbid using the earthen utensil after "kashering," since any taste that was not expunged during "kashering" will neither be emitted into food cooked in the pot. It was only Chazal, the Taz claims, who forbade using an earthenware vessel with absorbed forbidden taste even after "kashering."

Interestingly enough, if we accept this reading of the Taz's comments, then we may detect a consistent pattern of thought in the Taz's writings. For in his work on Rashi's commentary to the Torah ("Divrei David Turei Zahav"), the Taz indeed adopts this approach to the requirement to destroy earthenware utensils used for cooking sacrificial meat. He strongly rejects Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi's position (which we discussed two days ago), that the utensil may not be reused because the forbidden taste of "notar" will then be emitted into the food cooked in the utensil. Instead, he formulates the approach described here, viewing the requirement to break the utensil as a fulfillment of the obligation to destroy "notar." It turns out, then, that the Taz's comments in his work on Shulchan Arukh Yoreh Dei'a can be more clearly understood in light of the position he adopts in his work on Rashi's commentary to the Torah.

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We have been discussing this week the verse in Parashat Tzav (6:21) that establishes the rules concerning utensils used in cooking sacrificial meat. The Torah requires destroying earthenware utensils that had been used for this purpose, where metal utensils may be used again after being scoured.

This "scouring" required for metal utensils is described by the Torah with two words: "u-morak ve-shutaf." The Gemara in Masekhet Zevachim (97a) records a debate between Rebbi and the Chakhamim as to the precise definition of these terms. According to the majority view of the Chakhamim, which is the accepted position, "merika" refers to immersion in boiling hot water, whereas "shetifa" denotes rinsing in cold water. Pots used for cooking sacrificial meat thus required a two-step process of "kashering": immersion in hot water, followed by rinsing in cold water. Tosefot and most other Rishonim maintain that the second stage, shetifa, was required only when "kashering" pots used with sacrificial meat. In all other cases when one must "kasher" a metal utensil, he need not rinse it in cold water after immersing it in hot water. The Rambam, however (Hilkhot Chametz U-matza 5:23), maintains that the process of "kashering" utensils for Pesach likewise requires the second stage of shetifa.

The Hebrew verb "sh.t.f.," from which the term "shetifa" evolves, is a very familiar word that occurs many times in Tanakh in reference to flowing water, either in the context of washing or in describing floodwaters. The root "m.r.k.," by contrast, is much less common. Rashi, in his commentary to this verse, associates the word "morak" used here with a phrase in Megilat Ester. In describing the cosmetic procedure underwent by the girls under consideration for the position of queen of Persia, the verse tells that the process consisted of "six months with oil myrrh and six months with perfumes and 'tamrukei ha-nashim'" (Ester 2:12). According to Rashi, the word "tamrukei" stems from the verb "m.r.k.," as in the "scouring" required of utensils used for sacrificial meat. What precisely does this term mean?

Rav Yaakov Mecklenberg, in his "Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala," explains that "m.r.k." denotes extracting something absorbed in another substance. Its usage here in Parashat Tzav is clear; as we've discussed this week, the Torah here requires expunging the absorbed taste of sacrificial meat from the walls of the pot. In Megilat Ester, Rav Mecklenberg explains, "tamrukei ha-nashim" refers to cosmetics that thoroughly cleanse the skin and remove all dirt from the pores. Rav Mecklenberg extends this definition to explain the etymology of the familiar Hebrew word "marak" – soup, or broth – a term that appears very rarely in Tanakh – only in Sefer Shoftim (6:19-20) and Sefer Yeshayahu (65:4). Soup is a liquid that contains flavor extracted from another substance – such as chicken or vegetables – and is thus referred to with the term, "marak."

Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch similarly defines the verb "m.r.k." as "to free a material from foreign ingredients which have penetrated into it." He suggests a relationship between this word and the Hebrew word "morag" (Shemuel II 24:22; Yeshayahu 41:15; Divrei Hayamim I 21:23), a threshing tool. The "morag" frees the grains, so-to-speak, from their husks, and its name thus evolves from the root "m.r.k." Similarly, Rav Hirsch explains, a verse in Sefer Divrei Hayamim II (4:16) makes reference to "nechoshet maruk," which Rav Hirsch defines as "polished copper" – copper from which all dirt and sediment had been removed.

