PARASHOT TAZRIA METZORA

By Rav David Silverberg

            Parashat Metzora begins with a description of the ceremony through which a metzora (individual afflicted by the tzara’at skin discoloration) regains his status of tahara (ritual purity) and is then allowed to return to his city.  This ceremony included two birds, one of which was slaughtered, whereupon the other was dipped in its blood and then sent free.

            The image of a live bird carrying another bird’s blood on its body could shed light on the symbolic meaning of this ritual as part of the metzora’s purification.  Anytime the bird lands on a surface and walks about, it leaves its mark – in the form of the other bird’s blood.  It is the blood that constitutes the bird’s imprint wherever it goes, such that its “legacy” at each location is the blood of its fellow bird.

            Tzara’at is generally viewed as a punishment brought upon an individual on account of habitual lashon ha-ra – negative speech about other people.  Often, people resort to lashon ha-ra as part of a quest for fulfillment and vindication.  All too aware of their own shortcomings, inadequacies and limited achievements, people spread defamatory information about others, which allows them to feel superior and accomplished.  The gossip, talebearer and slanderer essentially “make their mark” with the “blood” of their victims, at the expense of their fellow’s reputation and social standing.  Instead of leaving an imprint through productivity and making a meaningful contribution to society, the metzora chooses instead to earn social acceptance and recognition by denigrating or defaming other people.  He takes his fellow’s “blood” – his tarnished reputation – and spreads it about in a pitiable attempt to feel important at somebody else’s expense.

            The metzora may not regain his state of purification until he views the live bird fly about with the slaughtered bird’s blood.  He must see with his own eyes how he “flew about” with his fellow’s blood, trying to bolster his own reputation at the expense of his fellow’s reputation.  He is thus reminded that the most effective – albeit most difficult – way to earn a sense of accomplishment is to accomplish, to do what he knows to be correct and avoid that which he knows to be improper.  This is far preferable than attempting to feel fulfilled by putting down those around him.

(Based upon Rav Yitzchak Stollman’s Minchat Yitzchak, Parashat Metzora)

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            The Torah in Parashat Tazria describes numerous different manifestations of the tzara’at skin discoloration, and specifies which manifestations render the individual tamei (ritually impure).  Among the types of tzara’at described is a discoloration that surfaces on skin recovering from shechin (boils – 13:18-23).  If the repaired skin is discolored in a certain way, the spot is deemed tzara’at and the individual is rendered tamei.

            Thereafter, the Torah describes a similar phenomenon, where a tzara’at infection forms on skin recovering from a burn.  Once again, certain discolorations render the skin tzara’at.  Rashi (13:24), citing the Gemara in Masekhet Chulin (8a), comments that the guidelines concerning the two cases of boils and burns are identical.  The same colors that indicate tzara’at on the scab of a shechin infection reflect this status on skin that forms after a burn.  Nevertheless, the Gemara notes, the Torah chose to divide these laws into two separate sections.  Rather than presenting one section outlining the rules for discolorations on skin recovering from boils or burns, the Torah allocated two separate units of text for these two manifestations of tzara’at.  The Gemara infers from this division that the two kinds of tzara’at do not combine with one another to comprise the minimum required size of a tzara’at infection.  Meaning, if a discoloration half the minimum size formed after a boil, and right next to it a discoloration that same size formed after a burn, the two infections are deemed separate, and do not combine to render the individual tamei.

            Rav Moshe Feinstein (Kol Ram, vol. 1) noted that symbolically, this halakha might demonstrate that identical “symptoms” do not always reflect the same condition.  Two people might suffer from the same character flaw, but for two completely different reasons.  For that matter, even within a single individual, different factors may contribute to what outwardly appears as one flaw.  The Torah here perhaps teaches that as complex creatures, we cannot evaluate ourselves superficially.  In studying our characters as part of the lifelong process of self-improvement, we must understand that our shortcomings may likely result from more than just one source, and often several different factors must be addressed in our attempt to perfect a single flaw in our characters.

