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Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT Tazria

by Rav David Silverberg

            The opening section of Parashat Tazria discusses the laws of "tum'at yoledet," the halakhic status of tum'a ("impurity") assigned to a woman immediately following childbirth.  In these verses the Torah delineates two successive periods of tum'a that apply after childbirth.  For the first week after delivering a male child and two weeks after delivering a female, a woman has the status of a nidda (menstruating woman).  All the laws that apply to a nidda, including the prohibitions against marital relations and against entering the Temple grounds or partaking of sacrificial meat, apply to a new mother for the first week or two weeks.  This 1-2 week period is followed by a second term referred to by the Torah as "demei tahara" (literally, "blood of purity").  This period lasts thirty-three days in the case of the birth of a baby boy, and sixty-six days after the birth of a girl.  During this period, too, the woman may not enter the Temple grounds or come in contact with sacred items.  However, as Chazal explain, during this period any blood that leaves the woman's body is considered by the Torah as "blood of purity."  Meaning, it does not render her a nidda.  The Torah here establishes a unique provision that a flow of blood during these weeks does not have the same halakhic effect as it does normally, and the laws of nidda thus do not apply during this period.  She is nevertheless forbidden from entering the Temple grounds and so on, due to a separate status of "tum'at yoledet."  But even if she experiences a flow of blood during these weeks, she is, according to Torah law, permitted to engage in marital relations.

            Throughout the ages, this halakha formed a point of contention between the believers and deniers of the rabbinic oral tradition.  Already the Tzedukim (Sadducees), a heretical sect during the Second Temple era, read these verses differently, to mean that a woman does not become "pure" at all, even from the status of nidda, until after the thirty-three or sixty-six days.  According to this reading, a woman has a status of nidda after the birth of a boy for a total of forty days, and, after the birth of a girl, for eighty days – regardless of whether or not she bleeds.  This position was later accepted by the Karaites (as recorded in the so-called "halakhic" works of the Karaites) and is reportedly the practice among the Shomronim.

            It turns out, then, that according to Chazal's understanding of Torah law, a woman cannot become a nidda during the thirty-three or sixty-six days, whereas the deviant position held that a woman cannot divest herself of the nidda status – even if she stops bleeding - until after this period.

            In practice, this debate is somewhat less consequential.  A famous comment of Rabbi Zeira in the Gemara (Masekhet Nidda 66a) establishes the universally accepted custom to consider a woman a "zava" at the sighting of any blood, regardless of when this occurs.  According to Torah law, the sighting of blood can render a woman either a nidda, or a zava.  A nidda can become tehora ("pure") by immersing seven days after the initial flow, whereas a zava must wait "seven clean days" – without blood – before immersing.  When the blood appears will determine whether the woman is a nidda or zava.  According to the practice recorded by Rabbi Zeira, however, we consider a woman a zava after any sighting of blood, regardless of when it occurs.  Therefore, after childbirth, too, Halakha considers a woman a zava and she cannot become tehora until the complete cessation of bleeding, which in any event often continues for many weeks.  (Though tomorrow we will reconsider the relevance of Rabbi Zeira's practice to the case of a yoledet.)  It turns out, then, that even according to normative Jewish law, a woman may very well be considered a nidda (or, more precisely, a zava) for six weeks or longer after childbirth.

            Interestingly, the Rambam (Hilkhot Issurei Bi'a 11:15) observes a custom among some traditional Jewish communities to de facto consider a woman a nidda until after the forty or eighty days after childbirth – in accordance with the reading of the Karaites.  Expectedly, the Rambam, among the premier, fierce opponents of Karaism, strongly denounces this practice and considers it heresy.  A number of centuries later, the Rivash (end of 14^th century) defends this practice.  He writes (siman 40) that if the followers of this custom do so sincerely, as an additional measure of stringency, knowing that in truth relations become permissible even before the end of this period (after the woman immerses in a mikva), then they should not be discouraged from observing this stringency.  He adds that we similarly should not object to those who refrain from relations for the forty or eighty days "because of cleanliness," apparently referring to the medical issues involved in marital relations during the weeks following childbirth.  This ruling of the Rivash is cited by the Rama (Y.D. 194:1).

