Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT SHEMINI

Rav David Silverberg

The second half of Parashat Shemini (starting from 11:1) deals with the Torah's dietary laws. The Torah describes the characteristics of various categories of living creatures that render a given creature either permitted or forbidden for consumption. Mammals may be eaten only if they chew their cud and have split hoofs (11:2); fish may be eaten only if they feature fins and scales (11:9); and the Torah forbids for consumption "all winged swarming things that walk on fours" (11:20), except for those "that have above their feet jointed legs to leap with on the ground" (11:21).

Several scholars have raised the question of whether to view these characteristics as the reason for the given animal's status, or as merely indicators of that status. For example, is pork deemed unfit for consumption because swine do not chew their cud, or, does this characteristic merely signify the presence of some other properties, on account of which the Torah forbids eating pork?

The Rambam, in Moreh Nevukhim (3:48), addresses this issue explicitly and takes a very clear stand:

The characteristics given in the Law of the permitted animals, viz., chewing the cud and divided hoofs for cattle, and fins and scales for fish, are in themselves neither the cause of the permission when they are present, nor of the prohibition when they are absent; but merely signs by which the recommended species of animals can be discerned from those that are forbidden.

The Rambam explicitly views these characteristics as indicators, rather than the reasons behind the permissibility or prohibited status of the given animal.

The Maharit, in his work of responsa (no. 51), draws proof to this position from a halakha mentioned in the Gemara, in Masekhet Bekhorot (6b). The Gemara establishes that if a kosher animal begets a child in the form of a non-kosher animal, the child is nevertheless kosher. Conversely, an animal born to a non-kosher species in the form of a kosher species is forbidden for consumption. Seemingly, if the properties mentioned in the Torah were the cause of the given animal's forbidden status, then their presence should deem the animal forbidden regardless of its genetic origins. The fact that we establish an animal's status in this regard based on the species to which it was born, rather than its own qualities, appears to prove that the characteristics specified by the Torah merely signify the animal's suitability for consumption, rather than cause it.

Rav Shemuel Barukh Deutsch, in his "Birkat Kohen," refutes this proof, arguing that the specified characteristics may indeed be the reasons for a given species' suitability. If a kosher animal begets a child in the form of a non-kosher animal, Halakha instructs that we consider the child to belong to the parents' species, regardless of the child's own physical properties. Thus, even if we view the split hooves and chewing of the cud as the causes of a given species' permissibility, a child born to a kosher species will be granted kosher status, even if it does not itself feature the requisite qualities.

******

Yesterday, we discussed the various characteristics outlined in Parashat Shemini by which we are to determine the status of a given animal with respect to human consumption. Mammals, for example, are permitted for consumption if they feature split hooves and they chew their cud. We addressed the issue of whether these properties are the reason for a given creature's status, or serve merely to indicate its status, which in truth results from some other factor. According to this second approach, these characteristics are external manifestations of some other existing feature on account of which the Torah forbids or allows the consumption of a given animal.

Rav Yosef Rosen (known as the "Rogatchover Gaon"), in his work on the Rambam's Mishneh Torah, "Tzofnat Panei'ach" (beginning of Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Asurot), brings proof to the first approach, viewing these properties as the cause of an animal's status, from a passage in the Talmud. In Masekhet Bava Batra (16a), the Gemara tells that at one point during Iyov's response to his suffering, as documented in Sefer Iyov, he advanced the deterministic theory that man's virtuous or sinful conduct is beyond his control. Iyov, the Gemara writes, "wished to absolve the entire world from [divine] judgment," by arguing, "Master of the world! You created an ox with split hooves, You created a donkey with uncloven hooves…You created the righteous, You created the wicked." The Gemara records that Iyov's comrades responded, "The Almighty created the evil inclination, and He created Torah as the antidote." They rejected Iyov's claim that a wicked person has no control over his natural tendencies, arguing that man has the capacity to overcome those tendencies through involvement in spiritual pursuits. In any event, Iyov, in presenting his argument, compares the contrast between the righteous and the wicked to that between the ox and the donkey. Just as God predetermined that these animals would be kosher and non-kosher, respectively, so did He determine from birth the virtues of the righteous and evil of the wicked. But Iyov describes the animals not as "kosher" and "non-kosher," but rather as featuring "split hooves" and "uncleft hooves." This reference, the "Tzofnat Panei'ach" argues, appears to work off the assumption that these characteristics are the cause of a given animal's status, rather than a coincidental indication of that status. After all, why would Iyov employ these characteristics in reference to "kosher" and "non-kosher" if they were but secondary manifestations of these statuses? It is far more likely, he claims, that these properties are the root, rather than an external manifestation, of the animal's suitability or unsuitability for consumption.