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The advent of audio technology has given rise to many intriguing halakhic questions, among them the issue of conducting a public Megila reading with the aid of a microphone. On Shabbat and Yom Tov, of course, the halakhic authorities generally forbid using microphones for reasons involving the prohibitions on Shabbat. On Purim, however, these prohibitions do not apply, and thus the question arises as to whether a congregation may use a microphone for Megila reading in order to increase and enhance the reader's audibility. (The concern for amplification becomes particularly important on Purim eve, when scores of festive, masked children – "kein yirbu" – flock to the synagogue to display their costumes and drown out the name of Haman. Very often, the noise they produce interferes with the Megila reading and, in many instances, prevents the adults from fulfilling their obligation to hear every word of the Megila.)

Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, in his "Mikra'ei Kodesh" (Megila, chapter 11), allows using a microphone for Megila reading, arguing that for purposes of this obligation, even hearing an echo or secondary amplification of the reading suffices. Rav Frank extracts this distinction from the mishna in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (27b), which addresses a case of one who blows a shofar on Rosh Hashanah into a cave or some other enclosed chamber. The mishna establishes that if the person heard only the echo of the shofar blast, rather than the original shofar sound itself, he has not fulfilled his obligation of shofar. The mishna then proceeds to address a different issue: "One who was passing behind a synagogue or whose house was situated near the synagogue and heard the sound of the shofar or the sound of the Megila – if he concentrated, he fulfilled his obligation; otherwise, he did not fulfill his obligation." Rav Frank observes that with regard the first issue, of the echo sound, the mishna speaks only of shofar blowing, whereas when it comes to the second issue, regarding the need for concentration, the mishna refers to Megila reading, as well. Apparently, he concludes, the echo disqualification applies only to the mitzva of shofar, and not to the mitzva of Megila. Therefore, one fulfills his obligation of Megila by hearing it through an amplification device.

Rav Frank explains this distinction between these two mitzvot – shofar and Megila – based on the famous position of the Rambam regarding the fundamental definition of the shofar obligation. According to the Rambam, the mitzva of shofar requires one to hear the shofar sound. This view is in contrast to Rabbenu Tam's position, which defines the obligation as requiring one to blow the shofar. According to Rabbenu Tam, those listening to shofar blowing fulfill their obligation through the halakhic vehicle of "shomei'a ke-oneh," which renders one listening to a recitation equivalent to the one reciting it. But normative Halakha follows the Rambam's definition, that the mitzva of shofar requires listening, and for this reason one does not fulfill the obligation if he hears only the echo. Therefore, this disqualification will not affect the obligation of Megila reading, which, according to all views, requires reading, rather than listening. Hence, in Rav Frank's view, a microphone may be used for this reading. (This is also the position of the Munkatcher Rav, in Minchat Elazar 2:72, who rules that even "le-khatechila" one may use a microphone for Megila reading.)

Most other authorities, however, do not allow the use of a microphone for Megila reading. In what has become a landmark ruling on the general issue of microphones and similar audio devices (such as telephones and radios), Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l, in Minchat Shelomo (9), presents a summary of correspondences he conducted with scientists as to the mechanics of these contraptions. On the basis of these discussions, he concluded that the resultant sound is not the sound produced by the human voice; the amplification is a new sound created by the given instrument. Therefore, when the Megila is read with a microphone, the audience does not hear the actual reading, and they therefore do not fulfill their obligation. According to Rav Shlomo Zalman, listening to Megila reading through amplification is mechanically equivalent to hearing an audio recording of the reading, and thus one cannot fulfill his obligation in this manner. (Others have responded that even the initial sound produced by the human larynx is nothing more than a series of sound waves that travel through the air and reach the listener's ear. Therefore, if these waves are amplified such that they can travel a greater distance, the sound should be no less than the original human voice.)

In any event, standard practice among halakhically observant communities is to refrain from using microphones for the reading of the Megila on Purim.

