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Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT METZORA

By Rav David Silverberg

            Parashat Metzora discusses the laws of tzara'at ha-bayit, the form of tzara'at that surfaces on the walls of a person's home.  If the suspicious discoloration is confirmed to be a manifestation of tzara'at, the house must be dismantled, and all its stones, wood and cement cast outside the city.  The Gemara in Masekhet Yoma (11b) establishes that this form of tzara'at surfaces as punishment for miserly behavior, for refusing to lend or otherwise grant assistance.  The Torah describes the owner of a tzara'at-stricken home with the phrase asher lo ha-bayit ("he to whom the house belongs" – 14:35), which the Gemara understands as an allusion to the individual's egotistical attitude towards his possessions.  He is so consumed by his ownership over his property that he selfishly refuses to share it with others.  What more, the Gemara adds, he outwardly denies owning anything that could be of assistance to his neighbors in need, in response to which God strikes his home with tzara'at, forcing him to move all his possessions outside his condemned home.  He must thus at this point put all his personal belongings on public display, and his entire community sees firsthand all the possessions that he had denied owning.

            Rav Simcha Bunim Sofer, in his Shevet Sofer, notes that this underlying cause of tzara'at ha-bayit helps explain a number of other textual nuances in this section, as well.  Firstly, the Torah instructs an individual who sighted a suspicious discoloration on the wall of his home to approach a kohen and declare, "A semblance of an infection appeared to me in the home" (14:35).  Curiously, the individual is bidden to speak of "the home" (ba-bayit), rather than specifying, "my home" (be-veiti).  Possibly, the Shevet Sofer suggested, this is yet another indication that the Torah speaks of a person who displays a certain "obsession with possession" by insisting on his exclusive rights to everything he owns and refusing to include others in his material blessings.  The educational process of outgrowing this possessiveness begins by downplaying one's ownership, and he therefore speaks of the house as "the home" – the building in which he lives – rather than "my home."

            Similarly, the Shevet Sofer adds, the Torah introduces this section by describing a case where, after Benei Yisrael enter the land which God "gives you as a possession" (notein lakhem la-achuza), He casts a tzara'at infection "be-veit eretz achuzatkhem" – "in a house in the land of your possession" (14:34).  This emphasis on the concept of achuza – a holding, or possession – perhaps provides the "spiritual background" for the phenomenon of tzara'at ha-bayit.  It is when Benei Yisrael focus their attention too strongly on the notion of achuza, on their status as legal owners over their property, to the point where they reserve it entirely and exclusively for themselves, that they render themselves susceptible to the plague of tzara'at ha-bayit.

            Chazal comment that there never was any actual case of tzara'at ha-bayit; the many laws and details relevant to this form of tzara'at never saw practical application.  This institution nevertheless serves as an important contrasting model for the value of generosity and selflessness as the foundations of the Jewish home.  In essence, the concept of tzara'at ha-bayit teaches that a home characterized by tzarut ayin, self-centered stinginess, loses its right to continue standing.  The home must serve not only its permanent residents, but also all those in need of shelter, warmth, companionship, or a nourishing meal.  The eternal value of the home is assessed not by its size or physical appearance, but rather by its ability to extend its impact beyond the family residing within it, and to touch the lives of the surrounding community and of all Am Yisrael.

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            One of the topics covered in Parashat Metzora is tzara'at ha-bayit, the laws concerning discolorations on the walls of one's home that renders the home tamei.  The Torah instructs an individual who discovers a suspicious spot on his wall to approach a kohen, who must then come to inspect the discoloration.  If the kohen confirms that the spot qualifies as tzara'at, he must "close off" the home for a seven-day period, a procedure known as hesger ("ve-hisgir" – 14:35).  The kohen then returns a week later to determine if the discoloration had spread.  If it had not spread beyond its original perimeter, the kohen declares the house pure.  During the hesger period, however, the house has a status of tum'a, such that all people and utensils that enter the home during these seven days are rendered tamei.  If the discoloration had spread, then the house is determined to have been afflicted by tzara'at, and the affected stones must be removed.  If the discoloration resurfaces on the new stones, the entire home is dismantled.

            What exactly does the Torah mean when it requires "closing off" the home?  What must the kohen do at this stage of the process, to establish the status of hesger?

