Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion

by Rav David Silverberg

Parashat Tazria introduces us to the laws of tzara’at, a type of skin-disease which renders the patient tamei (ritually impure). Throughout the ages, scholars have uncovered for us the symbolism underlying this institution and its particular laws, showing how the procedures for dealing with tzara’at reflect the proper approach towards spiritual defilement in general. These analyses generally take into account the prominent role of the kohen throughout this process. The kohen was the only one who could formally declare the presence of tzara’at. A non-kohen, no matter how proficient he may be in the relevant laws, cannot establish tum’at tzara’at. Only once the kohen determines the presence of tzara’at does the patient become ritually impure. Similarly, as the Torah outlines in the beginning of Parashat Metzora, the kohen is the one who conducts the metzora’s process of purification. The kohen’s role is often seen as symbolic of the function served by the spiritual guides and leaders in “purifying” the community from their spiritual ills.

Rav Yitzchak Stollman, in his “Minchat Yitzchak,” develops this idea in light of a passage in the Midrash Tanchuma on this parasha (7). The Midrash tells of a kohen who planned to leave on business and instructed his wife to take his place in assessing patients to determine if they indeed suffer from tzara’at. He told her, “If you see [from] the person’s hair that its fountain had dried, you should know that he has been smitten [with tzara’at], since for every hair the Almighty created its own fountain from which it drinks. Once the fountain dries, the hair dries.” The Midrash attributes tzara’at to the “drying of a fountain.” Leaving aside the physiological issue of to what exactly this Midrash refers, let us address the more crucial question: what does this represent in terms of tzara’at and its symbolic meaning?

Rav Stollman suggests that Chazal teach us in this passage that impurity results from a “drained fountain.” The process of defilement does not take place in a vacuum, it does not occur suddenly without reason. A person or community becomes “tamei” when its authentic fountains of spirituality are drained, when the “hairs” begin to “drink” from alternative sources of “life” rather than their traditional teachings. Tum’a thus means the detachment from one’s source, from one’s origins.

The kohen’s role, symbolic of the responsibility assigned to the religious leaders of every generation, is to identify this detachment, to check and see whether or not the people draw their values and ideals from the “fountain” of tradition. They must carefully study both the tradition and the current reality to determine whether or not there exists a parity between the two. Should they determine the presence of tum’a, that the fountain has indeed dried, then they must lend the metzora a hand as he undergoes the process of purification, the process of refilling the wellsprings with the spiritual waters of our traditions, enabling him to reenter the Jewish people and recommit himself to the teachings of our heritage.

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In describing the procedure required when a suspicious infection appears on one’s skin, the Torah addresses the case when, after two weeks of monitoring the patient, the infection fades. The Torah calls such an infection “mispachat,” some kind of rash or discoloration that does not qualify as tzara’at (13:6). Addressing the etymology of this word “mispachat,” Rav Yaakov Mecklenberg, in his “Ha-ketav Ve-ha’kabbala,” associates it with the common term “nispach,” which means an appendix or addendum, something added that remains separate from the original. Rav Mecklenberg explains that the fading infection shows that it had not resulted from an internal disorder, but rather from some external factor. To qualify for tzara’at, the skin irritation must originate from some bodily illness. A “mispachat,” by contrast, is a reaction of the skin to some external irritant, rather than a symptom of an internal disorder.

Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his “Yalkut Yehuda,” adds that this feature of tzara’at, that it evolves from an internal illness, relates as well to the symbolic, spiritual meaning behind tzara’at. Chazal teach that a person was stricken by tzara’at on account of certain violations, most commonly lashon hara (inappropriate speech about others). Sins come in two forms: those that originate from external factors, and those stemming from the person’s internal being. Tzara’at, as we saw from the Ha-ketav Ve-ha’kabbala, symbolizes the second type, the inherent flaws within a person. Therefore, as the Torah outlines in our parasha, the kohen initially proclaims a period of “hesger,” isolation, upon the patient. After this period, he checks the infection again to see whether or not it had spread. Rav Ginsburg explains that on the symbolic level, this “test” determines whether the spiritual ills from which the individual suffers originate from his inner self, or from the environment around him. If the infection remains even after the isolation period, then the kohen declares the presence of tzara’at. If the flaw exists even after the individual has been isolated from society, then he indeed suffers from an internal “illness” that requires extensive treatment. If, however, the infection begins to fade over the course of the “hesger” period, then evidently it was the result of external factors, rather than an internal flaw.