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The opening mishna of Masekhet Megila discusses when the Megila is to be read in various types of locations, and mentions the various exceptions that apply. The two basic categories that have practical application nowadays are cities that were walled at the time of Benei Yisrael's initial entry into Eretz Yisrael, and everywhere else. The locations in the first category read the Megila and celebrate Purim on the 15^th of Adar, whereas all other locations observe the festival on the 14^th. Today, Jerusalem is the only contemporary city which we know for certain was surrounded by a wall at the time of Benei Yisrael's initial conquest of the land. Therefore, Jerusalemites even today read the Megila on the 15^th of Adar. Several other cities in Israel, including Tiberias, Chevron, Tzefat, Shechem, Haifa, Acre, Jaffa, Lod, Ramleh, Jericho and Bet-She'an, have the practice to read the Megila on both the 14^th and 15^th, due to the uncertainty regarding their status. (This list is taken from "Piskei Teshuvot" 688:7, based on the "Pe'at Ha-shulchan" and Rav Tuketchinsky's "Sefer Eretz Yisrael.")

In addition, the mishna discusses the situation when either the 14^th or 15^th of Adar occurs on Shabbat, and rules that the Megila is not read on Shabbat. Rather, if the 15^th occurred on Shabbat, then both groups of cities read on Friday the 14^th. And should the 14^th fall on Shabbat, then the open cities conduct the reading on Thursday the 13^th. Since Thursday was a "market day," when surrounding villages – who would otherwise not have a minyan for the reading – come to the big cities to sell their produce, the Rabbis instituted that in such a case the cities should read on Thursday, so that the villagers can join them.

With the establishment of the fixed calendar system during the Talmudic period, the 14^th of Adar can never occur on Shabbat. The 15^th, however, can fall on Shabbat, albeit very rarely, as it does this year (5765). This year, therefore, even Jerusalemites read the Megila on Thursday night and Friday morning, just like other communities.

The Gemara (Megila 4b) cites two reasons as to why Chazal forbade reading the Megila on Shabbat. After all, reading from a scroll does not entail any Shabbat violation; in fact, we read from the Sefer Torah every Shabbat throughout the year! Rabba, as cited by the Gemara, explains that Chazal enacted this prohibition because many people lack the skills required to properly read the Megila, and one might therefore mistakenly bring his Megila to a professional reader for training. In order to help prevent this violation (of carrying through a public domain on Shabbat), the Rabbis outlawed Megila reading on Shabbat. As the Gemara mentions, similar concerns led Chazal to suspend the mitzvot of lulav and shofar when their respective festivals – Sukkot and Rosh Hashanah – fall on Shabbat.

Rav Yosef, by contrast, suggests a different reason for the provision forbidding Megila reading on Shabbat. A separate obligation – "matanot la-evyonim" – requires distributing money or gifts to the poor on Shabbat. Rav Yosef observed that the poor always anxiously anticipated the Megila reading, when the entire community would assemble in the synagogue, looking forward to their opportunity to receive the assistance they needed. On Shabbat, of course, it is forbidden to distribute money or gifts, and Chazal therefore transferred the Megila reading to a day when charity can be given.

Tosefot wonder why Rav Yosef found it necessary to add a second reason for this enactment. After all, as mentioned, Rabba's reason applies not only to Megila reading, but to shofar and lulav, as well. Since, presumably, Rav Yosef accepts Rabba's reason as it applies to those mitzvot, why did he insisting on suggesting a second reason for the ban against Megila reading on Shabbat?

Tosefot answer that Rav Yosef considered Rabba's explanation insufficient with respect to Megila reading. A famous halakhic principle establishes that "ein shevut ba-Mikdash" – rabbinic measures enacted to safeguard the Biblical prohibitions of Shabbat do not apply in the Temple. Accordingly, if we accepted only Rabba's explanation for the suspension of Megila reading on Shabbat, it would follow that in the Temple, the Megila would be read even when Purim fell on Shabbat. Rav Yosef held that this is not the case, and therefore had to provide an additional reason for the suspension, one that would apply even in the area of the Mikdash.