Rav Shemuel Barukh Deutsch, in his "Birkat Kohen," suggests yet another proof for this perspective on the physical characteristics outlined in the Torah. The Mishna in Masekhet Nidda (51b) asserts that scientifically, any fish that has scales must have fins, as well. The obvious question arises, why, then, did the Torah (11:9) find it necessary to specify that a fish is suitable for consumption only if has both fins and scales? Why didn't it state simply that a fish must have scales, in which case it certainly has fins, as well? The Gemara answers by citing the verse, "yagdil Torah ve-yadir" – "He [God] will magnify and glorify His teaching" (Yeshayahu 42:21). Meaning, God adds into the Torah material that might appear practically unnecessary, simply for the purpose of providing us with an abundance of Torah material to study and thereby earn reward. The question, however, remains, what "study material" is provided by adding the requirement for fins, once this requirement is met ipso facto once the fish is determined to have scales? Rav Deutsch cites the Shela and the "Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala" as explaining that the fish's fins contribute to its permissibility for consumption. Since its presence, together with the scales', yield the fish's status as kosher, its mention in the verse – even if it contributes no practical law or guidance – indeed provides more material for scholarly minds to ponder.

Clearly, Rav Deutsch argues, the Gemara considered these characteristics the underlying reason behind the status, rather than a mere indication. For if they were simply an outward expression of some other characteristic, and provided merely the practical means by which we can identify a given creature's status, there would have been no value at all in mentioning fins as a requisite characteristic, once the Torah must in any event mention scales. It is only because the fins constitute one factor that yields the fish's status as kosher that their inclusion in the Torah's guidelines bears intellectual value as part of the corpus of Torah knowledge.

As mentioned yesterday, the Rambam explicitly maintained that these characteristics are indicators, rather than the root cause of a creature's status. We leave it to the reader to determine whether or not the two pieces of evidence presented today indeed provide ironclad proof against the Rambam's theory.

******

Today we will continue our discussion concerning the guidelines outlined by the Torah in Parashat Shemini for determining the permissibility of animals for consumption. The Torah specifies certain physical properties by which we determine a creature's status in this regard, and we saw two possible approaches as to the nature of these rules. The specified physical characteristics may be viewed as the root cause of an animal's status as forbidden or permissible, or perhaps serve merely as indicators of some other factor, on account of which the Torah forbade the given species.

Another relevant source with regard to this question is a passage in the Maharal's "Gur Aryeh" here in Parashat Shemini. The Maharal addresses a question raised by many writers regarding the prohibition against eating mammals that do not have split hooves and do not chew their cud. Surprisingly, the Torah never issues an explicit prohibition to this effect. Instead, it names several animals that feature one of these two characteristics and forbids them for consumption (11:4-7). Nowhere, however, does the Torah explicitly forbid partaking of meat from other animals, which feature neither of the requisite properties. Rashi (11:8), citing from Torat Kohanim, comments that we derive the prohibition with regard to other animals through a "kal va-chomer" (fortiori deduction): if the swine, for example, is forbidden for consumption because it does not chew its cud, despite the fact that its hooves are split, then certainly animals who have neither characteristic are unsuitable for consumption. Many writers, however, including the Rambam (Sefer Ha-mitzvot, mitzvat lo ta'aseh 172) and the Ramban (commentary to 11:8), questioned this deduction in light of the fundamental halakhic principle, "ein onshin min ha-din." A Torah prohibition, which would warrant corporal punishment for violators, cannot be established through a "kal va-chomer"; it requires a more explicit reference in the Torah. How, then, could Chazal establish the prohibition against eating meat from a non-kosher animal through the process of a "kal va-chomer"?

In light of this question, the Ramban claims that the passage in Torat Kohanim cannot be explained in accordance with its literal reading. The prohibition against partaking of meat from other animals does not evolve from a "kal va-chomer." Rather, when the Torah forbids eating meat from animals that chew their cud but do not have split hooves, it in effect forbids eating any animal that does not feature split hooves. Conversely, the prohibition against eating swine amounts to a general prohibition against eating animals that do not chew their cud. Naturally, then, any animal without either of these two properties is deemed non-kosher.

