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ACHAREI MOT – KEDOSHIM
By Rav David Silverberg
Parashat Kedoshim begins with God's famous command to Benei Yisrael, "You shall be holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy." The Ramban famously explains this command as a reference to limiting physical indulgence. The central focus of a person's life must be the pursuit spiritual excellence, rather than the pursuit of physical pleasure, comforts and gratification.
The Midrash Tanchuma, commenting on this verse, writes that God here declared to Benei Yisrael, "Since you have been sanctified for My sake before I created the world, you shall be holy just as I am holy." It appears that the command to be "holy" somehow relates to, or evolves from, Am Yisrael's designation as God's people even before the creation of the world. How does this "ancient designation" give rise to the divine command of kedoshim tiheyu to "be holy"?
The Maggid of Duvna, in his Ohel Yaakov, explains that the Midrash Tanchuma refers here to the standards of kedusha to which Am Yisrael are to strive by force of this imperative. He draws an analogy to a promising yeshiva student, who distinguished himself through his extraordinary diligence and brilliance, but upon marrying and moving into his wife's village began lowering his standards of achievement. The father-in-law was disappointed by the decline in his son-in-law's commitment to learning, and asked him why this had happened. The son-in-law explained that although he studies far less intensively now than he had in the yeshiva, he is nevertheless still the leading Talmudist of the village. Having left the ivory tower of the yeshiva and moved into a community of simple villagers, the student felt content in achieving and maintaining a standard that exceeded that of the local population. The father-in-law admonished that he should display far greater ambition, and actualize his potential to its fullest, rather than striving only to a higher standard than that achieved by the local peasants.
Similarly, the divine command off kedoshim tiheyu could have been
misunderstood to mean simply that Benei
Yisrael are to live at a higher
standard of "holiness" than the rest of the world. In truth, however, it requires much more
than that; it demands that we live a life devoted to avodat Hashem.
Reaching beyond the generally accepted standards of morality and
spiritual focus does not suffice.
God therefore emphasizes that Benei Yisrael's stature of kedusha preceded the creation of the world; their
destiny to become an am
kadosh was ordained even before
the emergence of other nations. As
such, we must strive to not merely exceed the standards accepted by the rest of
mankind, but to reach the objective ideal of kedoshim tiheyu, by committing ourselves unconditionally to
the laws and spirit of the Torah, and making spiritual excellence the central
priority of our lives.
******
Among the laws presented in Parashat Kedoshim is that of neta reva'i, the fruit produced by a tree in its fourth
year since its planting. The Torah
requires treating this fruit as kodesh hilulim le-Hashem ("sacred, for praising the Lord" –
19:24). As Chazal explain, the owner must either bring the
produce to
The Mishna towards the beginning of Masekhet Sanhedrin (2a) establishes
that a three-member panel is required to evaluate the worth of one's neta
reva'i. Rather than selling his produce to the
highest bidder, the farmer must bring his fruits to a panel of three arbiters
who determine the value at which it should be sold. The Mishna applies this requirement also
to three other instances where Halakha requires a monetary evaluation of property:
1) Ma'aser sheni she-ein damav yedu'in: ma'aser sheni produce that does not have a set market value (such as if it is not fresh);
2)
Hekdesh: property donated to the
3)
Arakhin: When a person vows to donate the
value of a certain object (or person) to the
There is a
debate among the commentators as to whether the three-member panel is required
in all instances involving neta reva'i. With regard to ma'aser sheni, as mentioned, the Mishna requires an
assessment by three evaluators only where ein damav yedu'in, when the produce has no clear market
value. If there is a known market
value for this kind of produce, then the ma'aser sheni fruits can be sold at that value without
the formal evaluation of three experts.
From Rashi's commentary it appears that neta reva'i, too,
requires the assessment of three experts only if it has no set market
value. However, the Yad Rama (Sanhedrin 14b) distinguishes in this
regard between neta
reva'i and ma'aser sheni.
