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The concluding chapter of Parashat Metzora (Vayikra 15) outlines the general principles concerning a category of tum'a (ritual impurity) known as "tum'a ha-yotzeit mi-gufo" - impurity resulting from bodily emissions. By and large, given the sensitive nature of this field of Torah law, it is not included in elementary or secondary educational curricula, nor are they studied in public study groups. We will devote some time this week to discussing some basic issues arising from these laws, in the hope of educating ourselves at least to some limited extent in this somewhat neglected area of halakha. We will first outline the basic guidelines as presented in the Torah; we will then explain which of these laws are practically relevant nowadays.

The Torah distinguishes between two basic categories of emissions: normal, standard emissions, and those that signify an aberration from the norm, likely the result of an illness. In males, a normal, seminal emission, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its discharge, renders an individual ritually impure for a single day. After the passage of a day he immerses himself in a mikveh and is then considered ritually pure (verses 16-18). If his body discharges an abnormal substance, generally a symptom of an illness, he is considered a "zav." A man who experiences two such discharges is rendered impure. He cannot become "tahor" (ritually pure) until seven days after the last discharge. If he experiences three such emissions, he must also bring a sacrifice to regain his tahara (verses 1-15; Megila 8a).

Regarding women, the critical factor is not the nature of the emission, but when it occurs. A discharge of blood that corresponds with a woman's menstrual cycle renders her a "nidda." She is tamei for seven days beginning from the first day of the discharge (verse 19). Bleeding that occurs outside the framework of her regular cycle (it is clear from the writings in Chazal that in those days women's menstrual cycles occurred in far more consistent intervals than they do nowadays) renders her a "zava." Should such bleeding occur over the course of three successive days, she is considered a "zava gedola" and cannot become "tahor" until seven days after the end of the discharge and the offering of a sacrifice (verses 25-30).

Everything we have said until now involves the statuses of "tum'a" and "tahara" - ritual purity and impurity. In this parasha, the Torah is interested only in delineating when a given individual is ritually "pure" or "impure" for purposes involving the Temple and the consumption of sacrificial meat and the like. In this sense, this chapter bears little, if any, practical, halakhic relevance today, in the absence of the Temple.

Next week, in Parshiyot Acharei-Mot and Kedoshim, we read of the more familiar application of these laws, the prohibition against marital relations with a nidda and zava (see Vayikra 18:19, 20:18). As recorded already in the Talmud, we no longer differentiate between these two categories, nidda and zava. Given the stringency of the prohibition involved and the complex calculation required to determine which blood yields which status, the practice has become universally accepted to treat all sighting of menstrual blood as "dam zivut," rendering the woman a zava. Therefore, women today do not immerse in the mikveh to become tahor (and hence permissible to their husbands) until after observing the period of "shiva nekiyim," seven days without the sighting of blood.

Tomorrow we will look at one law practically applicable nowadays that may have its origins in Parashat Metzora.

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Yesterday, we briefly surveyed the general categories of "tum'a ha-yotzeit mi-gufo," ritual impurity resulting from bodily discharges, as outlined towards the end of Parashat Metzora. We noted that the laws and definitions outlined in this section involve the area of "tum'a" and "tahara," ritual purity and impurity, which relates to the laws of the Temple - entry into the sacred grounds, the consumption of sacrificial meat and the like, etc. The more familiar issue involving relations between husband and wife, is introduced later, in Parashat Acharei-Mot (Vayikra 18:19).

There may, however, be one law mentioned already in Parashat Metzora that bears practical, contemporary relevance. The Torah begins its conclusion of this section as follows: "You shall put the Israelites on guard against their impurity… " (15:31). In Masekhet Shavuot 18b and Masekhet Nidda 63b, the Gemara cites Rabbi Yoshia's interpretation of this verse as introducing the law of "perisha samukh le-veset," prohibiting marital relations within a time-frame in which menstruation is anticipated. (Later we will briefly discuss how this is determined.) At first glance, it appears that this constitutes a Torah prohibition, and this is indeed the view of several Rishonim, including the Ra'a and seemingly the Rambam (Hilkhot Issurei Bi'a 4:12, as understood by the Noda Bi-Yehuda 1:55, 56). The Ra'avad and the Rashba, however, argue that the prohibition was introduced by Chazal, and the verse in our parasha is viewed as an allusion, rather than the actual source. The general consensus among the authorities follows this second position. Indeed, the context of the verse implies that it does not at all relate to the issue of marital relations. As we noted, this entire parasha deals strictly with the statuses tum'a and tahara, without mentioning anything about the prohibitions involving relations. In fact, this verse itself continues, "… lest they die through their impurity by defiling My Tabernacle which is among them," suggesting that the warning issued in this verse involves the laws of ritual impurity, not prohibited relations.