The Maharal explains along similar lines, only with a somewhat different – and revealing – formulation. "Ein mazhirin min ha-din," he claims, means that we cannot derive a Torah prohibition through deductive reasoning from a different prohibition, because the explicitly stated law may be simply a "gezeirat ha-melekh" – a divine decree whose rationale eludes us. Since we may never assume a Torah precept to be grounded in accessible reasoning, we cannot establish a separate prohibition through logical deduction from the originally stated law. However, when the Torah explicitly provides the reason underlying a given prohibition, then we are indeed entitled to extend the prohibition based on that line of reasoning. Hence, since the Torah explicitly explained that we may not eat a camel, for example, because it does not have split hooves, and that we may not eat pork because a pig does not chew its cud, Chazal are authorized to conclude on this basis that we may likewise not partake of animals who feature neither of these characteristics.

The Maharal's formulation strongly suggests that these properties are indeed the reason, the root cause, for a given species' status. In his view, since the Torah explicitly explained why we may not eat swine – because it does not chew its cud – we are entitled to extend this prohibition to include all other animals that likewise do not chew their cud.

******

The first section of Parashat Shemini tells of the rituals concluding the eight-day "milu'im" ceremony, through which the kohanim and the Mishkan were formally consecrated. Parashat Tzav had ended by describing the rituals required during the first seven days; our parasha, Parashat Shemini, opens with Moshe presenting the instructions concerning the special offerings required on this eighth and final day of the consecration process. Moshe begins by outlining the types of animals and flour required for this day's sacrifices, and the nation promptly obeys his command: "They brought to the front of the Tent of Meeting the things that Moshe had commanded, and the whole community came forward and stood before the Lord" (9:5). Then, in the very next verse, Moshe appears to introduce another command: "Moshe said: 'This is what the Lord has commanded that you do, that the Presence of the Lord may appear to you'." As several commentators note, however, Moshe never proceeds to specify what it is that "the Lord had commanded" that the nation "do." Rather, he issues specific instructions only to Aharon with regard to the rituals he was to perform that day. Why, then, does Moshe begin telling the people of "what the Lord has commanded that you do"?

To resolve this difficulty, Ibn Ezra argued that this verse appears out of chronological sequence, and Moshe actually issued this declaration earlier, towards the very beginning of the parasha.

Chazal, however, in Torat Kohanim, present a homiletic reading of this verse, presumably in response to this difficulty. The Torat Kohanim interprets Moshe's instruction to mean, "That evil inclination – eliminate it from your hearts." According to this reading, Moshe here does not convey any specific instructions regarding the day's rituals and ceremonies; rather, he admonishes the people in a general sense to "eliminate" their evil inclination from their hearts.

The question, however, arises, of what relevance is this general admonition to this context? Furthermore, Chazal here speak of "that evil inclination," seemingly referring to a specific manifestation of the yetzer ha-ra that potentially could confront the people at this moment. To what exactly does this passage refer?

Several different approaches have been taken in explaining this comment in Torat Kohanim. Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch suggests that Moshe here reveals to the people the symbolic meaning underlying the sacrifices offered as part of the Mishkan's rituals. The burning of animal flesh on the altar as a religious service reflects the obligation of every Jew to "consume," to subdue and suppress, his animalistic tendencies and sensual inclinations. Moshe thus reminds the people that in order to achieve the desired goal of "that the Presence of the Lord may appear to you," they must understand and implement the symbolic meaning of the korbanot, the triumph of the spirit over the flesh. (In our S.A.L.T. series several years ago, we cited Malbim as explaining this Midrash along very similar lines.)

The Netziv, in his "Ha'amek Davar," presents a different explanation, claiming that Moshe detected the presence of a very specific manifestation of the "evil inclination" within the hearts of several groups among Benei Yisrael. There were those who, in the Netziv's words, "were fervently drawn after the love of God, but not through the limitations imposed by the Torah." Some among the nation felt that they could express their love of the Almighty through whichever means they felt appropriate or perhaps gratifying. They refused to acknowledge the limits set by God Himself on the extent of the "closeness" attainable by human beings, the required temperance of these feelings of love with a sense of awe and dread. Just as God is a loving father who eagerly longs for a close relationship with His children, so is He a fearsome King who demands reverence, fear and recognition of His unlimited authority. The Netziv remarks that the unbalanced emphasis on love, which was not tempered by the required sense of awe, came to the surface in the story of Korach's revolt, when two hundred and fifty otherwise pious, devout men insisted on offering the ketoret (incense) in the Mishkan. They showed no interest in the restrictions set by the Torah on the offerings in the Mishkan, and demanded the right to express their enthusiastic love of God by bringing the mystique-laden ketoret offering.

