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PARASHAT Acharei Mot-Kedoshim

by Rav David Silverberg

            In both Parashat Acharei-Mot and Parashat Kedoshim, the Torah presents the laws of arayot – forbidden sexual relationships.  It outlines in great detail all the familial relationships which render sexual contact forbidden, as well as other instances of forbidden relations, including homosexuality, relations with animals, and so on.  In Parashat Acharei-Mot (chapter 18), the Torah presents the actual prohibitions of arayot, whereas in Parashat Kedoshim (chapter 20) the Torah prescribes the punishment for each of the violations.

            One might wonder why the Torah divided its discussion of arayot into these two sections.  Why did it choose not to present a single section devoted to this topic, which would include both the prohibitions and the punishments?

            A closer examination of these two sections reveals a difference in theme between them.  At the end of Parashat Acharei-Mot, the Torah emphasizes the spiritually corrosive quality of forbidden sexual contact, the impurity that results and the repercussions:

"Do not defile yourself in any of those ways, for it is by such that the nation that I am casting out before you defiled themselves.  Thus the land became defiled; and I called it to account for its iniquity, and the land spewed out its inhabitants.  But you must keep My laws and My rules… and let not the land spew you out for defiling it, as it spewed out the nation that came before you." (18:24-28)

The Torah here establishes that the sexual conduct described in this section causes the land to become tamei (defiled), in which case it must "spew out" its inhabitants.

            In Parashat Kedoshim, by contrast, the Torah's discussion of arayot appears to focus on a different theme – the theme that runs throughout Parashat Kedoshim and for which it is named: kedusha (sanctity).  The arayot section in Parashat Kedoshim begins, "You shall sanctify yourselves and be holy, for I the Lord am your God.  You shall faithfully observe My laws: I the Lord make you holy" (20:7-8).  Similarly, this section concludes, "You shall be holy to Me, for I the Lord am holy, and I have set you apart from other peoples to be Mine" (20:26).  In this parasha, too, the Torah warns of the land's "spewing out" its inhabitants in response to improper sexual conduct (20:22-24), but unlike the parallel warning in Parashat Acharei-Mot, this warning makes no mention of the factor of tum'a.  Rather, God proclaims, "For it is because they [the inhabitants of Canaan] did all these things that I abhorred them and said to you: You shall possess their land… " (20:23-24).  These verses point not to the tum'a that filled the land as the cause for expulsion, but rather God's decision to expel the nations because He "abhorred" them.  God allows only holy people to live in his holy land.  When the land's inhabitants conduct themselves improperly, He will ultimately have no choice but to expel them.  In Parashat Kedoshim, then, God commands Benei Yisrael to live at a higher standard of sanctity, for only a nation at such a standard deserves to inhabit His land.  Parashat Acharei-Mot, by contrast, focuses on the tum'a resulting from immorality, which naturally causes the land to expel the violators.

            This difference in theme, between purity and sanctity, might help explain the division between the arayot prohibitions and punishments.  The prohibitions appear in Parashat Acharei-Mot, amidst the Torah's discussion of the repercussions of tum'a, because, quite simply, sexual immorality causes tum'a and is therefore forbidden.  We are told to refrain from immorality because it will naturally result in our expulsion.  In Parashat Kedoshim, by contrast, we are told not to avoid defiling the land, but much more than that: "Kedoshim tihyu" – to be holy people.  Kedusha entails not only refraining from "impure" conduct, but also eliminating it, by punishing those who commit such offenses.  A people that does not even allow isolated incidents of desecration to go unpunished lives according to a unique standard of holiness.  Thus, whereas the prohibitions themselves evolve from the need to avoid contaminating the land, the death penalty involved stems from the obligation of "kedoshim tihyu" – to establish a society that lives at a higher standard and thus cannot tolerate unholy conduct.

(Based in part on a devar Torah by Rav Amnon Bazak)

David Silverberg

*****

            In Parashat Acharei-Mot, God admonishes Benei Yisrael, "You shall not copy the practices of the land of Egypt where you dwelt, or of the land of Canaan to which I am taking you; nor shall you follow their laws" (18:3).  Rashi, citing the Torat Kohanim, comments, "This shows that the practices of Egypt and the Canaanites were more corrupt than [those of] the other nations; and the place where they dwelt was more corrupt than anywhere else."  The fact that the verse specifically forbids adopting the practices of the Egyptians and Canaanites reveals that their conduct was particularly abominable.  Moreover, the phrase "where you dwelt" indicates that the region where Benei Yisrael lived was particularly overrun by corruption.

            The Keli Yakar, in his commentary to this verse, raises several difficulties with Rashi's comments.  For one thing, Benei Yisrael were not forced to live in the Egyptian district where they did.  Recall that it was Yosef who specifically chose the region of Goshen for his brothers and their families, and Benei Yisrael appeared to have lived in Goshen throughout their stay in Egypt.  (See Bereishit 46:34 & 47:6; Shemot 8:18 & 9:26.)  Should we not assume that Yosef would choose the region with a more refined culture and society, and least corrupt lifestyle?  Is it possible that Yosef would have chosen for his brothers the most corrupt and decrepit neighborhoods?  Secondly, according to Rashi, the fact that the verse singles out the Egyptians and the Canaanites proves that their conduct was the most corrupt; had their practices been less depraved than those of other peoples, God would not have singled them out.  But, as the Keli Yakar argues, logic would seem to dictate the precise opposite, that God would emphasize the need for Benei Yisrael to distance themselves from the practices that are less displeasing than others.  Does Rashi mean to imply that Benei Yisrael did not need to refrain from the practices of other, less corrupt pagans?