            This issue was addressed by the Mishneh Le-melekh (Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at 14:5), who noted that a number of Rishonim appear to have understood that the kohen must actually close the door to the house.  This emerges from their comments regarding a passage in Masekhet Nedarim (56b), where the Gemara establishes that the kohen should perform hesger while standing just next to the doorway.  The Gemara then adds that if the kohen "closed off" the house only upon returning to his own home, the hesger nevertheless takes effect.  The Rishonim, by and large, explain this case – of a kohen performing hesger only upon returning home – in one of two ways: either he sends a shali'ach (messenger) to close the home on his behalf, or he pulls a string attached to the door of the affected home to close it.  Both interpretations assume that hesger entails actually closing the door to the home, as the literal meaning of the term "ve-hisgir" might imply.

            As the Mishneh Le-melekh notes, however, the Torah employs this term also in reference to the waiting periods required in cases of other forms of tzara'at – infections on human skin (e.g. 13:4) and on garments (13:50).  In these contexts, of course, there is no actual "closing" of which to speak, and thus hesger entails simply the kohen's declaration that the status of hesger has taken effect.  (It should be noted, however, that according to some views hesger in those cases means that the kohen draws a mark around the infected area so that later he can determine whether or not it expanded.)

            Furthermore, the Mishneh Le-melekh infers from the Rambam's comments that he understood hesger to mean merely that the kohen declares the onset of this status.  The Rambam (Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at 14:5) cites the verse, "The kohen shall leave the home and close the home off" as establishing that the kohen must be standing outside the doorway when he performs hesger.  Curiously, however, the Rambam extends this provision also to a kohen's declaration that the house is either decidedly tamei or decidedly tahor.  Meaning, on the basis of the Torah's formulation with regard to hesger, the Rambam established the protocol for all three possible declarations that a kohen could make concerning the house's status.  This would suggest a degree of parity between the three, and might therefore indicate that hesger is no different from the other two decisions that could be made with regard to the house.  Just as clearly no action is necessary when the kohen pronounces a house decidedly tamei or tahor, so does the pronouncement of hesger entail only that – a pronouncement, and not the formal act of closing the door.

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            The process of tzara'at ha-bayit, as the Torah outlines in Parashat Metzora, begins when an individual observes a discoloration on a wall in his home, at which point he must approach a kohen to inform him of his discovery of such a mark.  The Torah (14:36) instructs that before the kohen comes to inspect the home, he first issues a command that the house be emptied of its contents, so that they will not become tamei as a result of their presence in a bayit menuga (afflicted house).  Once the kohen affirms the presence of tzara'at in the home and "closes off" the house to see if the mark spreads, the house becomes tamei along with all the utensils situated within its walls.  The Torah therefore requires that all the contents be removed from the home prior to the kohen's visit.

            The Mishna in Masekhet Nega'im (12:5) records a fundamental debate among the Tanna'im in defining this obligation.  Rabbi Yehuda, surprisingly, claims that even chavilei eitzim and chavilei kinim, heaps of wood and reeds, which are not susceptible to tum'a, must be removed from the home before the kohen's inspection.  In his view, this halakha does not relate to – or at least is not limited to – the concern to avoid the advent of tum'a upon the individual's belongings.  As such, it applies even to those items which would not contract tum'a as a result of their presence in a house declared a bayit menuga.

            The Mishna then proceeds to cite Rabbi Shimon as exclaiming in response to Rabbi Yehuda, "Is the emptying mere busywork?" ("Eisek hu le-pinui?").  Rabbi Shimon insists that the Torah issued this command for the sole, practical purpose of protecting the homeowner's belongings from tum'a, and thus it applies only to those items that could become tamei.  The Mishna then cites a comment of Rabbi Meir, who apparently supported Rabbi Shimon's position: "What of his, after all, would this make tamei?  If you say his wooden utensils, garments and metals – he can immerse them and they are then pure.  What did the Torah protect – his earthenware utensils, jugs and oil vessels…"  Rabbi Meir marvels at the Torah's concern for even the inexpensive, easily replaceable earthenware utensils which would permanently become tamei if they remain inside the home (as earthenware cannot be "purified" through immersion).  Like his colleague Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Meir views this halakha as intended to assist the homeowner by rescuing his utensils from tum'a.