Moshe therefore warned Benei Yisrael, "This is what the Lord has commanded that you do, that the Presence of the Lord may appear to you." God appears to the nation not when they do what they please, but when they do as they are told. The excitement and emotional surge that prevailed on this day had to be tempered by a sense of dread and commitment to the strict guidelines and boundaries set by the Torah.

Rav Aharon Lewin, in his "Ha-derash Ve-ha-iyun," suggests yet another approach to this passage in Torat Kohanim. "That evil inclination," he suggests, refers to the particular form of the "yetzer ha-ra" that very often presents itself anytime a person or group of people has reached a significant spiritual milestone. Whenever a person performs an exceptionally good deed or completes an extensive unit of study, he runs the risk of allowing his intrinsically acceptable sense of gratification to develop into excessive pride in his achievement. Specifically at times of celebration and climactic occasions, we must include in our festivity a reminder of what remains to be accomplished, of how far we still remain from our ultimate goal. At this moment, when the process of the Mishkan's construction is about to be completed and the Shekhina would soon establish its permanent residence among Benei Yisrael, Moshe warned the people, "Eliminate that evil inclination from your hearts." Achievement is not equivalent to perfection; there is still work to be done in overcoming our wrongful tendencies to ensure that remain worthy of God's Presence.

******

The opening section of Parashat Shemini tells of the final rituals performed as part of the "mil'im" process, the formal consecration of the Mishkan and the kohanim. After the completion of all the required rituals, we read, "Aharon lifted his hands toward the people and blessed them; and he stepped down after offering the sin offering, the burnt offering, and the offering of well-being" (9:22). With which "blessing" did Aharon bless the people? Rashi, based on Torat Kohanim, claims that Aharon here recited the standard "birkat kohanim," the priestly blessing, which the Torah introduces later, in Sefer Bamidbar (6:22-27).

As the Ramban notes, this explanation requires rearranging the sequence of events, placing God's command regarding birkat kohanim earlier than the narrative here in Parashat Shemini. Although the Ramban generally tends to accept the sequence in the Biblical narrative as chronological, rearranging the sequence only when the Torah explicitly dates an event out of chronological order, in this instance he does not object to Rashi's approach. He notes that indeed, the divine command of birkat kohanim appears in Sefer Bamidbar just prior to the narrative of the Mishkan's consecration (beginning from Bamidbar 7:1), which occurred "on the day that Moshe finished setting up the Tabernacle." This clearly refers to Rosh Chodesh Nissan, the day mentioned towards the end of Sefer Shemot (40:2) as the day on which Moshe erected the Mishkan. The events recorded at the beginning of Parashat Shemini took place on the eighth day after the setting up of the Mishkan, and thus we might indeed claim that the birkat kohanim was introduced before the events of this eighth day.

Nevertheless, the Ramban prefers a different understanding of this blessing, comparing it to King Shelomo's blessing to the nation during the consecration of the First Temple: "Then Shelomo stood before the altar of the Lord in the presence of the whole community of Israel; he spread the palms of his hands toward heaven and said, 'O Lord God of Israel… keep the further promise that You made to Your servant, my father David: Your line on the throne of Israel shall never end'" (Melakhim I 8:22-25). The Ramban suggests that Aharon here offers a similar blessing to the people, that God should continually reside among them.

Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi, in his work on Rashi's commentary, cites two passages in the Talmud that appear to support Rashi's approach, that Aharon here indeed administers the formal birkat kohanim. In Masekhet Sota (38b), the Gemara establishes the halakha codified in the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 128:8) that a kohen may recite the birkat kohanim only if he ascended the "dukhan" (platform, where the kohanim stand when administering the blessing) while the chazan recites the berakha of "retzei." The Gemara derives this rule from our verse, which states that Aharon administered this blessing after completing the sacrificial service, implying a connection of sorts between the service, the avoda, and the priestly blessing. On this basis, the Gemara deduces that the kohanim must begin ascending the "dukhan" during the chazan's recitation of "retzei," which corresponds to the avoda by expressing our hopes for its restoration. Clearly, if the Gemara extracts a halakha relevant to birkat kohanim from this verse, then it understood that Aharon here bestows upon the nation the specific blessing of birkat kohanim.