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            As we discussed earlier this week, the opening section of Parashat Metzora outlines the process whereby a metzora regains his status of purification after the disappearance of the skin discolorations that had rendered him tamei.  This process entails two birds, one of which is slaughtered and the other dipped in the blood of the first.  The second bird is then sent away (14:7).

            The Mishna in Masekhet Kiddushin (56b) establishes that the tziporei metzora (birds used for the metzora’s purification process) are assur be-hana’a – forbidden for any kind of benefit.  One may not make any use of these birds, not to mention that their meat may not be eaten.  The Gemara (57a-b) discusses possible Scriptural sources for this halakha, and draws a distinction between the two tziporei metzora: whereas the flesh of the slaughtered bird remains permanently forbidden for use, the live bird becomes permissible once it is sent away.  (Rashi, commenting to Kiddushin 57a, understood that at least according to one view, the live bird does not become forbidden at all.)  Rava, as the Gemara cites, explains this halakha as based upon an intuitive rationale: “lo amera Torah le-shalach le-takala” – “the Torah would not say to send away the bird for an offense.”

            The straightforward explanation of Rava’s comment is that forbidding the meshulachat (sent-away bird) would cause people to transgress Torah law, as they would have no way of identifying the forbidden bird.  People who catch a meshulchat for food would have no reason to suspect that it is forbidden, and thus for no fault of their own, they would be in violation of the Torah.  This is, indeed, how Rashi explains the Gemara’s comment.

            The Mishneh Le-melekh (Hilkhot Me’ila 7:6), however, questions this reading, noting that it appears to ignore the famous halakhic principle of bittul be-rov.  This rule establishes that if a group of items consists of a minority of forbidden items, one may treat the entire group as permissible.  Since with regard to every item one can rely on the statistical majority, the entire group is permitted for consumption.  Accordingly, no violation would be entailed if a person catches a bird and partakes of its meat – even if it turns out that this was a meshulachat.  Since the majority of kosher birds in the world are clearly not meshulachat birds, one does not commit any violation by unknowingly partaking of a meshulachat.

            The Mishneh Le-melekh therefore suggests that the Gemara refers not to the “takala” (“offense”) of the individual who might partake of the meshulachat, but rather of the one who sends it away.  Had the bird been forbidden for consumption, the person who sends it off would be in violation of bittul issur le-khatechila – actively combining a forbidden substance with permissible substances so that it becomes halakhically “nullified.”  The Torah would not have sanctioned – let alone required – an act that causes a forbidden bird to become “mixed” with a majority of permissible birds, such that it becomes – at least functionally speaking – permissible.

This reading is also proposed by the Noda Bi-yehuda (Tanina, Y.D. 45), amidst his discussion of the prohibition of ein mevatlin issur le-khatechila.  The Rishonim famously debate the question of whether this prohibition applies on the level of Torah law, or was enacted by the Sages.  The Noda Be-yehuda asserts, however, that this debate refers only to cases of liquid mixtures, where the forbidden substance dissolves within the mixture and thus becomes “nullified” in actuality.  In a case of a solid item that becomes mixed together with other items and one cannot tell them apart, it becomes permissible only from a practical standpoint, but intrinsically it retains its initial status.  As the Noda Be-yehuda notes, if Eliyahu Ha-navi would suddenly appear and identify the forbidden object, it would certainly be forbidden.  Knowingly creating this kind of “mixture,” the Noda Be-yehuda contends, constitutes a Torah violation according to all views.  Hence, the Torah could not have allowed sending the bird away, in violation of the Torah prohibition of ein mevatlin issur le-khatechila.

One might, however, challenge this interpretation by posing a simple argument: God can forbid and permit anything He wishes.  Once the Torah commands performing a certain act, that act becomes a mitzva even if it would have otherwise transgressed a different command of the Torah.  There thus seems to be no reason why the Torah could not have prohibited deriving benefit from the meshulachat even if this would mean that the person sending it away would effectively be “nullifying” it.

