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Yeshivat Har Etzion

TAZRIA – METZORA

By Rav David Silverberg

            The opening section of Parashat Tazria deals with the laws of tum'at leida, the status of tum'a that applies to a woman after childbirth.  The process of the woman's purification culminates with the offering of a sacrifice in the Beit Ha-mikdash.  The basic obligation requires the woman to offer a sheep as an ola offering and a bird as a sin-offering (12:6), but if she cannot afford a sheep, then she brings instead two birds, one as an ola and the other as a chatat (12:8).

            Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson, in his Divrei Shaul, notes a subtle distinction in the Torah's discussions of the basic offerings and of the offering brought by a poor woman.  In describing the usual offering, the Torah writes, "he [the kohen] shall offer it before the Lord and atone for her, and she shall be pure" (12:7).  In the next verse, however, with regard to the poor woman's offering, the Torah appears to emphasize the role of the kohen: "The kohen shall atone for her, and she shall be pure."  Whereas in the first verse the Torah does not make particular mention of the kohen ("ve-khiper aleha ve-tahara"), in the second verse the Torah makes a point of mentioning the kohen – "ve-khiper aleha ha-kohen."

            Rav Nathanson explains this distinction on the basis of the greater role played by the kohen in the case of a poor woman's offering.  Wealthier women, as mentioned, bring a sheep as an ola and a bird as a chatat, and the kohen is not involved in any way in the designation of these animals for their respective roles.  In the case of a poor woman, by contrast, two birds are brought to the kohen, and he decides which is designated as a chatat and which is offered as an ola.  The Torah alludes to the kohen's involvement in this process by making particular mention of the kohen in the context of the poor woman's offering.

            We might add (al derekh ha-derush) that this greater involvement on the kohen's part when a poor woman brings her korban represents the particular effort he must exert in such a case on the personal level.  For such a woman, even the relatively inexpensive offering of two birds entails a "sacrifice" in the true sense of the term.  Besides allocating a portion of her limited budget for the birds themselves, she also incurs travel and lodging expenses as she brings the offering to Jerusalem.  Specifically in such a situation, perhaps, the kohen is called upon to ensure that the woman enjoys a positive experience and leaves with a feeling of inspiration and encouragement.  More so than in the case of a wealthier woman, the kohen here must personally involve himself in this offering so that the woman feels a sense of joy and gratification over her experience in the Mikdash.

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            Among the laws presented in Parashat Tazria concerning the metzora – a person stricken with tzara'at – is the requirement that he "dwell alone" outside his city (13:46).  This halakha has given rise to some discussion as to whether a metzora is permitted to live together and socialize with another metzora.  Does the Torah here demand that he live in solitude, or that all metzora'im be quarantined, separate from the rest of society?

            Malbim contends that metzora'im are, in fact, allowed to reside in each other's company.  Characteristically, Malbim advances this view on the basis of a distinction between two different Biblical terms.  The Torah here requires that a metzora live badad – alone – a term which, in Malbim's view, differs from another word for "alone" – galmud.  The word galmud appears (in feminine form – galmuda) in Sefer Yeshayahu (49:21) as an allegorical description of Am Yisrael in exile as a lonely, childless widow.  According to Malbim, galmud refers to a state of utter loneliness, where a person has nobody at all with whom to interact, whereas badad denotes isolation only from those who are different from oneself, but not from those of the same kind.  Thus, for example, the Gemara in Masekhet Sota (42a) comments that the term galmud is sometimes used in reference to a menstrual woman.  This woman is truly "alone" in the sense that she must remain separated from all men, including her husband; galmud thus denotes separation from all people.  The word badad, however, is occasionally used as a favorable description of Am Yisrael's isolation from other nations ("hen am le-vadad yishkon" – Bamidbar 23:9; "Hashem badad yanchenu" – Devarim 32:12).  Of course, this condition of "loneliness" does not preclude the Jewish people's social interaction with one another; it refers only to isolation from other peoples.  Similarly, Malbim argues, when the Torah speaks of a metzora living badad, it does not forbid his social interaction with fellow metzora'im; rather, he is forbidden from interacting with those who are different from him, who have not been stricken with tzara'at.