Similarly, in Masekhet Megila (18a), the Gemara cites this verse as the reason why birkat kohanim is recited immediately after the berakha of "retzei." Just as Aharon administered the priestly blessing immediately upon completing the sacrificial service, so do kohanim for all time recite this berakha immediately after the paragraph in shemoneh esrei devoted to the theme of avoda. Once again, the Gemara clearly works off the assumption that the Torah here refers to the birkat kohanim.

By contrast, the Mishneh Le-melekh (Hilkhot Tefila 14:9) cites a Talmudic passage which seemingly indicates that Aharon here does not, in fact, administer the formal birkat kohanim. Earlier in Masekhet Sota (38a), the Gemara brings a berayta that establishes the Biblical source for the halakha requiring kohanim to lift their hands while reciting birkat kohanim. One view in the berayta derives this requirement through a "gezeira shava" – a textual correspondence between this verse in Parashat Shemini and the Torah's introduction of birkat kohanim in Sefer Bamidbar. Just as Aharon here "blesses" the people while lifting his hands, so must the "blessing" spoken of in Sefer Bamidbar – in reference to birkat kohanim – be recited with lifted hands. The second view in the berayta suggests as the source a verse in Sefer Devarim (18:5) which states with regard to the priestly tribe's ritual responsibilities, "him and his descendants, for all time." This verse establishes an association between Aharon, progenitor of this tribe, and all his descendants. Hence, just as he blessed the people with lifted hands, so must his descendants. Seemingly, as the Mishneh Le-melekh contends, if Aharon here actually administers the priestly blessing, there should be no need for any further source to require hand-lifting during birkat kohanim. Aharon's recitation should have established the basic precedent for kohanim to follow for all time when reciting this blessing. If the Gemara had to resort to exegetical techniques such as "gezeira shava," it stands to reason that it understood the verse to mean that Aharon here administers some other blessing, and thus does not set a precedent concerning the required procedure for birkat kohanim.

The Mishneh Le-melekh attempts resolving this berayta with Rashi's view, but one might prefer to simply acknowledge two different opinions in this regard within the Talmud itself.

******

Parashat Shemini tells of the death of Nadav and Avihu, Aharon's two older sons, who were punished for bringing an unauthorized offering on the final day of the Mishkan's consecration. After this tragedy, Moshe orders Aharon and his two surviving sons, Elazar and Itamar, to continue with the scheduled procedure of that day's service, which required that they partake of the sacrificial meat and meal offering. Although normally one who loses an immediate relative may not partake of sacrificial food until after the burial, the extraordinary nature of this day, the day on which the kohanim were formally consecrated for the service in the Mishkan, warranted the suspension of this rule.

In recording Moshe's instructions to Aharon and his sons, the Torah writes, "Moshe spoke to Aharon and to his remaining sons, Elazar and Itamar…" (10:12). The Gemara (Yoma 87a), cited by Rashi in his commentary to this verse, and the Torat Kohanim, infer from this verse that death was initially decreed upon all of Aharon's sons, including Elazar and Itamar. Seemingly, the Gemara arrives at this conclusion based on the Torah's reference to the surviving sons as "notarim" – remaining. This formulation suggests that they had originally been destined to, or at least threatened by, the fate that befell their brothers, but were ultimately spared. The Gemara attributes their survival to the merits of their saintly father, Aharon.

Rav Yaakov Mecklenberg, in his "Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala," adds that the word "notarim" has a more specific connotation which led the Gemara to conclude that Elazar and Itamar were initially included in the divine decree of death. In Biblical Hebrew, we encounter two words that mean "left over," in reference to a part of a group that remains after the elimination or removal of the rest of the group: "nishar" and "notar." Rav Mecklenberg posits that the word "nishar" is used when the remaining portion is of greater importance and significance, whereas "notar" refers to a leftover portion deemed less important than the eliminated section. For example, in the description of the deluge during the time of Noach, the Torah writes, "va-yisha'er akh Noach" – "only Noach was left" (Bereishit 7:23). The Torah here uses the term "va-yisha'er," a derivative of the word "nishar," because Noach was clearly far greater than the rest of humanity, which was eliminated by the floodwaters. Similarly, in Sefer Bamidbar, the Torah tells the story of Eldad and Meidad, who were to have been appointed to the council of seventy elders, but remained in the camp when the other nominees entered the Tent of Meeting and were endowed with the divine spirit. The Torah writes, "Two men had remained ['va-yisha'aru'] in the camp…" (Bamidbar 11:26). This description, which employs the word "va-yisha'aru," alludes to their superior stature and characters, which exceeded that of their peers. Conversely, the term "notar" is frequently used in reference to sacrificial meat that had not been consumed before the deadline set by the Torah (e.g. Shemot 12:10). Similarly, earlier in Sefer Vayikra, the Torah mandates that a handful of the meal offering was placed upon the altar, and the "noteret" – the leftover portion (Vayikra 2:10) – was given to the kohanim. Here, too, the less significant portion, which was not placed on the altar, is referred to with the term "notar."