            It would thus appear that the nature of this halakha is subject to a debate between Rabbi Yehuda on the one hand, and Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon on the other.  Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon maintained that the Torah requires the removal of only those items susceptible to tum'a, whereas Rabbi Yehuda held that irrespective of tum'a, the Torah demands that the home be emptied of all its contents.

Rashi, in his Torah commentary, cites the view of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon.  The Rambam, however, somewhat surprisingly, codifies Rabbi Yehuda's position, that all the home's contents must be removed (Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at 14:4).  For some reason, the Rambam chose to rule against what appears to be the majority view of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir.

The Mishneh Le-melekh suggests that the Rambam perhaps drew his position from the corresponding passage in Torat Kohanim, which makes no mention of Rabbi Shimon as a participant in this exchange.  In Torat Kohanim, it is only Rabbi Meir who challenged Rabbi Yehuda's position, without any reference being made to Rabbi Shimon or any other Tanna'im.  It appears that the Rambam viewed this account of the debate as the more authoritative version, and thus naturally codified Rabbi Yehuda's position, in light of the general principle that Halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda's view in his debates with Rabbi Meir.

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            The first section of Parashat Metzora outlines the procedure that a metzora – a person stricken with bodily tzara'at – must follow as part of his purification process.  The Torah introduces this discussion by stating that the guidelines presented here are to be followed "be-yom taharato" – "on the day of his purification" – meaning, the day on which the tzara'at is cured.  Torat Kohanim infers from this verse that the metzora must not delay his purification process.  As soon as the tzara'at leaves his skin and he is capable of undergoing this process and restoring his state of purity, he must immediately consult a kohen and begin the procedure outlined in this parasha.

            Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his Yalkut Yehuda, comments on this halakha, "For once he is pure, he should not delay the matter and excessively torment himself by remaining in isolation, separated from people.  He must rather perform these mitzvot in order that he can live in the normal manner of people."  In his view, this halakha involves more than the general rule of zerizin makdimin le-mitzvot, which requires zeal, fervor and alacrity in performing mitzvot.  In the case of the metzora, Halakha is also concerned with his speedy return to normal social activity.  The Torah does not wish for the metzora to remain in isolation any longer than necessary.  Social engagement is an aspect of living that the Torah strongly encourages, and which it does not seek to deny even a metzora once the prescribed period of confinement has ended.  Rav Ginsburg cites in this context Chazal's famous remark criticizing the nazir for voluntarily abstaining from wine.  He comments that just as the Torah does not encourage denying oneself the physical delights of the world, so does it not call for individuals to abstain from the enjoyment of social activities.  (Of course, this comparison works in the opposite direction, as well: just as the Torah mandates moderation in physical indulgence, so is moderation necessary in the area of socialization.)

            We might add that the metzora, who was condemned to a period of solitude as punishment for his gossip and tale-bearing, might be initially hesitant to return to his friends and social milieu.  Having experienced the harsh repercussions of excessive socialization and intrusion upon the privacy of other people, he might seek to withdraw entirely from social life rather than run the risk of once again abusing the privilege of social contact.  For this reason, perhaps, the Torah writes that the metzora "shall be brought to the kohen," which Ibn Ezra understood to mean that other people should bring him and have him begin his process of purification.  Ibn Ezra explained that the metzora might not take the initiative to approach the kohen because of his unwillingness to endure the cost and inconvenience of the process entailed in regaining purification.  Additionally, however, we might suggest that the individual might be reluctant to reenter his social circle, where he may again fail in his responsibilities to the privacy and dignity of his fellow townspeople.  His peers must therefore take the initiative and invite him to return, reassuring him of the importance of social engagement and his ability to conduct himself properly in this context.

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            The final section of Parashat Metzora discusses the laws relevant to tum'a ha-yotzeit min ha-guf, the various kinds of tum'a that result from bodily emissions.  In concluding this section, God enjoins Moshe and Aharon, "Ve-hizartem et Benei Yisrael mi-tum'atam" – "You shall separate the Israelites from their impurity" (15:31).  Rashi, commenting on the unusual word ve-hizartem, explains that it refers to perisha, "withdrawal" or "separation," and cites two proof-texts to support this definition.  First, he cites the prophet Yeshayahu's lament that Benei Yisrael had "turned away" or "withdrawn" from God – "nazoru achor" (Yeshayahu 1:4).  Rashi then draws our attention to Yaakov's description of his son Yosef as "nezir echav," the one "separated" from his brothers (Bereishit 49:26).