In his view, since the Torah employs the term kodesh in reference to neta reva'i
(Vayikra 19:24), it more closely
resembles hekdesh – property
consecrated for the
The Mishna later records the position of Rabbi Yehuda, who demands that at least one member of the evaluation panel be a kohen. Regarding this issue, too, we find a debate among the commentators. Rabbenu Ovadya of Bartenura understood that Rabbi Yehuda refers specifically to the final case listed – that of arakhin, regarding which the Torah explicitly requires the involvement of a kohen (Vayikra 27:8,11-12,14). The Tosefot Yom Tov, by contrast, claimed that Rabbi Yehuda argues in all cases, and requires that a kohen be involved even in situations of neta reva'i, ma'aser sheni and hekdesh.
Interestingly,
Targum Yonatan Ben Uziel, in his interpretation of the verse in Parashat
Kedoshim that speaks of neta reva'i (19:24), comments that the produce is
"redeemed from a kohen" ("mitparak min kahana"). Rav Avraham
******
Yesterday we discussed the halakha known as neta reva'i, that applies to the fruits produced by a tree in its fourth year since it was planted. As the Torah discusses in Parashat Kedoshim (19:23), the fruits grown during the first three years, which are known as orla, are forbidden for consumption, and in the fourth year, the fruits are brought to Jerusalem and eaten there (19:24). Regarding the tree's status after the fourth year, the Torah writes (19:25), "and in the fifth year you shall partake of its fruit, in order to increase for you its yield." Rashi cites from Torat Kohanim the comment of Rabbi Akiva that the Torah here responds to the reservations one would naturally feel towards the strict laws of orla and neta reva'i. A farmer will likely lament – in Rabbi Akiva's words – "For four years I exert myself with it for naught!" God therefore gives His promise that compliance with these laws will "increase for you its yield," that the exertion during the first four years, far from being "for naught," will result in greater production and profit than one would otherwise enjoy.
The question arises as to why the Torah anticipated such reservations
specifically in this context, with regard to the restrictions of orla and neta reva'i.
The Torah imposes many financially-challenging obligations, including
mandatory gifts to the kohanim and Levi'im, charity to the poor, and so on. Particularly the restrictions of
orla, however, are likely to arouse feelings of
frustration and impatience.
Why?
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Kol
Ram, vol. 2) suggests that the
unique challenge of orla lay in the fact that nobody derives any
benefit from the fruits during the tree's first three years. With regard to mitzvot such as charity, terumot and ma'aserot, whatever anxiety or despondency one might
experience giving away his hard-earned assets is – hopefully – offset by the
sense of gratification received knowing that his earnings are helping those in
need. In the case of orla, however, nobody at all enjoys the fruits
of the farmer's toil, and he will likely begin to wonder why he exerts so much
effort "for naught." The Torah
therefore offers him encouragement by guaranteeing the ultimate success of his
efforts, which will be multiplied manifold in reward for his observance of this
mitzva.
Rabbi Akiva here underscores one of the primary messages underlying the
institution of orla:
the need to patiently wait for the realization of our dreams and the
product of our efforts. This
mitzva is perhaps intended to train a person not
to expect immediate results from his hard work. These results often take many years to
unfold – and, very often, many more years to be
recognized.
This message is a particularly meaningful one upon which to reflect as we
celebrate the establishment of the State of Israel 59 years ago. We all sense an enormous debt of
gratitude and admiration for the untold numbers of Jews who worked, toiled, and
even suffered while planting the seeds and laying the foundations of what is now
a thriving and prosperous country.
They understood the message of orla, investing extraordinary efforts and making
great sacrifices for a goal that would be realized only many years later. We must draw inspiration from their
example as we continue to struggle to build and fortify the physical, material
and spiritual foundations of our state.
We cannot expect to resolve all the country's dilemmas overnight, or even
in a year or several years. There
will undoubtedly be periods of orla, when it may seem at first that our efforts
are "for naught." As the Torah
promises, however, our sacrifices and hard work in building the
******
Among the many laws presented in Parashat Kedoshim is the admonition,
"Lo tisna et achikha
bi-lvavekha" – "Do not despise
your fellow in your heart" (19:17).