How does halakha determine when a menstrual flow is anticipated? The simplest way is based on an established pattern. If a given pattern repeats itself three times, then the woman must expect it to continue. Thus, on the given day or night when the sighting is expected based on the pattern, relations are forbidden. This is called a "veset kavu'a." There are nine or so different patterns that, when established, constitute a "veset kavu'a," and they are outlined in the various halakhic works on the subject (e.g. Artscroll's The Laws of Niddah by Rabbi Binyamin Forst).

Most women nowadays, however, do not menstruate in regular patterns. In this situation, halakhic tradition delineates three objectively-defined periods in which a woman must anticipate a sighting of blood and thus separate from her husband. It is important to note that this applies only to women without an established pattern; when a "veset kavu'a" is established, these periods need not be observed:

1. "Veset ha-chodesh" - the same day of the Hebrew month one month later. If the cycle began on the night of the 27^th of Nissan, for example, then relations are forbidden the next month, on the night of the 27^th of Sivan;
2. "Veset ha-flaga" - the same interval. A flow is expected after the same interval as had passed since the previous sighting. Thus, if menstruation occurred after a lapse of 26 days, relations are forbidden 26 days later.
3. "Ona beinonit" - thirty days after each sighting. According to some authorities, the "ona beinonit" occurs on the thirty-first day, rather than the thirtieth. Some contemporary authorities therefore require observing both days.

Needless to say, this brief overview barely scratched the surface of the intricate details involved. Our goal here is to educate ourselves in the basic concepts; competent halakhic authorities should be consulted for practical guidance.

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It is commonly understood, and correctly so, that the period of sefirat ha-omer, which runs from the festival of Pesach until Shavuot, expresses our anticipation of Matan Torah. Indeed, the Sefer ha-Chinukh explains the mitzva of counting tomer as based on the passage in the Midrashthat tells of Benei Yisrael's excitement upon learning that God will reveal Himself to them at Sinai. From the day after their departure from Egypt, the people counted the days towards the giving of the Torah. We commemorate this enthusiasm through the counting of the omer.

However, the simple reading of the verses in the Torah regarding the counting of the omer make no mention of this basis for sefirat ha-omer. In Parashat Emor, the Torah introduces the sefira period in a purely agricultural context, as the period in between the beginning of the barley harvest and that of the wheat harvest. The omer offering brought on the second day of Pesach consists of the new barley, whereas on Shavuot we offer the "korban shetei ha-lechem," two loaves baked from the flour ground from the new wheat. These sacrifices mark the agricultural transition that occurs over the course of the sefira period. According to the straightforward reading, then, the counting of the omer expresses the farmer's anticipation towards the completion of the process began on Pesach. Barley (at least in ancient times) is used primarily for animal fodder, while wheat is used in breads and goods eaten by human beings. A successful yield, then, is determined by the wheat harvest rather than the barley harvest. Agriculturally, the counting of the omer signifies the farmer's anxious anticipation towards the culmination of the process that begins with the barley harvest in the early spring.

Chazal, however, understood this anticipation and longing as symbolic of a much deeper, more inherently spiritual yearning: for Matan Torah. Is there any textual basis in the Torah for this association, or does it come to us purely through oral tradition?

Sure enough, we may detect at least an allusion to the Matan Torah aspect of sefirat ha-omer, which can perhaps enhance our understanding and appreciation of the precise nature of this anticipation. The mitzva of counting the omer parallels a different mitzva, that of counting the years with respect to shemita and yovel. As the Torah discusses at the beginning of Parashat Behar, every seventh year is observed as a shemita (sabbatical) year, in which agricultural activity is forbidden. These prohibitions apply as well on the fiftieth, yovel (jubilee) year, which features an additional element: the emancipation of slaves and the return of all real property to its original owner. The High Court is required to count the years leading up to the yovel - seven sets of seven years, parallel to the seven weeks counted annually between Pesach and Shavuot. The Torah calls for the sounding of a shofar on Yom Kippur at the beginning of the yovel year (Vayikra 25:9), which perhaps corresponds to the shofar blast at Sinai (Shemot 19:16). What more, the very term "yovel" - which means "trumpet" - used to describe this fiftieth year refers to this shofar blast, and brings to mind the "yovel" sounded at Sinai (Shemot 19:13). Thus, just as the counting of the years leads towards the yovel, which clearly relates to the Revelation at Sinai, so does the parallel mitzva of sefirat ha-omer express our anticipation towards Matan Torah.