            This debate has continued even among contemporary scholars.  Rav Ovadya Yosef strongly disapproves of this practice to consider a woman a nidda throughout the forty or eighty days, in accordance with the Rambam's position, whereas Rav Mordekhai Eliyahu allows observing this practice, provided that it is observed out of sincere motives.

David Silverberg

*****

            Yesterday, we discussed the laws presented at the beginning of Parashat Tazria regarding a yoledet – a woman who has recently given birth to a child.  According to Torah law, one week after the birth of a boy and two weeks after the birth of a girl, a woman begins a period called "yemei tohar" during which she cannot become a nidda.  Even if she experiences a flow of blood during this period, she does not attain the status of nidda which renders her forbidden to her husband.  This period last thirty-three days in the case of the birth of a boy, and sixty-six days if a girl is born.

            As we saw yesterday, practically, Halakha does require that we consider a woman a nidda should a sighting of blood occur during the yemei tohar.  But before we discuss the practical laws, one important clarification must be made concerning the laws as presented in the Torah.  Although, as we said, a woman cannot, on the level of Torah law, become a nidda during the yemei tohar, she may be a nidda during this period if she has yet to divest herself of her previous nidda status.  The verses in Parashat Tazria establish that for the first week after the birth of a boy and the first two weeks after the birth of a girl, a woman is considered a nidda (even in the highly unlikely case that she did not bleed at all during childbirth).  That nidda status will continue even into the period of yemei tohar unless the woman immerses in a mikva.  Although blood-sighting during the yemei tohar will not introduce a nidda status (on the level of Torah law), the yemei tohar certainly do not have the capacity to divest a woman of her previous nidda status.

            Now let us discuss the common practice concerning a yoledet.  As mentioned, today we do not rely on this provision, and we treat the sighting of blood during the yemei tohar as we do a sighting that occurred at any other point.  Yesterday, we attributed this halakha to the practice recorded by Rabbi Zeira (Masekhet Nidda 66a) to disregard the time of a sighting of blood.  The point at which a woman can immerse and thus become tehora ("pure") depends on when the sighting occurred.  Meaning, depending on when the bleeding takes place, the woman may immerse either seven days after the onset of the flow, or only after seven "clean days" in which she experiences no bleeding.  Rabbi Zeira records, however, that Jewish women have accepted the practice to consider all sightings of blood as "zivut," meaning, blood that requires the seven clean days, regardless of when the bleeding occurred.  Presumably, this would mean that we pay no attention at all to when the blood flow occurred, and thus even during the yemei tohar, a woman becomes a nidda upon the sighting of blood.  Indeed, the Taz (Y.D. 194:1), based on earlier sources, explains that the practice of treating blood during yemei tohar as ordinary "dam nidda" stems from this custom recorded by Rabbi Zeira.

            The Rambam, however, understands this practice differently.  In Hilkhot Issurei Bi'a (11:6), the Rambam writes explicitly that Rabbi Zeira's halakha has no effect upon the Torah law of yemei tohar.  Since the period of yemei tohar is excluded entirely from the laws of nidda, and the Torah explicitly denies the possibility of a woman becoming a nidda during the yemei tohar, Rabbi Zeira's halakha cannot transform the blood of yemei tohar into "dam nidda."  Rather, the Rambam states, this stringency originated later, after the Talmudic period, during the times of the Geonim.  In fact, the Rambam writes that he heard reports of Jewish communities in France who did not observe this stringency, and would not consider a woman a nidda if she bleeds during the yemei tohar.