Accordingly, Rav Mecklenberg claims, we would expect the Torah to describe Aharon's remaining sons with the term "nisharim," which denotes importance and superiority, since they are being contrasted with sinners – Nadav and Avihu. The Torah's preference for the word "notar" suggested to Chazal that Elazar and Itamar were actually no greater than their brothers, and they, too, had deserved the same fate suffered by Nadav and Avihu.

Why were Elazar and Itamar initially included in the decree of death?

The Midrash Ha-gadol comments that they were deserving of death due to their lack of meticulous precision in performing the day's rituals. However, the Midrash Ha-gadol does not specify in what way the younger sons acted negligently. The Ra'avad, in his commentary to Torat Kohanim, explains that all of Aharon's sons were initially destined to die as a result of Aharon's seminal role in the sin of the golden calf. As Rashi brings in his commentary here and to Sefer Devarim (9:21), God had decreed death upon Aharon's sons as punishment for his having fashioned the golden calf, and Moshe's petition on his brother's behalf succeeded in sparing two of his four nephews. It is to this decree, the Ra'avad suggests, that the Gemara refers when it speaks of the younger sons' initial inclusion in the decree against Nadav and Avihu. Of course, this raises the fundamental question as to how sons would die in retribution for the father's wrongdoing, a topic beyond the scope of our discussion. Additionally, as the Maharsha (in Yoma) notes, this approach does not appear to accommodate the Gemara's comment that Elazar and Itamar were spared only in the merit of their father. If we view this comment in light of the Midrash cited by Rashi, then to the contrary, it was due to Aharon's misdeed that they were destined to die, and only Moshe's plea on their behalf saved them.

Others, including the "Tzeda La-derekh" (a work on Rashi's commentary to the Torah) and the "Yalkut Yehuda" (Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, Denver, early 20^th century), suggest that Elazar and Itamar were in a position to admonish Nadav and Avihu and stop them from committing their wrongful act. But the younger brothers neglected to take action to prevent Nadav and Avihu's sin. For this they were deserving of punishment, and were spared only in Aharon's merit.

Finally, Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch, in his commentary to this verse, suggests an entirely different reading of Chazal's comment. He claims that Elazar and Itamar had initially been tempted to join their brothers in bringing an unauthorized offering to God. They, too, originally decided to breach the barriers set by God's explicit instructions and bring an unwarranted incense offering. Ultimately, however, they resisted this temptation and withdrew from the plan. Apparently, according to Rav Hirsch's reading, Aharon's merit did not directly save Elazar and Itamar from death, but rather assisted them in overcoming their desire to participate in their brothers' unlawful offering. Elazar and Itamar thus emerge as heroic examples of self-restraint and the power to overcome one's sinful tendencies, even after initially resigning oneself to improper conduct.

******

After the death of Aharon's two older sons, Nadav and Avihu, as recorded in Parashat Shemini, Moshe instructs two cousins, Mishael and Eltzafan, to bring the bodies outside the Mishkan (10:4). Generally speaking, kohanim, who normally may not expose themselves to tum'at met (ritual impurity transmitted by a dead body), are permitted to tend to the burial needs of a deceased relative, despite the exposure to tum'a involved. In this instance, as many commentators explain, Nadav and Avihu's brothers were nevertheless forbidden from becoming tamei. During the "milu'im" consecration process, they shared the status of "kohen gadol" with their father, Aharon, and thus had to abide by the rules governing a kohen gadol. Just as a kohen gadol may not expose himself to tum'at met even for the purposes of a deceased relative, so was it forbidden in this instance for Elazar and Itamar, Aharon's surviving sons, to become tamei. Likewise, several verses later, Moshe orders Aharon and his sons not to observe mourning practices for Nadav and Avihu, and explains, "for the Lord's anointing oil is upon you" (10:7). Specifically because anointing oil had been poured over their heads – as is normally done only to high priests – was it forbidden for Elazar and Itamar to become tamei by tending to the needs of their deceased brothers.