But wherein lies the connection between Matan Torah and the jubilee year?

It would appear that this association alluded to in the text serves as the basis of Chazal's dictum, "ein lekha ben chorin ela mi she-oseik ba-Torah" - a free man is one who occupies himself in Torah. The yovel, the year of freedom and emancipation, is linked with Matan Torah because the latter event reflects the true nature of freedom according to Jewish thought: true freedom is that which allows one to bind himself to God and accept upon himself His laws. Sefirat ha-omer, which bridges the Exodus and the receiving of the Torah, demonstrates that we attained complete freedom not on Pesach, with our departure from Egypt, but on Shavuot, as God suspended Mount Sinai over us and we accepted His Torah. By counting the omer, we show that Pharaoh was not the lone obstacle to religious fulfillment; what was required was the commitment of Sinai, the willful acceptance of God's law and the genuine desire to become His servants.

(Based on a recently published article by Rav Yaakov Medan)

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The mourning practices observed during the period of sefirat ha-omer are generally assumed to mark the tragic death of Rabbi Akiva's students, who, the Gemara (Yevamot 62b) informs us, were killed by a devastating plague during this period between Pesach and Shavuot. The Gemara explains that these students were punished "because they did not afford honor to one another." This explains why they perished, but it does not explain why the decree was executed specifically during the omer period, between Pesach and Shavuot. Is there any relationship between their failure to afford honor to one another and the counting of the omer, the seven weeks leading towards Matan Torah on Shavuot?

Perhaps a closer look at the precise nature of the sin for which these students deserved annihilation will bring to light the relevance of the omer period to their deaths. What does it mean that Rabbi Akiva's students did not treat one another respectfully? Rabbi Akiva ranks among the greatest of the tanna'im, and his yeshiva in Bnei-Brak was the center of the Torah world at the time. How could it be that his students did not act properly towards one another?

On one level, no answer will resolve this difficulty with complete satisfaction. When dealing with the "sins" of great people, we must maintain a proper sense of reverence for their stature and piety, a sense that must make us somewhat uncomfortable attributing misdeeds to them. However, this stature and piety is not undermined by the fact that they erred; if Chazal pointed to a flaw in their conduct, it behooves us to properly understand their mistake and learn and implement the lessons emerging from this tragedy.

In Masekhet Nedarim (40a), the Gemara tells that a certain student of Rabbi Akiva fell ill, but none of his peers came to visit him. Only Rabbi Akiva went and tended to the patient's needs. The disciple credited his rabbi for "saving his life" by coming to care for him. Why had none of the students visited their classmate, who, apparently, suffered from a serious illness? What were they doing that received priority over a simple visit to a friend in distress? Most likely, they were busy learning Torah. They perhaps felt unwilling to make the academic sacrifice necessary to assist their friend in need.

We may perhaps speculate that this reflects the lack of honor which the Gemara claims the students failed to afford one another. A degree of academic competition - however slight - may have developed within the walls of the yeshiva, one which resulted in the prioritization of intellectual progress over friendship and camaraderie. As the Almighty "is strict with the righteous as a hairsbreadth," this competitiveness and strife warranted the destruction of Rabbi Akiva's yeshiva.

This sentence was carried out in the weeks leading up to Shavuot, the festival of Matan Torah. Just as Benei Yisrael accepted the Torah "as one person, with one heart" (Rashi, Shemot 19:2), so must Torah be studied with a sense of love and mutual concern for one another. True, as the Gemara in Kiddushin (30b) describes, Torah study often takes the form of a battle between two intellectual combatants stubbornly upholding their views and defending their positions. However, the Gemara concludes, "but they do not budge from there until they become friends with one another." If, over the course of debate, students must rival and compete with one another, when the books are closed harmony and unity must prevail once again. This is how we must accept the Torah, in the spirit of, "Torah scholars increase peace in the world" (Berakhot 64a).

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Much of Parshiyot Tazria-Metzora is devoted the laws of tzara'at, a skin infection (generally associated with leprosy or similar disease) that generates tum'a (ritual impurity). The contraction of tum'a depends on many different factors aconditions, including the formal declaration of a kohen. Regardless of how long prior tothe kohen's pronouncement the tzara'at had surfaced, the tum'a takes effect only once the kohen determines that the infection is a manifestation of tzara'at and issues a verbal declaration to this effect.