            The origin of this stringency will have important ramifications concerning the possibility of disregarding it in extenuating circumstances.  The Noda Bi-yehuda (Mahadura Tanina, Y.D. 113) was consulted regarding a case of a woman who, during the yemei tohar after childbirth, could not complete the required seven clean days.  At some point blood would appear on the cloth used for the bedika (internal examination required during the seven-day period).  The questioner asked whether we might permit the woman to her husband given the fact that according to Torah law this blood does not render her a nidda in any event.  Perhaps under these unique circumstances, we can disregard the stringency and return to the original law of the Torah.  The Noda Bi-yehuda replies that this would depend on the origin of the accepted stringency to consider blood "dam nidda" during the yemei tohar.  If this stringency stems from Rabbi Zeira's halakha, then we do not have the luxury of suspending a law established in the Gemara, even under these circumstances.  If, however, the practice developed only later, then certainly in such a case we would not hesitate to permit the woman to ignore the blood sighted during the yemei tohar.  The Noda Bi-yehuda accepts the position of the Rambam, that the practice evolved in post-Talmudic times, and therefore permits the woman to her husband during the yemei tohar.  He writes that if the problem persists even after the yemei tohar, the couple should consult with him at that point for guidance.

            He adds, however, one important condition to this ruling: it applies only if the woman had become tehora at some point after the 1-2 week period following childbirth.  The woman's nidda status at that point is not merely an additional stringency, and Rabbi Zeira's halakha requires that she observe seven clean days subsequent to childbirth.  Therefore, only if she had already divested herself of her nidda status before experiencing bleeding again during the yemei tohar can we ignore this blood under extenuating circumstances.

David Silverberg

*****

            Parshiyot Tazria-Metzora deal entirely with the laws of tum'a and tahara, describing various situations which render a person "ritually impure" and the means by which he can divest himself of that status.  Parashat Tazria begins with tum'at yoledet – the tum'a status that comes upon a woman after childbirth – and then proceeds to elaborate in great detail on tum'at tzara'at – the tum'a resulting from tzara'at - various types of skin infections or discoloration of one's walls or garments.  The latter part of Parashat Metzora addresses "tum'a ha-yotz'a min ha-guf" – the tum'a caused when various fluids leave the body (menstrual blood, semen, and so on).

            Several early Jewish philosophers, most notably Rav Sa'adya Gaon (Emunot Ve-dei'ot, 6:4) and the Rambam (Moreh Nevukhim 3:47), have argued that these laws do not stem from any intrinsic, spiritually contaminating quality associated with these phenomena.  In fact, as Rav Sa'adya emphasizes, the bodily fluids that bring on tum'a do so only once they exit the body.  Had the Torah viewed them as an inherently contaminating force, why does a person become tamei only once they leave his body?  Rav Sa'adya and the Rambam therefore explain (with some variation) that the Torah simply wanted to establish certain periods in a person's life when he is barred from entering the Temple.  Unrestricted access to the Mikdash would diminish from a person's sense of awe and reverence towards it, and the Torah therefore required that at certain times a person must observe a period of tum'a and keep away from the Temple.

            By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda Ha-levi, in his Sefer Ha-kuzari (2:60), suggests a famous explanation for why specifically these phenomena bring a status of tum'a upon a person.  After emphasizing that we cannot possibly claim to know the full meaning underlying these laws, and expressing great ambivalence at even venturing an approach, Rabbi Yehuda Ha-levi suggests that all forms of tum'a relate, in one form or another, to death.  Chazal in several places identify tzara'at as a kind of death, and the bodily discharges that render one tamei all involve the loss of potential life (uterine blood, semen, etc.).  The Torah wishes to impress upon us that our religion focuses on life, rather than death.  Just as it strictly forbade the pagan practice to consult with spirits and overly concern oneself with death, so did the Torah cast a status of impurity upon those who have, in one way or another, experienced a form of "death."  The pagans felt they had to look beyond physical life for spirituality and religious meaning; the Torah emphasizes that we are to find religious meaning and holiness within daily life and the physical human condition.

            One obvious question, however, seems to negate this entire approach of Rabbi Yehuda Ha-levi.  As we mentioned, Parashat Tazria opens with the halakha of tum'at yoledet – the state of impurity that befalls a woman after childbirth.  Is not childbirth the very opposite of death?  If tum'a involves forms of quasi "death," how could childbirth possibly be included among those experiences that result in tum'a?