Torat Kohanim presents the following, enigmatic passage in conjunction with this verse: "From here they said: they [kohanim] may not become tamei through contact with the dead, for Elazar and Itamar were kohanim, and did not become tamei for them. Who did become tamei for them? The Levi'im [Mishael and Eltzafan]." Many writers have struggled to explain this passage, which appears difficult on two counts. For one thing, the prohibition against a kohen's exposure to tum'at met is introduced explicitly later in Sefer Vayikra (beginning of chapter 21). Why, then, would Chazal find it necessary to find other indications in the Torah to this effect? Perhaps even more troubling, as mentioned, a kohen is normally permitted to become tamei through contact with a deceased relative. The necessity to summon cousins for this purpose in our context constituted an extraordinary measure due to particular circumstances. How, then, could the Torat Kohanim establish any normative halakhic principles based on this extraordinary provision?

The commentary, "Raboteinu Ba'alei Ha-Tosefot" suggests that the Torat Kohanim sought to convey precisely this point – that newly consecrated kohanim have the status of kohen gadol and may therefore not tend to the burial needs of even immediate relatives. The passage in Torat Kohanim should read, "From here they said: newly consecrated kohanim may not become tamei through contact with even immediate relatives, since they have the status of kohen gadol."

However, the "Korban Aharon" (a classic commentary to the Torat Kohanim) raises two compelling arguments against this interpretation. Firstly, "ikar chaser min ha-sefer" – the central point the Torat Kohanim seeks to emphasize, according to this interpretation, is not mentioned at all in the relevant passage. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the unique kohen gadol status conferred upon Elazar and Itamar resulted from the fact that "the Lord's anointing oil" was upon their heads during this ceremony. But Aharon's sons were the only kohanim ever to be anointed with the anointing oil; after them, only the high priests were anointed with the oil. There is thus no purpose in establishing a general rule for situations such as this one, of regular kohanim consecrated with the anointing oil, since it applied only in this single instance.

The "Korban Aharon" therefore suggests a different approach, namely, that Chazal derived from here the rule that a kohen may become tamei to tend to the needs of a deceased relative only if his services are necessary. If, however, there are others who can deal with the relative's remains, the kohen may not defile his priestly status by tending to the burial needs. The Torat Kohanim found an allusion to this halakha in the fact that Moshe instructs Mishael and Eltzafan to remove the bodies, rather than allowing Elazar and Itamar to do so. However, this explanation works off the assumption that Halakha indeed forbids a kohen to become tamei to an immediate relative unless the body's needs require his involvement. This is the subject of a major controversy among the halakhic authorities, as discussed at length by the Minchat Chinukh (mitzva 264).

The "Imrei Kohen" (Warsaw, 5699) suggests a particularly novel reading of this passage in Torat Kohanim, claiming that it reflects the minority view of Rabbi Yishmael, allowing a kohen the option to refuse to become tamei for a deceased relative (Zevachim 100a, Sota 3a). The Gemara tells that a kohen named Yosef Ha-kohen lost his wife and refused to defile his priesthood to tend to her needs, basing himself on Rabbi Yishmael's ruling, until his fellow kohanim convened and concluded that Halakha requires him to become tamei. They then forced him to tend to the needs of his deceased wife despite his priesthood. This account, the "Imrei Kohen" writes, appears to indicate that this issue was left unresolved for quite some time; only during this incident did the leaders among the kohanim convene to arrive at a final decision on the matter. The passage in Torat Kohanim perhaps represents the voice of those who argued against a kohen's compulsory exposure to tum'a upon the death of an immediate relative. This group of kohanim saw within the story of Mishael and Eltzafan a subtle allusion to their position, that kohanim are not forced to become tamei if they choose not to. Of course, as mentioned earlier, this narrative in no way provides proof to this position, since Elazar and Itamar had the unique status of kohanim gedolim. Nevertheless, the Torat Kohanim cites the argument marshaled by advocates of the theory that a kohen may decide whether or not to become tamei to a deceased relative, despite the fact that their position was ultimately disregarded.