The Gemara in Masekhet Mo'ed Katan (8a) discusses another provision, that one cannot assess the infection to determine its status at nighttime. Only during daylight hours can the kohen examine the individual to determine whether or not his infection constitutes tzara'at. Abayei and Rava argue as to the source of this provision. Abayei derives this law from the verse, "On the DAY undiscolored flesh appears… " (13:14). As the verse describes the kohen's examination in this context as occurring specifically by day, it suggests that it must be conducted during the daytime. Rava cites a different verse, describing a homeowner's report to the kohen of a suspicious mark on the walls of his house: "Something like a plague has appeared to me in the house" (14:35). According to Rava, "appeared to me" implies that he beheld the "plague" through his natural, optical capabilities, unaided by means of illumination. Thus, the dark, nighttime hours are unsuitable for the assessment of potentially tzara'at-related marks.

The Chazon Ish (Nega'im 4:5) raises a very simple question on this entire discussion. Many times throughout the Talmud and Midrashim, the use of the word "yom" (day) in the context of a given halakha is understood as requiring its performance specifically by day. Now this word appears many times throughout the chapters dealing with tzara'at. Why, then, must Abayei and Rava search high and low for a compelling source for the disqualification of nighttime examinations? What more, Rava does not even cite an instance of "yom" as the source of this provision; and even Abayei chooses but one out of many such examples!

Rav Yitzchak Rosenblat, in his "Chedvat Yotzer," answers by distinguishing this halakha from other instances where a ritual performed at nighttime is disqualified. In other areas, the Torah established definite, objective boundaries of time within which the given action must take place. Just as one cannot fulfill his obligation of Chanukah candles by lighting them on Pesach, so must tefillin be worn specifically by day; at nighttime, the mitzva simply does not apply, just as the obligation of matza does not apply on Sukkot. The examination of ssara'at, by contrast, is incidentally - rather than essentially - limited to the daytime. It must take place by day because the infection in question must be seen in daylight, rather than by candlelight. Thus, for example, the Mishna (Nega'im 2:3) rules that the examination may not take place on a dark, cloudy day (this would seemingly apply to solar eclipses, as well), and presumably this disqualifies examinations even by candlelight, when the examiner's vision would not be impaired by the cloud cover. Were this provision to involve merely an objectively-defined time period, the amount of sunlight present on a given day would be inconsequential. However, since we deal here with a disqualification based on the means of viewing the infection, a dark afternoon is as unsuitable as nighttime.

Therefore, Rav Rosenblat suggests, the use of the word "yom" (day) in the context of ssara'at examination would not serve as the basis for this provision. This would merely define daytime as the exclusive period in which the examination could take place; it would not, however, introduce the requirement for sunlight. Rava therefore cites a verse that implies the unsuitability of candlelight, effectively disqualifying nighttime examinations. Abayei agrees in principle, only chooses a different verse: "On the day… appears." The textual link between "day" and "appear" suggests to Abayei that the appearance must be one of a "daytime" quality, meaning, one enabled by natural sunlight. Abayei therefore specifically chooses this verse, which associates the appearance of the infection with daytime, which indicates that the daytime light must provide the means for the sighting of the infection.

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The beginning of Parashat Metzora outlines the procedure required of a metzora (one who contracted tzara'at) before he becomes tahor (ritually pure). Among the rituals required is the placing of both oil and sacrificial blood on his right ear, right thumb and big toe of his right foot (14:14,17; 14:25,28). In only one other context throughout the Torah do we find a similar ritual: as part of the "milu'im" - the consecration ceremony of the kohanim. There, too, the blood of the special offering is placed on these body parts of the kohanim (see Shemot 29:20). This perhaps reflects a point of similarity between these two rituals - the preparation of the kohanim for service in the Mishkan, and the purification process of the metzora. At first glance, these two ceremonies seem hardly related. How are we to understand the association drawn between them?

Rav Zalman Sorotzkin (Oznayim le-Torah) explains that in both instances, an individual seeks entry into an area presently forbidden to him. The kohanim, chosen as God's servants to attend to His Sanctuary, must be "purified" from their heretofore mundane existence in preparation for their ascent to this new level, where they function in the Mikdash. The metzora, too, has been barred entry - but in his case, he is barred not only from the Mishkan, but from the entire camp (see Vayikra 13:46). In order to earn his way back in, he, like the kohen, must undergo a process of purification. Rav Sorotzkin adds that whereas the metzora's return from banishment is a far more drastic transition than the kohen's earning the privilege of officiating in the Mishkan, the process required is more complex. Whereas the kohen has only the sacrificial blood placed on his ear, toe and thumb, the metzora must have oil placed, as well. The additional requirement signifies the additional obstacle the metzora must overcome, beyond that which the kohen confronts.