            One explanation (suggested by Rav Yuval Shirlo) might be that the law of tum'at yoledet, according to Rabbi Yehuda Ha-levi, reflects the grim reality of the connection between life and death.  Inasmuch as all human life results in death, the birth of life in effect gives birth to death, as well.  By including childbirth among the phenomena that cause tum'a, the Torah perhaps alludes to this sorrowful reality.

            Alternatively, Rabbi Yehuda Ha-levi perhaps never intended to include tum'at yoledet in his general explanation of tum'a.  It is likely that this form of tum'a differs from the others in terms of its conceptual basis.  The Torah writes that for the first week or two weeks after childbirth, a woman observes a period of tum'a similar to that of a nidda.  Given the fact that childbirth is generally accompanied and followed by vaginal bleeding (in fact, according to the accepted halakhic position, even in the unlikely event that no bleeding occurred during birth we nevertheless assume that blood left the body – "ein petichat ha-kever be-lo dam"), the Torah perhaps conferred a nidda status upon the woman simply by virtue of the resemblance between the two phenomena.  Though in essence bleeding during childbirth and menstrual bleeding signify two opposite physiological experiences, the superficial similarity between the two perhaps warrants their common result of tum'a. 

            Secondly, one might suggest an entirely different approach to tum'at yoledet.  In our S.A.L.T. series last year, we presented the explanation given by Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch for this category of tum'a.  Without repeating our entire discussion, we will simply cite one passage from Rav Hirsch's commentary:

"Above all, the mother herself, under the fresh impression of her physically completely passively and painfully having to submit to the forces of the physical laws of Nature at the most sublime procedure of her earthly calling, has to reestablish again the consciousness of her own spiritual height.  And only after this impression of lack of freedom of will has completely passed away has she, by an offering, to undertake to allow herself of her own free will to give herself up to the whole spiritual height of her calling of woman and mother which is now restarting with all its momentous and often painful moments; and to allow herself to reenter the Sanctuary of holy happy faithfulness to duty."

Quite possibly, then, Rabbi Yehuda Ha-levi had never meant to apply his general approach to tum'a to the instance of tum'at yoledet, which has its own underlying reasoning, function and conceptual basis.

David Silverberg

*****

            Among the forms of "tzara'at" described in Parashat Metzora is tzara'at ha-bayit – a discoloration of the walls of one's house.  The Torah instructs that when one notices a discoloration of his walls, "the owner of the house shall come and tell the kohen, saying, 'Something like a plague has appeared upon my house'" (14:35).  The mishna in Masekhet Negaim (12:5) comments that the homeowner must speak to the kohen with uncertainty, as implied by the verse – "something like a plague… "  Regardless of the homeowner's level of scholarship and his certainty that the discoloration in his home qualifies as a tzara'at plague, he may not make a definitive comment to this effect.  He must rather summon the kohen and wait for his diagnosis.

            The Tosefot Yom Tov, in his commentary to this mishna, brings three possible explanations as to why the homeowner may not express himself definitively.  Firstly, the Torah perhaps intends to accustom the individual to express uncertainty, rather than always assuming with confidence that he has definitive answers.  Secondly, the Torah's concern here is perhaps for the honor and respect of the kohen, who, as we see throughout Parshiyot Tazria-Metzora, is assigned the responsibility of overseeing the entire tzara'at process.  Finally, this might be one example of the principle, "al tiftach peh le-satan," literally, "do not open your mouth to the Satan."  The Torah discourages people from predicting or anticipating ahead of time calamities that have yet to occur.

            In any event, the mishna establishes what the individual may not say: he may not come to the kohen with a conclusive report that tzara'at has appeared on his walls.  The Minchat Chinukh (177:3) asks a different question: what must the individual say to the kohen?  Must he recite the precise text as formulated by the Torah, or does the Torah simply instruct him in a general sense to invite the kohen to observe the discoloration?  According to this second possibility, the homeowner is not obliged to employ the specific text that appears in the verse, and may simply tell the kohen to come look at his house, using any formulation he chooses (again, so long as he does not use definitive language).