In light of this question, Rav Baruch Weintraub (www.etzion.org.il/vbm/archive/yomyom/dafyomyomi/2008-12-04.php) suggested that we may perhaps return to Rashi’s understanding of Rava’s comment, namely, that it refers to the possibility of somebody unknowingly partaking of the meshulachat.  Apparently, Rashi understood that even if, strictly speaking, one would commit no prohibition in this case, nevertheless, the Torah would not have created a situation whereby people would end up eating forbidden foods for no fault of their own.  Had the meshulachat been forbidden, its consumption would have been spiritually detrimental even in cases where no strict halakhic violation had occurred.  The Torah would certainly not have issued a command that made such a situation likely, and Rava therefore concluded that the meshulachat could not be forbidden once it is sent away.

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            Parashat Tazria begins with laws of tum’at yoledet – the status of tum’a (ritual impurity) which the Torah imposes upon a woman after childbirth.  We read that upon the completion of the assigned period of tum’a, the woman must bring two sacrifices to the Mikdash – a sheep as an ola (burnt offering), and a bird as a chatat (sin offering).  A woman who cannot afford both a sheep and a bird brings instead two birds, one as an ola and the other as a chatat.

            The Gemara in Masekhet Zevachim (90a) notes (citing a berayta) that in presenting this halakha concerning the underprivileged yoledet, the Torah speaks of her ola offering before mentioning the chatat (“echad le-ola ve-echad le-chatat” – 12:8).  The implication of this sequence, as the Gemara comments, is that the kohen must offer the ola before the chatat.  This verse might then call into question the rule established in the Mishna (Zevachim 89a) that when a pair of birds is brought as a chatat and ola, the chatat is performed before the ola.  Rava answers, somewhat ambiguously, that the Torah afforded precedence to the ola only “le-mikra’a” – literally, “for reading” or “for calling.”

            Rashi explains this to mean, “that it should be read first in the text.”  The precedence given to the ola affects only the text of the Torah reading, but not the procedure to be followed in the Beit Ha-mikdash in the case of a financially disadvantaged yoledet.  This explanation, however, seems difficult to understand.  Why would the Torah want us to read about the ola before the chatat, if in actuality the chatat was brought first?  What significance is there to this reversed sequence?

            Malbim, in his Torah commentary, explains Rashi to mean that the ola is mentioned first for literary purposes, and not for halakhic purposes.  As opposed to other situations requiring an ola and a chatat, the situation of a new mother does not entail any wrongdoing for which atonement is necessary.  Therefore, although the mother must bring a chatat (for reasons discussed by a number of commentators), which is normally brought as atonement, the primary component of her offering is the ola sacrifice.  Therefore, the Torah found it appropriate to mention the ola first, as it constitutes the primary component of the woman’s offering.  (Malbim adds other literary reasons, as well, for why the Torah mentioned the ola before the chatat.)

            Tosefot cite a much different reading of Rava’s comment in the name of Rav Chayim Kohen.  In his view, the woman is required to designate a bird as the ola before designating a second bird as the chatat.  Rava refers not to the “reading” of the Torah, but rather to the designation of the birds by the mother, who must first assign the ola, followed by the chatat.

            The Shita Mekubetzet in Masekhet Zevachim cites yet another interpretation of Rava’s comment, in the name of Rabbenu Yechiel, who understood the word “le-mikra’a” as a derivative of the Hebrew word mikreh, or “chance upon.”  He explained that Rava refers to a woman who cannot find a pair of birds for her offering, but comes upon only a single bird that she could purchase.  In such a case, she is required to bring the bird as an ola, and then bring the chatat later when she has the opportunity to purchase a second bird.

            Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson, in his Divrei Shaul (Mahadura Revi’a’a), detects a subtle textual nuance in the Torah’s discussion of the yoledet that may disprove the position of Rav Chayim Kohen.  In reference to the standard yoledet offering, the Torah writes, “He [the kohen] shall offer it before the Lord and earn atonement for her” (12:7).  With regard, however, to the offering brought by an underprivileged yoledet, the Torah appears to place special emphasis on the role of the kohen in this process: “…and the kohen shall earn atonement for her” (12:8).  The Divrei Shaul suggests that in the case of an underprivileged yoledet, the kohen plays a more significant role because he determines which bird serves as the chatat and which is offered as the ola.  As Rashi (12:9) cites from Torat Kohanim, it is specifically the chatat through which the woman achieves purification, and upon which the process hinges.  The ola, though obligatory, is not indispensable for the restoration of the woman’s status of tahara (purity).  The kohen thus plays a very prominent role in the purification process, in that he decides which bird is offered as the chatat through which the woman achieves tahara.  For this reason, the Divrei Shaul contends, the Torah emphasized the kohen’s role specifically in the context of the poor woman’s offering.  Accordingly, he writes, this emphasis might disprove the position of Rav Chayim Kohen, who held that the woman herself designates the first bird as an ola and the second as a chatat, rather than allowing a kohen to make this designation.