            As many writers have noted, one may, at first glance, draw proof to this position from the haftara for Parashat Metzora, which tells the story of God's intervention to rescue the city of Shomron (Melakhim II, chapter 7).  The army of Aram had besieged the city, subjecting its inhabitants to starvation.  Four metzora'im who dwelled outside the city gate decided to surrender to the besieging army, but when they arrived at the military camp they found it abandoned.  God had produced the sound of pursuing armies to frighten the Arameans and mislead them into thinking that the Kingdom of Israel had commissioned neighboring armies to lift the siege.  The Aramean soldiers fled, leaving behind their provisions which were taken by the starving residents of Shomron.

            It is clear from the narrative that the four metzora'im dwelled together outside the city gate and together reached their decision to surrender, seemingly proving that metzora'im are permitted to dwell and interact with another, as Malbim argues.  (Tomorrow, however, we will present possible refutations of this proof.)

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            Yesterday, we began discussing the question of whether a metzora, whom the Torah requires to dwell "alone" (13:46), may reside and interact with fellow metzora'im.  Does the Torah refer to actual solitude and isolation, or merely to his separation from non-metzora'im?  As we saw, the story read as the haftara for Parashat Metzora, which tells of four metzora'im residing together outside the city of Shomron (Melakhim II 7:3), would appear to prove that metzora'im are, in fact, permitted to live and interact with one another.

            A number of works, however, cite an argument by the Eil Milu'im to refute this proof from the story of the four metzora'im.  The Gemara in Masekhet Sanhedrin (107b) identifies these four metzora'im as Geichazi – the attendant of the prophet Elisha – and his three sons.  Earlier (Melakhim II, chapter 5), we read that Geichazi disobeyed Elisha, who responded by declaring that he and his children would be stricken with tzara'at, and the Gemara comments that Geichazi and his three sons were the four metzora'im outside the city of Shomron.  Why, the Eil Ha-milu'im asks, did the Gemara feel compelled to identify these four metzora'im as Geichazi and his sons?  The Eil Ha-milu'im explained that the Gemara reached this conclusion on the basis of the fact that normally, metzora'im are forbidden from residing with one another.  The Gemara in Masekhet Arakhin (16b) comments that the Torah requires a metzora to live in isolation because tzara'at generally results from the sin of lashon ha-ra, gossip and negative speech about others, which breaks friendships and marriages.  The metzora is punished for causing people to separate from one another by living himself in isolation.  It follows from this remark, the Eil Ha-milu'im reasons, that a metzora must live in complete solitude, and may not interact with anybody, even fellow metzora'im.  Accordingly, the Gemara in Masekhet Sanhedrin wondered why there were four metzora'im living together outside the city of Shomron during the Aramean siege.  It thus concluded that these metzora'im must have been stricken for a reason other than lashon ha-ra, and were therefore permitted to engage in social interaction.  Since isolation is required as a punishment for lashon ha-ra, a person stricken with tzara'at for some other reason is not included in this requirement.  The Gemara thus explained that these metzora'im found themselves in this condition due to the curse of Elisha, and for this reason they were permitted to live together outside the city.

            According to the Eil Ha-milu'im, then, metzora'im are generally forbidden to reside even with one another, and must live in complete isolation, except in situations where it can be ascertained that the condition did not result from lashon ha-ra.