The Rambam includes this prohibition in his list of the Torah's 365
prohibitions (Sefer
Ha-mitzvot, lo ta'aseh 302), indicating that the Torah here issues
not merely a general admonition, but a specific prohibition against "despising"
one's fellow.
Rav Asher Zelig Weiss, in his Minchat Asher (Parashat Kedoshim, 42), discusses the precise parameters of this prohibition and outlines the different approaches taken by the Rishonim. From the Rambam's discussion in Sefer Ha-mitzvot it appears that he defined the prohibition in terms of harboring unexpressed feelings of resentment towards one's fellow. In his view, the Torah here forbids harboring feelings of hatred internally; it does not refer to one who acts upon such feelings. He notes that if a person was victimized by another and as a result refuses to speak or act kindly towards him, he transgresses other prohibitions mentioned in Parashat Kedoshim – that of harboring grudges or acting vengefully (lo tikom ve-lo titor – 19:18). The command against "despising" thus refers to the internal emotion, rather than speech or actions.
The Meiri, by contrast, in his commentary to Masekhet Yoma (75a), advances the precise opposite view: "A person's hatred must never prevent him from dealing kindly to his fellow in any way that he can act kindly, and this is what is said, 'You shall not despise your fellow in your heart'." In his view, as Rav Weiss explains, the verse means that one may not withhold from his fellow a favor he would have otherwise performed had it not been for the feelings of hatred in his heart. According to the Meiri, then, the Torah forbids not the internal feelings, but rather treating a person differently because of those internal feelings.
Rav Weiss suggests drawing proof for the Meiri's position from the Gemara's remark in Masekhet Kiddushin (41a), "It is forbidden for a person to betroth a woman until he sees her, lest he find something uncomely in her and will transgress 'You shall love your fellow as yourself'." The Gemara requires that one see the woman before he betroths her in order that he not enter the marriage with unreasonable expectations and then suffer disappointment. Such disappointment may lead to his resenting his new bride, which would render him in violation of the mitzva to love one's fellow as himself (ve-ahavta le-rei'akha kamokha – 19:18). Curiously, the Gemara makes no mention of the possible violation of lo tisna et achikha bi-lvavekha, that the man might transgress the prohibition against "despising" one's fellow. Perhaps, Rav Weiss suggested, this Gemara worked off the assumption that lo tisna is transgressed only through action, and not through feeling. The feelings of resentment that could result from unmet expectations would not be likely to cause the husband to mistreat his wife, and would rather remain concealed and suppressed in his heart. Thus, these feelings would constitute a violation of the mitzva to love one's fellow, but not of the prohibition of lo tisna.
Rav Weiss concludes his discussion of this topic by citing the famous, landmark responsum of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l concerning the question of whether one may give food or drink to a non-observant Jew, who would likely eat or drink without reciting a berakha. At first glance, this would violate the prohibition of lifnei iver lo titein mikhshol (19:14), which forbids assisting one's fellow in committing a transgression. Rav Shlomo Zalman, however, rules (Minchat Shelomo 35:1) that one may – and indeed must be prepared to – offer food even to a Jew who will presumably not recite a berakha. He explains that withholding food in such a case will likely cause the non-observant Jew to despise him and, even worse, harbor feelings of resentment towards all religious Jews, in violation of lo tisna et achikha. Since the Biblical prohibition of lo tisna is far graver than the Rabbinic obligation to recite a berakha before eating, one will actually cause his fellow to commit a more severe transgression by withholding the food. It is therefore preferable that one offer food and drink to one's fellow Jews regardless of the likelihood that they will or will not recite a berakha.
Rav Weiss adds that although there is room to discuss and debate the halakhic rationale behind this ruling, it most certainly serves as an inspiring example of the importance of treating all Jews with loving kindness regardless of their level of observance, and of avoiding as much as possible kindling or fueling flames of resentment among our fellow Jews.