            The Minchat Chinukh draws proof to the first possibility from a brief passage in the Torat Kohanim (to this verse), forbidding the use of a shaliach (messenger) when summoning the kohen.  The Torat Kohanim requires the homeowner to call the kohen personally, rather than sending a messenger to bring the kohen.  (It would be interesting to discuss whether a telephone call would satisfy this requirement.)  Apparently, the Minchat Chinukh argues, the individual must employ the specific text used in the verse.  If the Torah simply required summoning the kohen in a general sense, without requiring any specific text, then sending a message to the kohen should presumably be sufficient.  The fact that one must invite the kohen personally would seem to reflect a formal quality to this obligation of summoning the kohen, and it thus stands to reason that the Torah's formulation must be used.

            In truth, however, one might claim that this halakha in the Torat Kohanim is a "ra'aya li-stor" – a proof to the precise opposite conclusion than that intended by the Minchat Chinukh.  First of all, the Torat Kohanim explicitly rules that an elderly or sick homeowner, who would experience considerable discomfort and pain personally going to the kohen, may send a message through a messenger.  This would indicate that the requirement to personally appear before the kohen constitutes not a strict formality, but rather a measure of derekh-eretz (good manners) and a show of respect to the kohen.  The Torah requires the homeowner to go the kohen himself simply for purposes of manners and respect, rather than due to formal guidelines as to how he must summon the kohen.  (Interestingly, however, the Midrash Ha-gadol, which also forbids the use of shaliach, applies this prohibition even in the case of an elderly person or sick patient; this would indeed reflect a strict, formal requirement to personally come before the kohen.)  Secondly, as noted by the Misnneh Le-melekh (Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at 15:2), the Rambam omits this halakha of the Torat Kohanim, forbidding the use of a shaliach.  Seemingly, the Rambam felt that normative Halakha does not follow the view expressed in this berayta in Torat Kohanim, and the homeowner may, in fact, send for the kohen through a shaliach.  It would seem, therefore, that contrary to the Minchat Chinukh's conclusion, the Torah here does not establish specific, formal guidelines, and the homeowner is not obliged to use the particular text of the Torah when calling the kohen.

David Silverberg

*****

            In the final section of Parashat Tazria, the Torah describes a form of tzara'at that affects garments – "tzara'at ha-beged."  As the Ramban notes (in his commentary to 13:47), this form of tzra'at cannot possibly be understood in natural, scientific terms.  There is no scientific phenomenon corresponding to the Torah's description of tzara'at ha-beged.  Necessarily, then, this was a supernatural discoloration of garments, not a result of any scientific properties of the affected garment.  The Ramban adds that the supernatural quality of tzara'at ha-beged reveals the supernatural quality of tzara'at in general.  All the forms of tzara'at outlined in Parshiyot Tazria-Metzora signify miraculous phenomena, rather than various forms of illnesses or natural decay of skin, garments or homes.  When Benei Yisrael lived in strict accordance with the Torah, they were at a unique spiritual level at which their wrongdoing would often result in these divine punishments.  Whereas nowadays God punishes through purely natural means, in the days when Am Yisrael lived at a higher standard, they experienced supernatural punishments, in the form of tzara'at.

            Amidst his discussion, the Ramban addresses the restriction of tzara'at to Eretz Yisrael.  In introducing the laws of tzara'at ha-bayit – the tzara'at affecting the walls of one's home, the Torah explicitly mentions that these laws take effect only once Benei Yisrael enter and settle the land (14:34; see also Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni).  The Ramban claims that since the occurrence of tzara'at requires a spiritual state of near-perfection, its laws apply only in Eretz Yisrael – the only place where Benei Yisrael can live at such a standard.  (This assumption of the Ramban runs consistent with his theory expressed in several places throughout his commentary concerning the unique spiritual quality of Eretz Yisrael, and the qualitative difference between religious life in and outside the land.)  He adds that although the Torah does not explicitly limit tzara'at ha-beged to Eretz Yisrael, the truth is that this type of tzara'at, too, can only occur in Eretz Yisrael, where Benei Yisrael have the opportunity to rise to the level necessary for the application of these laws.