            Rav Yisrael Be'eri, in his work Kevoda Shel Torah (Israel, 5730), cites a different refutation to this proof from the work Tiferet Yehonatan, which claimed that the four metzora'im outside the city of Shomron were not stricken with halakhic tzara'at.  Elisha had cursed Geichazi by declaring that "the tzara'at of Na'aman shall adhere to you and your offspring" (Melakhim II 5:27).  Geichazi's condition was not standard tzara'at, but rather "the tzara'at of Na'aman."  Na'aman was an Aramean general whom Elisha had cured from tzara'at.  Since the laws of tum'a and tahara do not apply to gentiles, Na'aman's condition did not render him ritually impure.  He suffered from skin discoloration similar to tzara'at, but the halakhic effects of tzara'at did not apply.  Conceivably, the Tif'eret Yehonatan claims, if Na'aman's condition was transferred to Geichazi and his sons, then they, too, suffered from a physical condition that did not meet the halakhic criteria of tzara'at.  They were driven from the city of Shomron not because of the halakhic requirement that a metzora live in isolation, but rather as a medical precaution to prevent any further spreading of the illness.  The laws of formal tzara'at thus did not apply, and for this reason they were permitted to live and interact with one another.

            According to this approach, then, a metzora is indeed required to live in complete isolation, and may not interact even with other metzora'im, and the four metzora'im during the siege of Shomron were not stricken with halakhic tzara'at.

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            Yesterday, we discussed the story read as the haftara for Parashat Metzora about four metzora'im who lived together outside the city of Shomron (Melakhim II, chapter 7).  We mentioned a theory that some have proposed (as cited in Rav Yisrael Be'eri's work Kevoda Shel Torah) claiming that these four men were not stricken with halakhic tzara'at.  They suffered from a medical condition that resembled tzara'at but did not meet the strict halakhic criteria to qualify as formal tzara'at.  According to this theory, the four "metzora'im" were driven outside the city of Shomron not due to the halakhic requirement that a metzora live outside his city, but rather for medical reasons, to prevent the spreading of the disease.

This is not, however, the conventional understanding of this episode.  Rashi, the Radak and Metzudat David, in their respective commentaries to Sefer Melakhim II (7:3), all comment that these metzora'im resided outside the city of Shomron in fulfillment of the Torah's requirement that a metzora live in isolation ("badad yeishev mi-chutz la-machaneh" – Vayikra 13:46).  Clearly, in their view, these four men were formally declared to be halakhic metzora'im and were thus required by Torah law to reside outside the city's walls.

A number of Acharonim, however, raised the question of whether the laws of tzara'at would indeed require that a metzora reside outside the city of Shomron.  A number of sources in Chazal, including Torat Kohanim (to Vayikra 14:40) and the Mishna in Masekhet Keilim (1:7), establish that a metzora is banished only from arim mukafin choma – walled cities.  A person stricken with tzara'at is not required to reside outside other cities.  The Rash Mi-Shantz and Rav Ovadya of Bartenura, in their respective commentaries to Masekhet Keilim, claim that the Mishna refers specifically to cities that were walled already during Benei Yisrael's conquest of the Land of Israel under Yehoshua.  The unique status of these cities is familiar to us from other areas of halakha, namely, the provision of batei arei choma (that sold houses in walled cities do not return to their original owners during the jubilee), and the celebration of Purim on the fifteenth of Adar.  According to the aforementioned commentators, the status of walled cities with respect to a metzora's banishment similarly applies only to cities that were surrounded by a wall during the time of Yehoshua.  Now the city of Shomron was built many years after Yehoshua's death, during the reign of Omri, one of the kings of the Northern Kingdom of Israel.  We read in Sefer Melakhim I (16:24) that Omri purchased the mountain of Shomron and proceeded to build the city, which later became the kingdom's capital.  Seemingly, then, metzora'im were not required to reside outside Shomron, and it thus requires explanation why Rashi and other commentators attributed the metzora'im's residence outside the city to the Biblical command of "badad yeishev."

Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in his notes to the Mishnayot (Masekhet Keilim), suggests that the city of Shomron had perhaps existed even before Omri's purchase and development of the area.  The verse in Sefer Melakhim I (16:24) states that Omri purchased "the mountain of Shomron" and then proceeded to develop it, but Targum Yonatan translates "ha-har Shomron" as "keraka de-le-Shomron" – the city of Shomron.  The Targum apparently understood that a city had already existed on the mountain, and Omri fortified and further developed it.  Quite possibly, then, there had, indeed, been a wall surrounding the city of Shomron already from the time of Yehoshua, and for this reason the four metzora'im were required to leave the city.  (Rav Yaakov Mecklenberg likewise suggests this approach, in his Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala, Vayikra 14:40.)