This helps explain the particular stringency of tum’at tzara’at, requiring the metzora to remain quarantined, outside the camp or city, until his illness is cured. So long as the metzora remains within society, he can easily attribute all his shortcomings to the influences around him, to the negative forces in the community in which he lives and works. He is therefore sent outside the camp, where he has no one on whom to cast the blame for his own wrongdoing. There he can blame only himself, and undergo a process of sincere introspection and commitment to change, at which point his illness will be cured and he will be granted permission to reenter society.

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Parashat Tazria discusses the intricate laws and guidelines regarding tzara’at. In Masekhet Negaim, the section of the mishnayot dealing with these laws, we find the following comment: “Kol ha-negaim adam ro’eh chutz mi-nig’ei atzmo” – “A person can see all [tzara’at] except his own” (Negaim 2:5). This mishna refers to the procedure by which tum’at tzara’at is established. As we discussed earlier this week, only a kohen can determine the presence of tzara’at and thereby establish the impurity generated by tzara’at. The provision introduced by this mishna teaches that a kohen stricken with an infection cannot serve as his own “kohen” with regard to establishing tum’at tzara’at. He must bring his case to a different kohen who will make his determination according to the prescribed guidelines.

The Minchat Chinukh raises a fundamental question regarding this mishna. Does it refer to the observation of the infection in question, or to the formal declaration affirming the presence of tum’at tzara’at? To explain the Minchat Chinukh’s query, let us consider a case of a knowledgeable kohen who examines his own infection and reaches the conclusion that it does, indeed, qualify as tzara’at. If he reports his findings to a different kohen, who is ignorant in the laws of tzara’at, can the second kohen declare the presence of tum’at tzara’at on that basis? This depends on how we interpret the mishna in Masekhet Negaim. If we take the passage literally, that one cannot “see” his own infections, then a kohen is disqualified from examining himself for tzara’at. Thus, the second kohen, who merely hears the report from the kohen-patient, will have no power to declare tum’at tzara’at, given the fact that the patient examined himself. We may, h, adopt a more liberal interpretation of the mishna, to mean that a kohen cannot declare himself a metzora, though he may indeed examine himself and assess the empirical evidence. Conversely, if a kohen himself does not have the necessarily knowledge to decide his status, may he bring a proficient scholar to study the situation and reach a conclusion, at which point the kohen himself will make the declaration? If the mishna disqualifies only the formal declaration of a kohen concerning his status, then presumably such a system would not work; if, however, it is the examination that is invalid, then so long as someone else conducts the examination, the kohen can declare his own state of tum’a.

The Minchat Chinukh expresses his inclination towards the second, more liberal reading of the mishna, that “seeing” actually refers to the formal declaration. He cites proof from Masekhet Zevachim (102a), where the Gemara discusses the most famous instance of tzara’at – the infection of Miriam, Moshe’s sister (Bemidbar 12). The Gemara asks, which kohen made the formal declaration establishing Miriam’s tzara’at? The kohanim at the time were Aharon and his two sons, Elazar and Itamar, who were relatives of Miriam, and kohanim cannot declare tzara’at on behalf of relatives (according to one view in that same mishna in Negaim), just as a kohen cannot declare tzara’at for himself. (The Maharsha briefly discusses the question as to why Pinchas could not serve as the kohen for Miriam.) Now if a kohen is disqualified from examining an infection for himself or a relative, but may issue the declaration of his own or relative’s tzara’at, we do not understand the Gemara’s question. Certainly they could have found a non-kohen proficient in the laws of negaim who could conduct the examination and report his findings to Aharon, who could then declare his sister a metzora’at! Apparently, then, the mishna in Negaim disqualifies a kohen from formally declaring his own or relative’s tzara’at, and hence an examination conducted by a non-kohen would be of no avail.

This is also the implication of the Vilna Gaon, who said, as cited by Rav Yehuda Assad (Yehuda Ya’aleh, Y.D. 187), that a person can rule on matters of halakha for situations concerning himself except in situations where a formal, verbal declaration is required, and he lists negaim as one such area of halakha. This would imply that the problem lies with the formal declaration, not with the examination.