            Other sources, however, appear to indicate otherwise.  Torat Kohanim, commenting on the final verse of Parashat Tazria, which concludes the Torah's discussion of tzara'at ha-beged, explicitly remarks, "Just as the mitzva applies in the land, so does it apply outside the land."  Clearly, then, Torat Kohanim maintains that tzara'at ha-beged can occur even outside Eretz Yisrael.

            There is some ambiguity in the Ramban's discussion concerning tzara'at ha-guf – bodily tzara'at.  On the one hand, unlike the tzara'at of garments and houses, it can be attributed to physiological causes, and thus perhaps it does not hinge upon the unique spiritual quality of Eretz Yisrael.  Indeed, the Ramban mentions the Eretz Yisrael limitation only with regard to tzara'at ha-bayit and tzara'at ha-beged, perhaps implying that he concedes that bodily tzara'at can apply outside the land.  This is the position explicitly adopted by the Sefer Ha-chinukh (mitzva 170).  On the other hand, the Ramban writes in this passage, "When Yisrael were in a state of perfection to God, the spirit of God was upon them at all times to maintain the pleasant appearance of their bodies, garments and houses, and when a sin or misdeed was committed by one of them, a deformity would occur in his flesh, garment or home, to demonstrate that God has left him."  By including bodily tzara'at in his description of this link between religious standards and the possibility of tzara'at, the Ramban might imply that tzara'at ha-guf likewise can occur only in the unique spiritual environment of Eretz Yisrael.

            In any event, the Minchat Chinukh (172) raises a difficulty against the Ramban's general approach, that by its very nature tzara'at can occur only in Eretz Yisrael.  If this is true, asks the Minchat Chinukh, why must the Torah specify that tzara'at ha-bayit is limited to Eretz Yisrael?  Is this not self-evident, in light of the unique spiritual conditions required for tzara'at generally?  The Minchat Chinukh answers by observing that the same verse from which Chazal derive the limitation of tzara'at ha-bayit to Eretz Yisrael is used as the source for other halakhot, as well.  In truth, then, the Torah did not go out of its way to specify this limitation to Eretz Yisrael; the verse which indicates this limitation was written to introduce other halakhot, which Chazal extract from that verse.

            One might also suggest a different explanation, based on Chizkuni's comments to 14:34.  Chizkuni claims that tzara'at generally applied during Benei Yisrael's period of wandering in the wilderness, with the exception of tzara'at ha-bayit, which, as clearly indicated in the verse, occurred only once Benei Yisrael entered the land.  The Ramban's theory might not necessarily preclude the possibility of tzara'at in the wilderness; it stands to reason that during that period, too, Benei Yisrael lived at a sufficiently high spiritual standard to allow the occurrence of tzara'at according to the Ramban's theory.  If so, then perhaps the Torah's limitation of tzara'at ha-bayit to Eretz Yisrael, indicated in this verse, was meant only to establish that tzara'at ha-bayit would not take effect until after Benei Yisrael's entry into Eretz Yisrael.  The Torah had no need to restrict tzara'at ha-bayit to Eretz Yisrael in a general sense, for this is self-evident given the particular nature of tzara'at.  It needed only to point out that tzara'at ha-bayit, unlike the other forms of tzara'at, did not apply in the wilderness, as it took effect only once Benei Yisrael entered and settled the land.