            Rav Yaakov Ettlinger, in his work of responsa Binyan Tziyon (60), rejects Rabbi Akiva Eiger's theory that the city of Shomron had stood even before the time of Omri.  Rav Ettlinger cites the Gemara's comment in Masekhet Sanhedrin (102b) that Omri was blessed with a successful kingship despite his impiety "because he added a metropolis in the Land of Israel."  This comment strongly suggests that Omri actually founded a new city, and did not merely expand a preexisting city, as Rabbi Akiva Eiger had suggested.  (Tomorrow we will present Rav Ettlinger's approach regarding the status of Shomron with regard to the banishment of metzora'im.)

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            Today we will conclude our discussion of the haftara for Parashat Metzora (Sefer Melakhim II, chapter 7), which tells of four metzora'im who were residing outside the besieged city of Shomron.  As we saw, a number of commentators (including Rashi and the Radak) explain that these four men were required to reside outside the city in fulfillment of the Biblical command (Vayikra 13:46) that a metzora dwell in isolation.  A number of Acharonim raised the question of why this command would apply to the city of Shomron, in light of the provision that metzora'im are banished only from cities that had been walled during the time of Yehoshua's conquest of the Land of Israel.  The city of Shomron was built many centuries after Yehoshua, during the reign of Omri, and the question thus arises as to why the four metzora'im were required to live outside the city.

            Rav Yaakov Ettlinger, in his work Binyan Tziyon (60), suggests that the four metzora'im were driven outside the city despite the fact that Torah law did not require their banishment.  He cites a comment from Tana De-vei Eliyahu to the effect that Omri built the city of Shomron with the intention that it would serve as the Northern Kingdom's equivalent to Jerusalem.  Apparently, the majesty and mystique of Jerusalem, which was not paralleled by any city in the Northern Kingdom, undermined the kingdom's efforts to establish itself as a legitimate rival.  Omri realized that constructing a large, glamorous metropolis that could compete with Jerusalem would go a long way toward enhancing his kingdom's stature and repute, so that it could eventually overshadow its neighbor to the south.  Possibly, Rav Ettlinger suggests, the authorities in Shomron imposed upon the city the standards demanded of walled cities despite the fact that it did not exist during the time of Yehoshua.  Thus, although the Biblical requirement to banish metzora'im did not apply to Shomron, the city nevertheless implemented such a policy as part of its effort to present itself as an equivalent to Jerusalem.

            Rav Yaakov Mecklenberg, in his Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala (to Vayikra 14:40), likewise addresses this issue and concludes his discussion by questioning the assumption that metzora'im are barred only from cities that were walled from the time of Yehoshua.  Torat Kohanim (to Vayikra 14:40) and the Mishna in Masekhet Keilim (1:7) mention only the condition that the city be walled; they do not require that the wall had stood since the time of Yehoshua.  The Rambam, too, speaks only of walled cities in Eretz Yisrael, without requiring that the city was walled in Yehoshua's time (Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at 10:7, Hilkhot Beit Ha-bechira 7:13).  Conceivably, the aforementioned commentators to Sefer Melakhim, who applied to Shomron the halakha requiring the banishment of metzora'im, followed this view, and did not accept the position of the Rash Mi-Shantz and Rav Ovadya of Bartenura, who, as cited yesterday, restricted this requirement to cities that were walled in Yehoshua's time.

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            Parashat Metzora presents the laws relevant to a zav and zava, a man or woman who experiences an unusual discharge.  The Torah here lists the various ways in which a zav or zava transmits tum'a, including contact with a keli cheres, an earthenware utensil: "And an earthenware utensil that is touched by a zav shall be broken" (15:12).  An earthenware utensil cannot be rendered pure after contracting ritual impurity, unless it is broken and then reconstructed.