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Towards the beginning of Parashat Tazria, the Torah repeats the mitzva of berit mila, which we had already encountered much earlier in the Chumash, at the end of Parashat Lekh-Lekha. Chazal (Masekhet Shabbat 132a) derive from the verse in our parasha one specific detail relevant to berit mila, that an eight-day old baby is circumcised even on Shabbat. Although normally the infliction of a bloody wound constitutes a Shabbat violation, this special provision requires the suspension of the laws of Shabbat for the performance of a berit mila (when it is performed on the eighth day).

Many scholars have questioned why Chazal did not forbid the performance of circumcisions on Shabbat, just as they forbade the performance of other mitzvot on Shabbat. A famous decree issued by the Sages prohibits us from taking the lulav on Shabbat during Sukkot, reading the Megila when Purim falls on Shabbat, and blowing shofar on Rosh Hashanah that occurs on Shabbat. This decree was intended to prevent a possible Shabbat violation that might result from carrying the given item (lulav, Megila, shofar) through a public domain. Perhaps, then, we should have expected a similar decree regarding berit mila. Why did Chazal not issue such a decree in order to prevent a mistaken Shabbat violation such as by carrying the knife through a public domain?

Among the famous answers offered to this question is that of the Taz (O.C. 585:5), who explains based on a famous principle that he advances in several places throughout his writings. In establishing this and other similar decrees, Chazal make use of the power invested within them by the Torah to make “fences” around Torah observance even by suspending a mitzva. The Torah empowered the Sages (under certain, limited circumstances) to suspend the performance of a mitzva in order to safeguard halakha. The Taz, however, imposes a significant restriction on this power granted to Chazal, namely, that they cannot override a Torah law explicitly formulated in the Torah. Thus, for example, one could ask why Chazal did not forbid shofar blowing even on Rosh Hashanah that falls on a weekday, lest someone blow it for non-mitzva purposes, which would violate Yom Tov. The answer, the Taz explains, is that Chazal cannot issue a decree that overrides an explicit verse in the Torah. If the Torah explicitly demanded that the shofar be blown on Rosh Hashanah, Chazal cannot do away with this mitzva.

Similarly, the Taz claims, the Torah, as interpreted by Chazal, explicitly mandates circumcision when the child’s eighth day occurs on Shabbat. Therefore, refraining from performing this mitzva on Shabbat would constitute a direct violation of this explicit provision, which Chazal are not empowered to decree.

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Yesterday, we discussed the halakha extracted by the Gemara from a verse towards the beginning of Parashat Tazria, that should a male baby be born on Shabbat, his circumcision takes place on Shabbat the following week. Despite the Shabbat violation involved, the Torah itself calls for overriding the strictures of Shabbat for the purposes of berit mila. We then addressed the question raised by many as to why Chazal did not prohibit Shabbat circumcisions just as they forbade other mitzvot on Shabbat (lulav, shofar, Megila) out of concern for the possible violation of Shabbat as a result. The Taz, as we saw, claimed that Chazal do not have the power to override an explicit verse in the Torah. Once the Torah explicitly mandated a Shabbat circumcision for a child born on Shabbat, Chazal cannot legislate otherwise.

Some later scholars have questioned this reasoning of the Taz. The Taz considers this provision, requiring a Shabbat berit mila, as a law explicitly introduced in the Torah. One can easily argue that this is simply not the case. The verse understood as the source for this halakha reads, “And on the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised.” On the surface, this verse says nothing about Shabbat; it is only through traditional, rabbinic exegesis that Chazal interpret this verse as referring to an instance of a Shabbat birth, mandating circumcision on the following Shabbat, on the child’s eighth day. Can we really consider this law “explicitly mentioned” in the Torah, such that a decree by Chazal forbidding a Shabbat berit would oppose an explicit law of the Torah?

One could perhaps answer that according to the Taz, a law derived from a verse through the principles of halakhic exegesis is, indeed, to be seen as “explicitly mentioned.” In other words, perhaps in his mind, from the perspective of halakha, the “derash” rereads the verse as clearly stating the derived halakhic principle. Only a Torah law that is not derived from a verse at all do Chazal have the power to override in the interest of safeguarding the Torah; when, however, a law is based on a Biblical verse, either explicitly or subtly, Chazal cannot issue overriding legislation.