David Silverberg

*****

            In introducing the laws of tzara'at ha-bayit – the form of tzara'at that affects the walls of houses – the Torah writes in Parashat Metzora, "When you enter the land of Canaan that I give you as a possession, and I inflict an eruptive plague upon a house… " (14:34).  The Gemara in Masekhet Yoma (12a) notes that the description of Eretz Yisrael in this verse as "possession" indicates that the laws of tzara'at ha-bayit (as we discussed yesterday) do not take effect until after Benei Yisrael capture the land.  Only once the land indeed becomes their "possession" – through military conquest – do the laws of tzara'at ha-bayit apply.  In the next verse, the Torah writes, "the owner of the house shall come and tell the kohen" about the discoloration.  The Gemara there in Yoma understood the phrase "owner of the house" ("asher lo ha-bayit") as further restricting the application of these laws.  Not only must Benei Yisrael first capture the land before the halakha of tzara'at ha-bayit can take effect, they must also complete the entire process of distribution, as well.  Only once each family has been assigned his portion, at which point a person becomes an "owner" over his house in the full sense of the term, can the laws of tzara'at ha-bayit apply.

            The Ramban (in the passage cited yesterday – 13:47) explains this latter restriction according to his general theory concerning the connection between tzara'at and Eretz Yisrael.  As we discussed at length yesterday, the Ramban maintains that tzara'at, a supernatural phenomenon that serves as a punishment for sin, can occur only when Benei Yisrael live at a standard of perfection (or near-perfection) in their religious observance.  Only under such conditions does God respond so drastically and overtly to their wrongdoing.  Therefore, the Ramban argues, tzara'at can occur only in Eretz Yisrael – the only location where Benei Yisrael can attain this status of perfection.  The Ramban follows this same line of reasoning to explain why tzara'at ha-bayit cannot take effect until after the completion of the land's distribution.  Only once everyone has established his possession over his territory could the nation focus their energies and attention on their spiritual goals and attain the level required for the possibility of tzara'at.  (It would seem to follow from this explanation that all the forms of tzara'at, not merely tzara'at ha-bayit, took effect only after the land's distribution.  Yesterday, however, we suggested, in light of the Torah's particular emphasis in the context of tzara'at ha-bayit, that even according to the Ramban this particular restriction might apply only to tzara'at ha-bayit.)

            We might suggest a different explanation for why the laws of tzara'at ha-bayit could not take effect before the process of the land's distribution was completed.  As mentioned, the Gemara derives this provision from the phrase, "asher lo ha-bayit" ("the owner of the house"), which implies that only once the house has an established owner do these laws applies.  Elsewhere (Arakhin 16a), the Gemara derives another principle from this same phrase.  The  description, "asher lo ha-bayit" implies that only this individual, the house's owner, makes use of the house; meaning, he does not permit anyone else to use his possessions.  From here the Gemara concludes that "tzarut ayin" – stinginess – is one of the sins for which tzara'at serves as punishment.  A person who claims exclusive right to his possessions – "asher lo ha-bayit"- refusing to allow any others to borrow his belongings, is punished with tzara'at.

            Perhaps the two conclusions deduced from this phrase essentially amount to a single idea.  The fact that tzara'at (and perhaps specifically tzara'at ha-bayit) serves as a punishment for "tzarut ayin" might itself dictate that this phenomenon cannot occur until after the land has been distributed.  Once the distribution process was completed, landowners for the first time experienced a sense of "ownership" in the full sense of the term.  Although Benei Yisrael owned property before the land's distribution, ownership over land is of an entirely different dimension than ownership over tangible items.  (This difference is reflected in the drastically different halakhot concerning the purchase of, or legal cases involving, real property and tangible items.)  The completion of the land's distribution process left Benei Yisrael with a feeling of possession they had never before experienced, which could have potentially resulted in a sense of exclusive ownership and refusal to share with others.  Tzara'at ha-bayit would serve as a punishment for this very sin, and for this reason, perhaps, it became possible only after the land's distribution, at which point Benei Yisrael became particularly vulnerable to the plague of selfishness.