            Torat Kohanim comments on this verse that a keli cheres does not contract tum'a in the same fashion as other utensils.  As Chazal deduce from other sources, an earthenware utensil does not contract tum'a when a source of tum'a touches its exterior; rather, it becomes tamei when a source of tum'a enters the space of its receptacle.  The rationale behind this provision is that the actual substance of clay is not valuable (in contrast to metal or wood); the value of an earthenware utensil lies purely in its shape, which enables it to serve as a container.  Since the worth and value of this utensil pertains only to its use as a receptacle, its status is affected only by the introduction of tum'a into its interior space, and not through contact with its exterior.  By the same token, the entrance of tum'a into its interior space renders the utensil tamei regardless of whether or not it touches the utensil; since the determining factor is the shape, and not the substance of the utensil, direct contact between the source of tum'a and the body of utensil is not necessary for the transmission of tum'a.

            As Torat Kohanim notes, this does not, at first glance, appear to be the implication of the aforementioned verse in Parashat Metzora: "And an earthenware utensil that is touched by a zav shall be broken."  The Torah here appears to speak of a case where a zav touched the exterior of a keli cheres, and yet it establishes that tum'a is transmitted in such a fashion.  Torat Kohanim explains that the verse does not refer to direct contact, but rather to a case of heset, where a zav causes a utensil to move without actually touching it.  The classic example of such a case is where a utensil sits on a beam and a zav moves the beam.  Even though the zav did not touch the utensil, it nevertheless contracts tum'a by virtue of its having been moved as a result of the zav.

            What is the halakha in a case where a zav inserted his hand (or foot, for that matter) into an earthenware utensil, without touching it?  As mentioned earlier, an earthenware utensil becomes tamei through the introduction of tum'a into its interior space, regardless of whether the source of tum'a touched the utensil.  Would this mean that a zav can transmit tum'a to a keli cheres by placing his hand into its space?

            This issue is subject to a debate between the Rambam and the Ra'avad, in Hilkhot Metam'ei Mishkav U-moshav (8:4).  The Ra'avad follows the more intuitive approach, claiming that the utensil becomes impure.  An earthenware utensil becomes tamei through the introduction of tum'a in its interior space just as a metal or wood utensil becomes tamei when its exterior comes in direct contact with tum'a.  Hence, just as a zav transmits tum'a by touching the exterior of a metal or wood utensil, so does he transmit tum'a by thrusting his hand inside an earthenware utensil.  The Rambam, however, disagrees, applying in this case the rule of ein nida ve-kayotzei ba metame'in be-eivarin.  This principle says that although a zav (or other people who become tamei through bodily emissions) transmits tum'a by sitting or lying on a chair or bed (even if he does not come in direct contact with the actual bed), this applies only if his entire body sits or lies on the bed.  If he rests only his hand or leg on the bed, it does not become tamei (unless he directly touches it).  Similarly, the Rambam maintains, an individual limb of a zav cannot transmit tum'a to an earthenware utensil by entering its receptacle.

            Rav Yitzchak Zev Soloveitchik suggested that this debate between the Rambam and Ra'avad flows from a conceptual question regarding the process by which a keli cheres contracts tum'a – a process which, as described, differs from that of all other utensils.  In principle, we can approach this halakha in one of two ways.  More intuitively, perhaps, we might explain that the presence of tum'a in the receptacle of an earthenware utensil is deemed "direct contact" with respect to the conferral of tum'a.  In the case of a keli cheres, the Torah simply redefined the concept of maga – direct contact – whereas it is achieved not through physical contact, but rather through the presence of tum'a in the interior space.  According to this perspective, an earthenware utensil's contraction of tum'a through its interior space follows the same rules and guidelines that apply to the contraction of tum'a through direct contact in the case of other utensils.  This is the view of the Ra'avad, who held that just as a zav transmits tum'a by touching a metal or wood utensil, so does he transmit tum'a by thrusting his hand inside an earthenware utensil, even if he does not touch its surface.