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            The Gemara comments in Masekhet Arakhin (15b), “Whoever speaks lashon ha-ra [negative speech about others] – the Almighty says [about him]: ‘He and I cannot reside [together] in the world’.”

            The simple reading of this passage, perhaps, relates to the theme of arrogance as the basis or source of lashon ha-ra.  People who speak negatively about others, in many cases, do so out of a desire to pride themselves and bolster their self-esteem at the expense of other people.  Rather than achieving fulfillment through hard work, developing their character and accomplishing, they instead deride others so that they can feel superior.  God says about such people that “he and I cannot reside together in the world.”  God created the world and its inhabitants for His own honor.  If a person spends his time on earth working to glorify himself, rather than to glorify the Almighty, then, quite simply, he has no place in the world, in God’s domain.

            Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his Yalkut Yehuda, suggested a different reading of the Gemara’s comment:

Among those who engage in lashon ha-ra are people who constantly seek the honor of Heaven and speak negatively about their peers regarding the fact that they sin against the Almighty or other people… Concerning this they commented here that those who say that their intention in their speech is solely to make a place for the Almighty in this world must realize that the Almighty is not pleased with them.  For not only do they fail to make space for Him, they also “push His feet away,” because He cannot be in a place where there are such people…

According to this reading, Chazal speak here of a particular kind of lashon ha-ra – derogatory speech directed against the nation’s sinners.  A person who engages in such talk may think he helps bring the Almighty into the world, but in truth, he helps keep the divine presence away from the world.  God does not wish to reside among gossipers, talebearers and slanderers even if they target the sinners of Am Yisrael.  He concerns Himself with even their dignity, and commands us to refrain from speaking negatively about them, even as we work to ensure not to follow their example.

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            Among the laws of tzara’at mentioned in Parashat Tazria is the requirement for the person afflicted with the condition to remain “outside the camp” (13:46), which Chazal understood to mean that he may not enter any walled cities in the Land of Israel.

            Different levels of tum’a require one to keep away from certain domains.  A person who came in contact with a human corpse is barred from the Temple courtyard, and people who experienced bodily emissions that render them tamei may not tread anywhere upon the Temple Mount.  Tzara’at constitutes the strictest manifestation of tum’a, in that the metzora must remain outside Jerusalem and other walled cities.

            Rav Chayim of Brisk is cited as distinguishing this final halakha – barring a metzora from walled cities – from the other laws of shilu’ach temei’im (the restrictions on entering certain sites in a state of impurity).  In his view, the prohibition against a metzora’s entry into a walled city should be classified together with the mourning practices required of a metzora, namely, that he must rend his garments and let his hair grow (13:45).  This restriction is not part of the system of shilu’ach temei’im, as a third level of restriction imposed upon those in a state of impurity.  It relates not to the general realm of tum’a, but rather to the specific area of tzara’at, as one of several measures that the metzora must observe as an expression of his state of “bereavement.”

            Rav Chayim drew proof to his theory from the Rambam’s presentation of this halakha.  The Rambam mentions the prohibition against a metzora’s entry into walled cities in the tenth chapter of Hilkhot Tum’at Tzara’at, among the other mourning laws that apply to the metzora.  He does not discuss this halakha in Hilkhot Bi’at Mikdash, where he addresses the restrictions that apply in other cases of tum’a.  Apparently, the Rambam viewed the metzora’s restriction as part of the framework of mourning which the Torah imposes upon him, rather than part of the general system of shilu’ach temei’im.