The "Turei Even," however, raises a compelling difficulty against Tosefot's answer. The first mishna of the fourth chapter of Masekhet Sukka states explicitly that the mitzva of lulav was generally suspended on Shabbat even in the Temple. Only when the first day of Sukkot – which has a unique status with respect to the lulav obligation – occurred on Shabbat was the lulav taken in the Beit Ha-mikdash. Apparently, the "Turei Even" notes, the principle of "ein shevut ba-Mikdash" does not apply in this regard. He explains that "ein shevut ba-Mikdash" pertains only to intrinsically Temple-related issues, matters involving sacrifices and the like. In this regard, the kohanim were not bound by safeguard measures enacted by the Rabbis. Regarding, however, other issues that do not directly relate to specifically Temple-related concerns, such as lulav and Megila, these rabbinic prohibitions indeed applied even in the Beit Ha-mikdash.

We should note, however, that the shofar was sounded in the Temple even on Shabbat, despite the fact that this was forbidden in all other locations. And Rashi, in his commentary to Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (29b), indeed explains this halakha based on the principle of "ein shevut ba-Mikdash." At first glance, Rashi appears to apply the "ein shevut ba-Mikdash" rule even beyond the realm of Temple-related matters, which would appear to contradict the halakha regarding lulav, as mentioned earlier.

We might explain Rashi's position in light of a passage earlier in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (26a), which explains that a cow's horn may not be used for the mitzva of shofar because it is reminiscent of the golden calf. The Gemara comments that generally, this concern applies only to rituals performed in the kodesh ha-kodashim (innermost sanctum of the Mikdash), and thus the kohen gadol wears gold garments – which also bring to mind the golden calf – when performing the service outside the kodesh ha-kodashim. Nevertheless, the Gemara insists, this rule applies even to the shofar, which is of course blown outside the kodesh ha-kodashim. The Gemara explains, "Since it [the shofar blowing] is for remembrance, it is like it is performed inside [the kodesh ha-kodashim]." Needless to say, this remark requires further elaboration. For our purposes, however, this concept perhaps allows us to consider the mitzva of shofar an intrinsically Mikdash-related obligation. For good reason, then, Rashi applies to this mitzva the principle of "ein shevut ba-Mikdash."

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Yesterday, we discussed the halakha forbidding Megila reading when Purim occurs on Shabbat. Practically speaking, since the 14^th of Adar never occurs on Shabbat, this halakha is relevant nowadays only on a year such as this one (5765), when the fifteenth of Adar – the day when Purim is normally celebrated in Jerusalem – falls on Shabbat. In such a situation, Jerusalemites read the Megila together with other communities, on Thursday night and Friday. As we saw, the Gemara (Megila 4b) records two reasons as to why Chazal prohibited Megila reading on Shabbat. Rabba explains this halakha as resulting from the same concern that led Chazal to suspend the mitzva of lulav when Sukkot falls on Shabbat, and shofar blowing when Rosh Hashanah occurs on Shabbat. Namely, there is concern that one may bring the given item (Megila, lulav or shofar) to a professional to learn how to properly use it, and may thereby violate the prohibition against carrying through a public domain on Shabbat. Rav Yosef, however, claims that the halakha pertaining to Megila stems from a different concern – to allow the poor to collect their "matanot la-evyonim" when the Megila is read, which they clearly cannot do on Shabbat. As we discussed, Tosefot ask why Rav Yosef found it necessary to present an additional reason. Given that Rav Yosef accepts Rabba's reason as it applies to shofar and lulav, why must he suggest a new reason with respect to Megila? Seemingly, there must be some practical difference between these two reasons, which prompted Rav Yosef to argue with Rabba.

Rav Katriel Aharon Natan, in his work "Keter Ha-melekh" (Warsaw, 5656), suggests a number of practical ramifications of this debate between Rabba and Rav Yosef. The Gemara (Megila 14a) cites two views as to why hallel is not recited on Purim. One view explains that the Megila reading fills the role of the hallel recitation, whereas the second view claims that hallel is not warranted at all on Purim, given that our liberation on Purim was incomplete. Several writers noted that according to the first view, that the Megila reading substitutes for hallel, communities who do not have access to a Megila should recite hallel on Purim. At first glance, this view would also require the recitation of hallel when Purim falls on Shabbat and the Megila is thus not read. However, the "Keter Ha-melekh" writes, in situations where hallel is recited instead of the Megila, the poor naturally depend on the public hallel recitation – instead of the Megila reading – as their opportunity to receive the assistance they need. Therefore, if hallel would be read instead of the Megila on Shabbat, the poor would lose their opportunity to receive their charitable gifts.