            One might wonder why Rashi did not simply make reference to the familiar term "nazir," which describes an individual who voluntarily vows to abstain from wine.  This inference seems far more obvious than the perhaps more esoteric verses in Bereishit and Yeshayahu.

            Rav Dov Weinberger, in his Shemen Ha-tov (vol. 3), answers that Rashi could not draw proof from the word nazir because it lends itself to a different meaning, namely, a "crown."  In addressing a situation where a nazir inadvertently violates his vow by coming in contact with a corpse, the Torah (Bamidbar 6:9) speaks of the defilement of "rosh nizro" – which likely means, "his crowned head," a reference to the nazir's overgrown hair.  (See also Bamidbar 6:18.)  The usage of the word neizer to mean "crown" is familiar to us from the tzitz (frontlet) worn by the kohen gadol, which the Torah refers to as "neizer ha-kodesh" ("the sacred crown" – Shemot 29:6).  Hence, the fact that the Torah employs the term nazir to describe a person abstaining from wine does not necessarily indicate that this term relates to the theme of "separation."  Since the nazirite must also allow his hair to grow, the term nazir might refer simply to the "crown" upon his head which serves as an outward symbol of his status.  Rashi was therefore compelled to draw proof from the verses mentioned above.

            This discussion might lead us to consider a possible relationship between the two implications of the root n.z.r. – a crown, and withdrawal.  The Shemen Ha-tov suggests that the association between these two concepts – as manifest in the shared etymology – reflects the notion that from the Torah's perspective, "royal" honor and glory is earned specifically through perisha – separating oneself from the various forms of "tum'a."  A person obtains noble stature by exercising discretion and discipline, knowing when to abstain and withdraw, rather than indulge.

            We might add, however, a simpler association, namely, that a crown serves to distinguish and set apart the individual.  A crown is called neizer because it represents and highlights the "separation" between the person wearing the crown and ordinary citizens, and it therefore closely relates to the root n.z.r. which denotes "separation."

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            In Parashat Metzora the Torah introduces the various forms of tum'a that result from various emissions of the body.  In four instances, we find that the furniture upon which the individual sat or slept in his state of tum'a likewise contracts tum'a: with regard to a zav (a male who experienced an unusual emission), a zava (female who experienced an unusual menstrual flow), a nida (menstrual woman) and a male who had relations with a nida (menstrual woman).  In the context of a zav (15:5), a zava (15:21) and a nida (15:20), the Torah writes explicitly that anybody who touches something upon which the tamei individual had sat or slept is tamei, a halakha known as tum'at mishkav u-moshav.  In the case of one who has relations with a nida, the Torah (15:24) simply states that the furniture upon which he sits or sleeps becomes tamei, without specifying the halakha concerning a person who touches that piece of furniture.

            Accordingly, the Gemara (Masekhet Nida 32b) draws a basic distinction between these two cases, noting that a bo'el nida (man who had relations with a nida) does not transmit tum'a to the same extent as a zav (or a zava or nida).  When a bo'el nida sits on a chair, for instance, that chair confers tum'a status only upon foods that come in contact with it, but not upon people or other objects.  In halakhic terminology, we would say that the chair becomes only a rishon le-tum'a – which is capable of conveying tum'a only upon foods – as opposed to an av ha-tum'a, which can convey tum'a even to people and certain objects.  In this respect, a bo'el nida differs from a zav, zava and nida.  When a zav sits on a chair, that chair becomes an av ha-tum'a, in that it conveys tum'a to even a person who then touches it.