            The Rambam, however, approached this halakha differently.  In his view, the Torah introduced an entirely new and distinct mode of contracting tum'a for a keli cheres.  This process does not parallel the transmission of tum'a through direct contact with other utensils; it is a separate means of transmitting tum'a which is not bound at all by the guidelines that apply to maga in cases of metal or wood.  Therefore, the case of a zav inserting his hand into a keli cheres does not parallel the case of touching the exterior of a metal utensil.  Instead, we apply the rule that a zav's transmission of tum'a without direct contact requires the presence of his entire body, as opposed individual limbs, and therefore a keli cheres does not become tamei through the insertion of a zav's hand.

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            The final section of Parashat Tazria discusses the laws of tzara'at ha-beged, situations where a green or red discoloration appears on a wool or linen garment.  The garment is to be shown to a kohen, and if the discoloration meets the criteria of tzara'at the garment is put away for a seven-day period.  The kohen inspects the garment again after that period, and if the discoloration has spread, the garment must be burned.  If the discoloration had not spread, it is washed, put away for another seven days, and then reexamined.  If the laundering had no effect on the discoloration, then the garment must be burned.  If the discoloration faded as a result of the washing, then the discolored fabric is torn from the garment.  If a discoloration later reappears in the garment, the garment is burned.

            These laws are discussed in greater detail in the Mishnayot in Masekhet Nega'im (11:5-6).  The Mishnayot there establish that in the final situation described above, where the discoloration faded as a result of laundering, in which case the discolored area is removed from the garment, the removed piece of fabric is burned.  Furthermore, a new piece of fabric, referred to by the Mishna as a matlit, is sewn into the garment to replace the piece that was removed.  If the tzara'at resurfaces on the garment, the Mishna adds, the halakha in such a case depends on where the new discoloration appears.  If it appears on the original fabric, then the original fabric must be burned, but the matlit may be retained, as it is not considered to have been stricken with tzara'at.  The Mishna then turns its attention to a case where the discoloration appears on the matlit, but its ruling is somewhat ambiguous: "soreif et ha-beged" – "he burns the garment."  To what exactly does this refer?

            The Rambam, in Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at (12:6), follows the straightforward reading of the Mishna, and rules that in such a case the entire garment – including the matlit – must be destroyed.  Even though this is the first occasion of tzara'at on this piece of fabric, we do not begin anew the process of weekly inspections, laundering, and so on.  Rather, since this garment has already been stricken with tzara'at, the reemergence of tzara'at even on the newly added piece of material requires the entire garment's destruction.

            Rabbenu Ovadya of Bartenura, however, understands the Mishna's ruling differently.  In his view, "soreif et ha-beged" means that only the original garment – to the exclusion of the matlit – must be burned.  The matlit, however, is seen as a separate entity, and it is therefore treated as a garment on which tzara'at has appeared for the first time.  If it is smaller than the minimum required size for a garment to contract tzara'at (three finger-widths), then it may be retained and it does not have the status of a tzara'at-infected garment at all.  If it does meet the minimum size requirement, then it undergoes the same process outlined above, whereby it is put away for a week and then reexamined.

            Thus, the Rambam and Rabbenu Ovadya of Bartenura argue as to whether the matlit becomes integrated as part of the garment, and is therefore burned immediately upon the appearance of a new discoloration, or remains as an independent entity.  Whereas the Rambam viewed the matlit as part of the garment, Rabbenu Ovadya of Bartenura held that it is treated as a separate entity, and thus the appearance of tzara'at on the matlit begins anew the entire process of tzara'at ha-beged.

            One might, however, ask why, according to Rabbenu Ovadya of Bartenura, the appearance of tzara'at on the matlit should require burning the rest of the garment.  If, as we saw, he considers the matlit a separate, independent entity, why should the manifestation of tzara'at on the matlit affect the status of the original material?  Apparently, in his view, even though the matlit is external to the garment, the appearance of tzara'at is attributed to its connection to the garment, thereby determining the garment's infection, which requires that it be destroyed.