******
The Gemara in Masekhet Yevamot (62) famously tells of the plague that killed Rabbi Akiva's thousands of students one year during the period between Pesach and Shavuot, as punishment for their disrespectful treatment of one another. It is generally believed that the quasi-mourning traditionally observed during the sefira period is in commemoration of this terrible tragedy.
Many scholars noted the painful irony latent in the fact that specifically Rabbi Akiva's academy was plagued by internal strife and discord. It was Rabbi Akiva himself who famously pointed to the verse in Parashat Kedoshim (19:18), "Ve-ahavta le-rei'akha kamokha" ("You shall love your fellow as yourself") as the "great principle of the Torah" (Torat Kohanim). He, seemingly more than his contemporaries, championed the unparalleled central importance of brotherly love and mutual concern. It might seem, at first glance, that the disunity that ravaged his academy marked a tragic educational failure on his part, and reveals his inability to convey this important message to his disciples.
Alternatively, however, it is possible to distinguish between the value of "love your fellow as yourself" as emphasized by Rabbi Akiva, and the Talmud's description of his students' not showing respect to one another.
Rav Eliyahu Baruch Shulman (http://www.yutorah.org/showShiur.cfm/711006/Rabbi_Eli_Baruch_Shulman/Drosho_for_Kdoshim_5765) suggested such a distinction by noting the difference between the terms ahava (love) and kavod (respect). The basis for distinguishing between these terms is a famous remark earlier in Masekhet Yevamot (62) that a husband must "love his wife like himself, and respect her more than himself." This remark clearly presumes a distinction of sorts between the feelings of "love" and "respect," demanding that a husband "respect" his wife even more than he "loves" her. Wherein lies the difference between these two concepts?
Rav Shulman suggests that ahava refers to a sense of kinship one feels with another person, whereas kavod denotes an admiration one feels for another person's distinctive characteristics. Relatives naturally "love" one another because of the bond and connectedness they feel towards each other. This is true as well – albeit in much less intense fashion – of people connected by other commonalities, such as classmates, teammates and coworkers. People bound together by some shared feature – be it a familial relationship, or common interests, goals or experiences – naturally feel some degree of affection towards one another.
Kavod, by contrast, is, in Rav Shulman's words, "the acknowledgement and deference that we offer to individuality, to individual uniqueness and accomplishment." Respect is directed towards a person's individual features and qualities, that which he does not share with anybody else. As Rav Shulman explains, "We don't honor someone for being the same as everyone else, but for being – in some way – different, and different in a way of value."
The Talmud admonishes a husband to "love" his spouse "as himself," to feel the kindred spirit between them and treat her accordingly. As his closest relative, so-to-speak, she deserves the same concern as he shows to himself; her needs must be seen as his own. But, in addition, one must "respect" her individuality and admire her for her distinctive qualities, those parts of her being which he does not share with her. The tension between ahava and kavod is that between a sense of oneness and an acknowledgement of distinctiveness; sensing the genuine bond between the two parties while at the same appreciating each other's distinctive nature. One should love his spouse "like himself," but respect his spouse "more than himself," acknowledging and admiring his/her individual, distinctive achievement and qualities, that part of the spouse which he himself does not possess.
This, then, helps explain the strife that gripped Rabbi Akiva's academy. Even if they sensed ahava, they felt the kindred spirit shared by all Jews and all Torah students, as their revered teacher admonished, they failed in the area of kavod, of respecting the qualities of those who differed from them. They felt emotionally bound to those of the same kind, but could not bring themselves to appreciate and admire each other's distinctive qualities. The tragedy of Rabbi Akiva's students thus teaches the importance of treating others with both ahava and kavod, to both love and admire, to feel both bound to our fellow Jews while at the same time respecting each person's individuality and unique qualities.