            This distinction between the two cases was further developed by Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, as cited in Rav Herschel Shachter's Mi-peninei Ha-Rav (pp. 307-8).  Rav Soloveitchik noted that the halakha of tum'at mishkav u-moshav as it pertains to a zav appears, at first glance, to defy the fundamental rule of toledoteihem lav ka-yotzei bahem (Bava Kama 2b).  This rule dictates that whenever a source of tum'a confers tum'a status upon another entity, the recipient's status is lower than that of the original source.  Thus, for example, a person who had come in contact with a corpse can confer tum'a even to another person, but that person can then confer tum'a only to utensils or foods.  In the case of a zav, however, the chair is endowed with the same "potency" as the zav himself; it, too, can confer tum'a upon people, other utensils, and foods.  In order to reconcile the mechanics of tum'at mishkav u-moshav with the rule of toledoteihem, Rav Soloveitchik suggested reformulating the concept of tum'at mishkav.  A zav does not confer tum'a upon the chair or bed; rather, the chair on its own right is given the status of an av ha-tum'a.  Generally, when something becomes tamei as a result of contact with a source of tum'a, we say that the tum'a somehow "passes" from the origin to the recipient.  In the case of mishkav u-moshav, however, no tum'a is "passed," "transferred" or "conferred."  The Torah declares the furniture tamei on its own right, not as a "recipient" of tum'a from the zav.  It therefore can have the same capacity to transfer tum'a as the zav himself.

            In the case of bo'el nida, however, the man confers tum'a upon the piece of furniture, and it therefore receives a lower status of tum'a.  It thus has the capacity to transfer that tum'a only onto foods, and not onto people or utensils.

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            Parashat Metzora continues the Torah's discussion of the laws of tzara'at, various forms of discoloration that cause tum'a (ritual purity).  One of the topics addressed in Parashat Metzora is tzara'at ha-bayit, discoloration that would surface on the wall of a person's home, warranting, in some cases, the dismantling of the entire home.  The Torah writes that when a person discovers the mark on his wall, he should approach a kohen and declare, "Ke-nega nir'a li ba-bayit" – "The likeness of an infection appeared to me in the home" (14:35).  The Mishna (Nega'im 12:5) understands this verse as requiring that the homeowner present the information in an uncertain manner.  Even if the individual happens to have expertise in this area of Halakha and knows for certain that the discoloration qualifies as tzara'at ha-bayit, he should nevertheless report only "the likeness of an infection."  He should not declare unequivocally that a tzara'at infection has surfaced on his wall.

            Maimonides codifies this halakha in Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at (14:4), amidst his presentation of the laws concerning tzara'at ha-bayit.  A number of writers raised the question of whether or not Maimonides intended to restrict this provision to specifically this context.  As noted by the Ma'aseh Rokei'ach commentary, the omission of this halakha from the rest of Maimonides' discussion of tzara'at would certainly imply that it applies only here, with regard to tzara'at ha-bayit.  When it comes to the other forms of tazra'at, it would appear, the Torah does not dictate the manner in which the stricken individual should approach the kohen.  If he feels confident that the discoloration indeed constitutes a tzara'at infection, he may indeed state definitively that he suffers from tzara'at.  (He must still approach a kohen, since only a kohen's formal declaration effectuates the status of impurity associated with tzara'at.)

            Alternatively, however, one might contend that this halakha indeed applies, in principle, to all forms of tzara'at, but as a practical matter, it obtains only in the context of tzara'at ha-bayit.  When a person discovers a suspicious spot on his body or garment, he approaches the kohen and shows him the discoloration; he does not have to first approach the kohen to report the discovery and invite him to inspect the mark.  It is only in the case of tzara'at ha-bayit that the individual must first approach a kohen to report the discovery of a suspicious mark, since in this case he obviously cannot bring the mark to the kohen.  Practically speaking, then, it is only in this instance that the Torah dictates the manner in which the person reports the information to the kohen.

            In any event, if we do wish to distinguish between tzara'at ha-bayit and other manifestations of tzara'at in this regard, we might point to the Talmud's comment in Masekhet Yoma (11b) that views tzara'at ha-bayit as a heavenly response to tzarut ayin – stinginess.  A person who displays an exaggerated sense of entitlement, to the extent that he refuses to share his belongings with others, is subjected to the humiliating and aggravating process of tzara'at ha-bayit.  Possibly, this educational process begins with the individual's confession to the kohen, "The likeness of an infection appeared to me."  As he begins to engender within himself a greater sense of humility and respect for other people, he is told to speak in an uncertain manner, to recognize the possibility of error and misjudgment, rather than arrogantly presume definitive knowledge.  The first step towards respecting the needs, concerns and opinions of others is to acknowledge one's own fallibility, and to realize that his perceptions and conclusions may not always be definitively correct.  The training thus begins with the word ke-nega – "the likeness of an infection" – whereby the individual expresses a degree of self-doubt and acknowledges the limits of his knowledge and judgment.