            Rav Chayim drew further support for this theory from a comment by Rashi in Masekhet Mo’ed Katan (14b).  The Gemara there entertains the possibility that the mourning laws relevant to the metzora should not apply on festivals, just as actual mourning is not observed on these joyous occasions.  Rashi mentions as an example of this hypothetical provision the prospect of allowing a metzora to enter walled cities on festivals.  Meaning, at the stage when the Gemara considered suspending the metzora’s mourning practices on festivals, it would have suspended the restriction on the metzora’s entry into walled cities.  This clearly demonstrates that this restriction belongs to the framework of mourning practices.  After all, the Gemara could never have entertained the possibility of suspending all the restrictions imposed upon temei’im during the festivals; there is no basis at all for considering such a notion.  Undoubtedly, then, Rashi understood that the prohibition against a metzora’s entry into walled cities relates to the special mourning-like practices he must observe, and not to the broader rubric of shilu’ach temei’im.

            A practical result of this distinction, as noted by Rav Binyamin Sorotzkin in his Nachalat Binyamin commentary to Negaim (chapter 14), is the status of a “musgar.”  This term refers to an individual with a tzara’at-like discoloration for whom the Torah prescribes a “waiting period,” after which the discoloration is reexamined in order to definitively determine the individual’s status.  The laws of tum’a that apply to a musgar are identical to those that apply to a person determined to be a metzora; in both cases, the individual transmits his status to other people and to utensils through direct contact, and even though is mere presence in a building (see Rambam, Hilkhot Tum’at Tzara’at 10:10-12).  Thus, had we viewed the prohibition against entering a walled city as part of the general system of tum’a, we would have likely concluded that a musgar is similarly barred from entering walled cities.  Since he shares the same tum’a status as an actual metzora, he shares as well this restriction.  According to Rav Chayim, however, this restriction relates to the mourning observances practiced by a metzora, which are not required of a musgar.  Therefore, a musgar would, in fact, be permitted to enter walled cities, just as he is not required to observe the mourning practices of a metzora.

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            A famous passage in the Midrash (Vayikra Rabba 16:2) tells of a peddler who walked through the street of a certain town, announcing that he was selling “life-giving potion.”  The announcement piqued the interest of Rabbi Yannai, who lived on that street, and he requested that the peddler show him his valuable merchandise. The peddler opened a Sefer Tehillim and showed the rabbi the verses (34:13-15), “Who is the man who desires life, who loves [his] days in which to behold goodness?  Guard your tongue from evil, and your lips from speaking deceit; turn away from evil and perform goodness…”  Rabbi Yannai lauded the peddler for his “merchandise,” and exclaimed, “All my life I never understood this verse, until this peddler came along and taught me.”

            Why did Rabbi Yannai find the peddler’s remarks so profound?  After all, he merely opened up a Tehillim and read two famous verses!

            Rav Yissachar Frand suggested that peddlers in ancient times were known as gossipers and talebearers.  Traveling salesmen would go from town to town carrying not only their wares, but also the news, rumors and chitchat they picked up along the way.  People are always all too eager to hear of the latest scandals, and, before the advent of telecommunications, traveling peddlers were the best source for the coveted “inside” information.  And besides, what better way was there for a merchant to develop a rapport with potential customers than by bringing them the “juicy” news from other communities?

            It is precisely the peddler’s natural proclivity toward gossip that endeared Rabbi Yannai to this particular merchant.  Rabbi Yannai saw that even those most inclined toward lashon ha-ra are capable of resisting this temptation and “guarding their tongues from evil.”  One does not have to keep his mouth closed at all times to avoid lashon ha-ra; he needs to guard his tongue from evil, but not from other things.  Even those whose professions lend themselves to intensive socialization and being “in the know” can overcome this tendency and speak with honor and dignity, avoiding inappropriate talk about other people.

            Of course, this can be applied equally to all areas of Torah observance.  Even if a certain situation by nature lends itself to religious compromises, this need not happen.  With firm resolve and fortitude, every individual is capable of withstanding spiritual tests and maintaining his standards regardless of the situation.