This parallel between these two procedures, as explained by Rav Sorotzkin, perhaps conveys a powerful message. Although, as we just mentioned, a clear, quantitative distinction exists regarding the transition required in the two cases, the Torah nevertheless equates these two types of progress: the metzora's return to society and the kohen's induction into the Temple service. As the metzora is generally seen as representing the results of sin and spiritual contamination, we see here an equation of sorts between progress from the lowest level, and progress towards the highest level. To one extent or another, the Torah compares the sinner's return to spiritual life with the righteous kohen's preparation for the apex of spiritual life: serving as God's minister in His chambers. This perhaps reinforces the notion that in religious life, where one is bears far less significance than where he is headed. The message conveyed is that one who lifts himself from the lowest rung is comparable with the nearly perfect individual who works towards total perfection. At any given moment, we cannot be expected to be anything more than a step ahead of where we currently stand. We are called upon merely to take the next step, with the sincere intention of then taking the next, and so on.

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Parashat Tazria opens with the ritual laws relevant to a childbearing woman. After childbirth, the woman is considered temei'a (ritually impure) for a period of either thirty-three of sixty-six days, depending on the child's gender, during which time she may not enter the Mikdash or partake of sacrificial meat. In order to become "tehora" (ritually pure), she must first bring a sacrifice - a lamb and either a pigeon or a turtle dove. The Mishna and Gemara in Masekhet Keritut (9b) discuss how many sacrifices the woman brings in cases of multiple or successive births. The principle established is that a single korban suffices for all births that occurred within the "melot," or the specified period of ritual impurity observed bethe purification offering may be brought. (The Mishna describes in detail how such cases can occur.) However, if a woman conceives and givebirth again after the completion of this period, but before she got around to bringing her purification offering, she must bring two sacrifices - one for each child. (However, she is considered tehora immediately after the first sacrifice, only not exempt from the second.)

This halakha gives rise to a troubling difficulty concerning the Mishna just two pages earlier - in Keritut 8a. The Mishna there relates that once the price of the birds used for these sacrifices soared (probably as a result of a cartel of sorts). Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel, the rabbinic leader ("nasi") at the time, threatened the retailers that if the price did not come down he will issue an exemption from the additional sacrifices. Meaning, he will absolve women who owe sacrifices for previous births from their obligation. They will be required to bring only a single offering for all their births. The bird sellers took his threat to heart and lowered the prices.

How could Rabban Shimon simply uproot a Biblical obligation? As sensitive as halakha always is to the underprivileged, financial straits can never eliminate mitzvot whose performance costs money. On what basis did Rabban Shimon issue this exemption?

Rashi there writes that this situation warranted the application of the principle, "et la'asot le-Hashem, heferu Toratekha," meaning, that the recognized rabbinic authority of a generation has the power to overturn a Biblical law if he foresees widespread neglect of the Torah otherwise. Rabban Shimon realized that unless the prices went down, women would not bring any sacrifices after childbirth, and would thus violate the severe prohibition of walking on the Temple grounds and eating sacrificial meat in a state of tum'a. He therefore threatened to issue an exemption from the additional sacrifices, as a woman can become tehora with only a single offering.

The Netziv (in his "Herchev Davar" to 12:7), however, cites an explanation from his son, Rav Chayim Berlin, by which Rabban Shimon's threatened measure accommodates the halakhot themselves. The obligation to bring multiple sacrifices for successive births (unless they occurred within the "melot" period) is derived from the concluding verse of this section in Parashat Tazria: "this is the procedure for her who bears a child" (12:7; how this verse implies multiple obligations is not our topic at the moment). Though we refer to this verse as "the concluding verse," this is not entirely true. It is followed by one more verse relevant to the laws of the childbearing woman: a woman who cannot afford this sacrifice brings a less expensive offering, consisting of two turtle doves. Rav Chayim Berlin argued that the obligation to bring multiple sacrifices for successive births does not apply to the underprivileged woman; after all, the provision was introduced earlier, specifically with regard to the wealthy woman. Rabban Shimon thus informed the salesmen that if the women cannot afford to pay the exorbitant prices, the provision requiring multiple offerings would not apply to them. Since they would be considered underprivileged with respect to this offering, the multiple sacrifice provision - which pertains only to the wealthy - would no longer apply. Thus, his threat in this regard fully complied with the halakha, and did not mark an overruling of Torah law, as it were.

(The Netziv notes that according to his son's analysis, if Rabban Shimon's ruling had taken effect, then wealthy women who could afford the higher prices would still have had to bring multiple sacrifices for their previous births.)

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