Such an approach, however, would encounter considerable difficulty explaining other instances when decrees are issued that contradict Torah law derived from “derash.” One such example is brought from Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (21b). The Gemara there derives from a verse (“tikre’u otam be-mo’adam” – Vayikra 23:4) an extraordinary provision allowing witnesses to the new moon to violate Shabbat in order to travel to Jerusalem to give testimony. (Until Talmudic times, months were determined based on the sighting of the new moon.) Chazal, however, restricted this provision to the months of Nissan and Tishrei; witnesses to the new moon for all other months were not permitted to violate Shabbat for purpoof their testimony. Seemingly, according to the Taz, one might wonder how Chazal could issue such a decree, given that the Torah – albeit subtly – gives witnesses permission to violate the Shabbat to testify!

Rav Moshe Feinstein, in his Iggerot Moshe (O.C. 1:134), suggests an explanation in defense of the Taz. In truth, the Taz referred only to laws that the Torah mentions explicitly. The permission granted to the witnesses to travel on Shabbat does not appear explicitly in the Torah, but is rather extracted through the process of “derash.” Our verse, calling for a child’s circumcision on Shabbat, does not appear to present this law explicitly, but it nevertheless qualifies for the Taz’s restriction on Chazal’s power of legislation. Rav Moshe claims that Chazal view this verse as coming entirely to introduce this provision allowing for Shabbat violation. They did not impose an additional level of interpretation, or derive a law from some nuance in the verse. Rather, they found the verse entirely superfluous, and therefore concluded that it must have been added for this very reason – to introduce the law calling for a circumcision even on Shabbat. Therefore, Rav Moshe suggests, the Taz considered this halakha explicitly mentioned in the Torah, thus precluding the possibility of a rabbinic decree forbidding Shabbat circumcisions.

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Parashat Tazria opens with the halakha of “tum’at yoledet,” the laws regarding the tum’a status of a woman after childbirth. After every birth, a woman is deemed ritually impure for seven days, similar to her period of tum’a during her menstrual cycle. Afterwards, she observes a longer period – thirty-three days for a male child, sixty-six for a female child – called “yemei tahara.” During this period, her blood is not considered menstrual blood which would render her ritually impure, but she is nevertheless forbidden from entering the Mikdash or partaking of sacrificial meat. At the end of this period, she brings a special sacrifice and thereby becomes tehora.

Several different explanations have been offered as to the concept underlying this form of tum’a. We will present here the approach taken by Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsh, in his commentary to this parasha. Rav Hirsch finds the clue to understanding this halakha in the word used by the Torah to describe childbirth, the word that has become the name of this parasha: “tazria.” Rather than simply stating, “When a woman gives birth to a child,” the Torah chose to add this term, which, as Rav Hirsch observes, appears in only one other instance in Tanakh in the context of reproduction: in Bereishit 1. The Torah there describes the vegetation God created on the third day of creation as “mazri’a zera” – that it gives forth seed, enabling its own reproduction. Why did the Torah choose to describe childbirth in this manner? What does this term contribute to the context at hand?

Rav Hirsch suggests that the term “tazria” invokes a certain perspective on the event of childbirth, one which focuses on “the purely material physical character of its physiological process.” The Torah describes childbirth here as something more or less parallel to the reproduction in the plant world, without any distinctive human quality involved. “Tazria” connotes an entirely mundane, physical event, having nothing to do with the introduction of a new human soul, the addition of a new member to Kenesset Yisrael, or the emergence of yet another link on the golden chain of Jewish tradition. Childbirth is depicted here in its crudest form, as a physiological phenomenon shared by human beings, the animal kingdom, and plant life. This, Rav Hirsch claims, forms the basis of tum’at yoledet. After childbirth, a process is necessary by which a mother can overcome “tazria,” the passive, purely physical experience of childbirth, and “reestablish again the consciousness of her own spiritual height.” The procedure of tum’at yoledet, culminating with a visit to the Temple and the offering of sacrifices, is meant specifically to help the woman gradually regain her sense of spirituality, which to some extent gives way to a more dominantly physical focus over the course of the painstaking process of childbirth.

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One famous law relevant to a metzora introduced in Parashat Tazria requires that “badad yeishev” – he must dwell in solitude outside the camp (13:46). The Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim (47a) establishes that a metzora must remain isolated from even other temei’im – those who, like him, have contracted ritual impurity (presumably including other metzoraim). The Torah requires that the metzora live in complete solitude, and may not enjoy social contact with any other person.