******
Parashat Kedoshim begins with God's command to Moshe, "Speak to the entire assembly of Israelites and say to them, 'You shall be holy – for I, the Lord your God, am holy." Torat Kohanim, noting the unusual phrase "the entire assembly of Israelites," remarks that the contents of this parasha were to be conveyed be-hakhel, in the presence of the entire nation. Unlike the other laws of the Torah, which were first taught to the nation's leaders and then to the rest of the nation, the mitzvot presented in Parashat Kedoshim were spoken to the people all at once, in a national assembly. The reason, Torat Kohanim explains, is that rov gufei Torah teluyin ba – "most of the fundamentals of Torah depend on it."
Many different approaches have been taken over the centuries to identify
the "fundamentals of the Torah" to which Torat Kohanim here refers. Rav Moshe Rosen, in his Ohel
Moshe (published posthumously in
In some
other faiths, "sanctity" is associated with monasticism and other forms of
self-denial, and is therefore restricted to the given faith's "spiritual elite,"
those who are inclined and able to lead such a lifestyle. Parashat Kedoshim, by contrast, teaches
the fundamental precept that kedusha is required of each and every member
of the nation, as it does not entail unreasonable demands and standards. Kedusha is manifest in everyday life, in even the
most common and ordinary everyday situations, through the implementation of the
Torah's laws and values in those situations.
Understandably, then, God instructed Moshe
to teach this section be-hakhel, in the presence of the entire
nation, to underscore the notion that the ideal of kedoshim tiheyu is both attainable by, and expected from,
each and every member of the nation.
******
Parashat Kedoshim presents the prohibitions against exacting revenge
from, and bearing a grudge against, one's fellow for wrongs that he had
committed (19:18). Chizkuni concludes his comments to this verse by
explaining the rationale underlying these prohibitions: "The Almighty thus said:
Let the love you have towards him triumph over the animosity you have towards
him, and peace will thus prevail in the world." This explanation sees the prohibitions
against revenge and grudges as intended to help maintain peaceful relations
among people. It is inevitable in
any society that people will – knowingly or otherwise – insult or wrong one
another. If every wrong was
reciprocated by another wrong, and every harsh word responded to with another
harsh word, social harmony will be virtually impossible to achieve. If people are not prepared to forgive,
forget and forego, one would be capable of enjoying positive and meaningful
relationships with only a very small number of other
people.
The Rambam similarly writes in concluding his discussion of these laws
(Hilkhot Dei'ot 7:8), "This is the proper mode of conduct through which it is
possible for the earth's settlement and people's dealings with one another to be
maintained." If everybody insists
on "settling the score" for each and every wrong committed against him, the
level of cooperation and mutual assistance that mankind needs to develop and
cultivate the earth cannot possibly be sustained. The Torah therefore demanded that one be
prepared to work with and help even those who have wronged him, in order to
ensure the viability of large-scale cooperation among
people.
Earlier (7:7), however, the Rambam appears to allude to a slightly
different point of focus underlying these laws:
Even though one is not lashed on account of
it [exacting revenge], nevertheless, it is a very grievous mode of conduct. It is rather worthwhile for a person to
be forbearing with regard to all matters on earth, for it is all – for those
with understanding – matters of vanity and nonsense, for which it is not worth
exacting revenge.
Beyond the practical necessity for people to
forgive and forego, these prohibitions relate as well to the proper perspective
and sense of proportion that one must maintain in responding to negative
experiences. When seen in a broader
perspective, virtually everything for which people seek revenge and bear grudges
is sheer "vanity and nonsense." The
wrongs we suffer at the hands of others are, more often than not, relatively
slight infractions that do not deserve the honor of anger and aggravation. A person who leads his life with the
proper mindset and priorities will immediately recognize the foolishness in
harboring resentment against his fellow for an insensitive remark or other,
similar offenses. Thus, beyond the
general, practical value of avoiding grudges and revenge, it also helps foster a
healthy perspective towards adversity, reminding a person that it is simply not
worth his time or emotional energy to insist upon "settling scores" for every
wrong committed against him.