David Silverberg

*****

            Towards the end of Parashat Metzora, the Torah presents the laws concerning the tum'a ("impure") status of a menstrual woman.  According to Torah law, the purification process for a woman after menstruation depends upon when the blood flow occurred.  If the bleeding took place during a period during which the flow can be deemed normal, then the woman waits seven days from the onset of the bleeding.  So long as the bleeding stops by the end of the seventh day, she may then immerse in a mikveh and achieve tahara ("purity").  At other points, however, a blood flow will render the woman a "zava" (as opposed to a nidda).  A zava's status is more stringent than that of a nidda in that she may not immerse seven days after the onset of her blood flow.  If the bleeding continued for one or two days, then she must observe one "clean day" – if her flow lasted only a single day – or two "clean days" – if the flow lasted two days.  In other words, she must establish the cessation of bleeding for the same number of days as the bleeding lasted, and only thereafter may immerse a mikva.  (Halakha refers to a woman in this situation as a "zava ketana.")  If, however, a woman experiences bleeding during her zava period for three days or more, she attains the particularly stringent status of "zava gedola," and may not immerse and become pure until she observes "shiva nekiyim" – seven days without any bleeding.  (A major dispute among the Rishonim surrounds the question of how we determine when a given instance of bleeding will render a woman a nidda and when she becomes a zava.)

            Earlier this week, we mentioned the famous comment of Rabbi Zeira, recording the practice to observe the "shiva nekiyim" period regardless of when the blood flow occurred.  This practice most likely developed due to the complexity of these laws, the ease with which confusion can arise, and the particular gravity of the prohibition against marital relations while the woman has the halakhic status of nidda or zava.

            Parashat Metzora also contains the laws pertaining to a "zav," roughly the male equivalent of a zava.  A zav is a man who experiences an abnormal emission, generally signifying some sort of illness.  A normal semenal emission renders a man a "ba'al keri," a status of tum'a which lasts only a single day.  A zav, however, like a zava, must observe a period of seven "clean days."  But unlike the law concerning women, a man's status as a "ba'al keri" or zav depends not on when the emission occurred, but rather on the nature of the discharge.  A woman's status, by contrast, as we discussed, has nothing to do with the properties of the discharged blood, but depends solely on when the flow occurred.

            A well-known passage in the Zohar draws an intriguing association between the laws of a zava and the period of sefirat ha-omer that we are currently observing.  During Benei Yisrael's subjugation in Egypt, the Zohar writes, they resembled a woman during her menstrual period, meaning, they became spiritually "impure."  Their inability to engage in spiritual pursuits and their involvement in Egyptian paganism cast upon them a status of impurity, comparable to that of a menstrual woman.  Their circumcision the night before they left Egypt (in preparation for the korban pesach) is likened by the Zohar to the cessation of menstrual bleeding.  Their firm, resolute decision to enter into a covenant with the Almighty allowed them to begin a process of purification and move towards a relationship with God.  Just as the end of bleeding permits the nidda (or, more accurately, the zava) to begin her seven-day waiting period in anticipation of reuniting with her husband, so were Benei Yisrael now able, after over two centuries of spiritual stagnation, to undergo purification.  The korban pesach ritual signified Benei Yisrael's clean break from Egyptian paganism and their decision to establish a relationship with God.  From here they embarked on the seven-week period of sefirat ha-omer, which, according to the Zohar, parallels the seven-day purification period observed by the zava.  During these forty-nine days, Benei Yisrael gradually rid themselves of the impurities they had developed during their exile, making their way towards Matan Torah.  The Zohar describes that as the nation approached Mount Sinai, a "dew of sanctity" descended upon them from the heavens and, like the purifying waters of the mikva, cleansed them entirely and rendered them perfectly "pure."

            It turns out, then, that Ma'amad Har Sinai represents the long-awaited union between Am Yisrael and the Almighty.  Just as husband and wife reunite after the seven-day period of "shiv'a nikiyim," so did the Almighty and His people consummate their relationship, so-to-speak, as God revealed Himself at Sinai after the seven weeks of purification.  It is the Torah, then, that serves as the means by which we experience our close, unique relationship with God.  By engaging in the Torah given to us after our "immersion" at Sinai, we engage with the Almighty Himself and further enhance our singular relationship with our Creator.

David Silverberg

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