The "Keter Ha-melekh" suggests that for this very reason, Rav Yosef found it necessary to explain the prohibition against Megila reading on Shabbat as stemming from the concern for the poor. Without this reason, in Rav Yosef's view, communities would read hallel on Shabbat in place of the Megila, and the poor would lose their opportunity for collecting charity. He therefore explains that Chazal specifically sought to ensure that the needy receive their donations, and thus forbade both Megila reading and the hallel recitation on Shabbat. Rabba, by contrast, followed the view that hallel is not warranted on Purim at all, and thus it is not recited even if the Megila cannot be read. Therefore, Rav Yosef's concerns do not apply, and there is no reason to advance an additional reason for the prohibition against Megila reading on Shabbat.

It turns out, then, albeit in a convoluted, "pilpulistic" fashion, that Rabba and Rav Yosef debate the issue of whether Megila reading takes the place of hallel on Purim, or if hallel on Purim is altogether unwarranted. As the "Keter Ha-melekh" himself notes, however, the Rambam appears (at least at first glance) not to accept this approach. For on the one hand, he follows Rabba's explanation, that Megila reading is not permitted on Shabbat due to the concern for Shabbat violation (Hilkhot Megila 1:13), while at the same time codifying the position that the Megila reading substitutes for the hallel recitation (ibid. 3:6).

The "Keter Ha-melekh" proceeds to suggest an additional ramification of the debate between Rabba and Rav Yosef. The Gemara (Megila 4a) comments that when Purim falls on Shabbat and the Megila is thus read earlier, people must study material related to Purim on Shabbat in order that they recall that Purim occurs that day, even if the Megila is not read. According to the "Keter Ha-melekh," this applies only according to Rabba's explanation, that Megila reading is forbidden on Shabbat to prevent Shabbat desecration. The "Keter Ha-melekh" arrives at this conclusion by tracing the historical background of this halakha according to both views. If, as Rav Yosef claims, Megila reading does not take place on Shabbat in order to ensure that the needy receive their "matanot la-evyonim," it stands to reason that this provision is as old as Megila reading itself. The Anshei Kenesset Ha-gedola, who themselves established the obligations of Purim, would not have allowed Megila reading on Shabbat if it would interfere with the mitzva of "matanot la-evyonim." Presumably, then, they themselves, from the very outset, legislated that the Megila is never read on Shabbat. If so, the "Keter Ha-melekh" argues, Chazal would not have required people to remind themselves of Purim on years when it falls on Shabbat. Since the Anshei Kenesset Ha-gedola themselves never ordained that Purim be observed on this day, it has no status of Purim whatsoever, and there is no need to study the laws of Purim. According to Rabba, by contrast, we may assume that the original establishment of Purim indeed applied to Shabbat, as well. It was only centuries later, when Chazal realized the likelihood of Shabbat desecration should Megila reading be permitted on Shabbat, that the reading was forbidden. But since the initial enactment of Purim celebration applied even on Shabbat, Chazal felt it necessary for people to keep in mind the day's status of Purim, by studying the relevant laws.

A much simpler ramification of this debate was suggested more recently by Rav Shimon Moshe Diskin, in his "Mas'at Ha-melekh." A person who must travel and will not have access to a Megila may read the Megila as early as Rosh Chodesh Adar (Shulchan Arukh O.C.688:7). According to Rav Yosef's reason for the prohibition against Megila reading on Shabbat, we should permit one in such a case to read on Shabbat. Since the poor do not anticipate receiving charity on the 6^th of Adar, for example, nothing is lost by allowing him to read on Shabbat. Rabba's reason, however, clearly applies even in such a case. (We should note, however, that it appears from all we have seen that Rav Yosef indeed accepts Rabba's explanation for the prohibition, and merely felt it was insufficient. Consequently, even Rav Yosef would forbid this individual from reading the Megila on Shabbat.)