A surprising qualification of this halakha is cited in the name of the work, “Eil Miluim.” Why does the Torah require the isolation of the metzora? The Gemara in Masekhet Arakhin (16) explains that a metzora “separated between people”; he is therefore punished by having to remain isolated and separate from all other people. The Gemara here refers to the famous association drawn between tzara’at and lashon ha-ra – gossip and slander. Spreading rumors about someone causes others to keep their distance from him; the talebearer is thus punished by living in solitude until he is cured from his tzara’at.

In truth, however, the Gemara there in Arakhin lists seven sins for which one is stricken with tzara’at. Thus, while we generally associate tzara’at with the sin of lashon ha-ra, it is actually brought on by other transgressions, as well. Indeed, we find in Tanakh several examples of tzara’at as a punishment for other forms of wrongdoing. King Uziyahu was stricken by tzara’at for bringing an unlawful incense offering. Geichazi, the attendant of the prophet Elisha, is punished with tzara’at for greedily accepting a gift from Na’aman, the general of Aram, after Elisha had turned down the offer of such a gift. Accordingly, the “Eil Miluim” contends that the provision in Masekhet Pesachim, that a metzora must remain isolated even from fellow metzoraim, applies only to someone stricken with tzara’at for speaking lashon ha-ra. A violator of a different transgression who suffers from tzara’at as a result, may, in fact, maintain social contact with other metzora’im. (Presumably, we must find some other reason why he is banished from the city in the first place.)

In light of this theory, the “Eil Miluim” suggests an explanation for a comment in Masekhet Sanhedrin 107a regarding the famous story of the “arba metzoraim,” the four lepers of Shomron, of which we read as the haftara for Parashat Metzora (though this year on Shabbat Parashat Metzora we will read the special haftara for Shabbat Ha-gadol). Sefer Melakhim II (chapter 7) tells of four metzoraim who resided outside the city of Shomron when the city came under siege by the forces of Aram. Seeing that there was little hope for the city’s survival, the four decided to try launching an offensive of sorts against the enemy camp. When they arrived in the camp, they found it deserted; the entire army had been scared away by a miraculous simulation of the sound of large armies produced by God. They informed the city of what had happened, and the starving residents of Shomron were saved and took all the goods left by the fleeing soldiers. The Gemara in Sanhedrin identifies these four metzoraim as Geichazi and his three sons. As mentioned, Geichzai was punished for dishonestly taking a gift from Na’aman against the wishes of his mentor, Elisha (see Melakhim II chapter 5). Elisha declared that Na’aman and his offspring will suffer from tzara’at on account of Geichazi’s greed. According to the Gemara, these four were the metzoraim outside the city of Shomron.

On what basis did the Gemara make such an identification? The “Eil Miluim” suggests that the Gemara sought to resolve a basic question with this story of the four metzoraim: how could it be that they dwelled together outside the city? Did not the Gemara explicitly state in Masekhet Pesachim that a metzora may not enjoy the company of even another metzora? The Gemara therefore ithese metzoraim as Geichazi and his sons who, as we know, were not stricken with tzara’at for spreading gossip; they were punished for an entirely different matter. Therefore, based on the principle established by the “Eil Miluim,” they were, indeed, allowed to dwell together.

One may, however, suggest a far simpler explanation as to the significance of this identification of the metzoraim as Geichazi and his sons. As mentioned, Elisha decreed tzara’at upon their family as a punishment for greed. In the story of the “arba metzoraim,” we read that when the four first noticed the deserted enemy camp, full of food, provisions and riches, they ate, drank, and began hiding treasures for themselves. In the midst of their activity, they suddenly come to the realization that this was improper: “They then said to one another: We are not doing right. This is a day of good news, and we are keeping silent! If we wait until the light of morning, we shall incur guilt. Come, let us go and inform the king’s palace” (Melakhim II 7:9-10). These verses take on far deeper significance in light of the Gemara’s assertion that these men were none other than Geichazi and his sons. We see in the clearest possible way the positive effects of the tzara’at experience, the transformation of a greedy family into people sensitive to the plight of others. The ordeal they had just undergone led them to take pause as they filled their pockets and hid treasure chests, realizing their obligation to people other than themselves. This account, then, is a true tzara’at success story, an example of genuine teshuva resulting from the metzoraim’s banishment from society and process of introspection and change.

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