            The Keli Yakar therefore claims that to the contrary, Egypt and Canaan lived at a higher moral and ethical standard than did the other pagan nations.  God therefore had to specifically warn Benei Yisrael against adopting the practices of these nations, which they might deem acceptable due to their superiority over other peoples.

            Rav Moshe Rosen, in his "Ohel Moshe" (New York, 1963), suggests a novel interpretation of Rashi's comments, according to which Rashi in fact agrees – to some extent – with the Keli Yakar's approach.  Perhaps, Rav Rosen writes, when Rashi speaks of the practices of the Egyptians and Canaanites as "mekulkalin" – generally translated as "corrupt" or "depraved," he means not that their conduct's depravity exceeded that of other peoples, but rather that it posed a greater danger to Benei Yisrael.  By and large, throughout Jewish history, foreign cultures lured the Jews away from Torah only if they were sophisticated, refined, culturally impressive, and intellectually appealing.  Greek scholarship and culture enchanted the Jewish mind; likewise, many centuries later, the European Enlightenment attracted the best and brightest Jewish scholars.  Rarely were the Jews led astray by cultures characterized by illiteracy and vulgarity.  Rashi, like the Keli Yakar, believed that the Egyptians and Canaanites were the "enlightened" civilizations of their time; they boasted a higher, more sophisticated culture than did the other nations.  And specifically for this reason Rashi describes their societies as the most "mekulkal" – as posing the greatest threat to Benei Yisrael's ideological and cultural autonomy. 

David Silverberg

*****

Parshat Kedoshim includes several of the most central commandments relating to interpersonal interaction, such as the prohibitions to steal, withhold payment, bend justice, take revenge, tell lashon hara etc… and the positive commandments of loving ones neighbor as oneself and respect for the elderly and the scholarly. Many ask why we do not say blessings before fulfilling such mitzvot. Why, for example, did our Rabbis not institute a blessing upon the returning of a lost object or upon the giving of charity as they did institute for the laying of Teffilin or immersion in a mikva. Many answers have been suggested; here we will deal with one possible answer which suggests much concerning the nature of such blessings and also concerning the nature of mitzvot relating to interpersonal interaction.

While there is a famous dispute regarding our understanding of the meaning of those commandments which are not obviously meaningful, but rather ritual in nature, it is clear that even one that understands there to be inherent value in them (besides their being the will of God) agrees that this value is not openly evident. It often would seem that it is not so much the act but rather its context and the intentions of the actor during the performance of the mitzva that give meaning to the ritual act. A blessing before performing such an act may be considered as a way to give context and meaning to the act, and as such make it the mitzva that it is. Even if one understands that a mitzva performed without intent is of value (an ancient unresolved dispute) it is still clearly of a greatly reduced level. (See Kovetz Hearot of Rav Elchanan Wasserman, at the end of Yevamot, siman 3, where the argument is made that such mitzvot only contain intrinsic spiritual meaning but are not a fulfillment of Hashem's command; they cannot be fulfilled again because there is nothing left to do.) By such an understanding a beracha (blessing) may be compared to the hineni-muchan-umzuman that kabbalists recite - it clarifies both ones own intention and gives context to the action. 

This seems both necessary and also in place when the action being performed is ritualistic in nature. When, however, the aim of the act is to fulfill some clear function - even were it not concerning interpersonal interaction - it is not clear what it would mean to define the act and declare ones intention beforehand. It may even seem wrong, as it would show that the individual is not appreciative of the inherent value of the act. It is superfluous to declare meaning and praise God in the act of giving charity - it would suggest that such an act is devoid of intrinsic meaning, that doing such an act is not self-evidently an act of service of God. It is the difference between ritual and functional acts, between performance of a service and serving by performance. In the case of functional mitzvot one does not need to invest the act with meaning in order for it to have value, the act itself is a valuable act.

This does not mean that one should not fulfil these acts because God commanded them - the question of intent in the performance of rational mitzvot is a separate issue. The point is simply that these acts are meaningful as forms of service because of what they do, not as rituals.

One may use this distinction to explain various anomalies in hilchot berachot. Why is there no beracha over the recitation of Shema? (the encircling blessings are not birchot hamitzva), or over the hearing of Parshat Zachor (if not including the beracha over the torah), and why does one not recite a beracha before remembering our redemption from Egypt at the conclusion of the Shema? These acts, while not relating to interpersonal interaction, are not merely ritual in nature, they perform a clear function.

This explanation is telling concerning the meaning of mitzvot between people; they must not be seen as ritualistic. Their fulfillment has intrinsic value within their own contexts, within the context of relationships between individuals or between structures within society. They cannot be understood otherwise or properly fulfilled in any other way. 

By Shlomo Dov Rosen

*****

For Yom Haatzmaut

This week we read both Parshat Acharei-Mot and Parshat Kedoshim. According to many interpretations the beginning of the second relates directly to the ending of the first. Parshat Acharei-Mot ends with an explanation of the centrality and importance of the laws creating restrictions on forbidden sexual relations. We are told that if we make ourselves impure, or contaminate ourselves, with these various acts, it will cause the land to become impure, resulting in the land sending us away (Vayikra 18:24-5). We are even informed that this was the reason for the previous inhabitants' loss of the land (Vayikra 18:28-9), and we are told not to do as they did - not to make ourselves impure (Vayikra 18: 30). The very next verse begins Parshat Kedoshim. We are commanded to be holy - for the Lord our God is holy (Vayikra 19: 1-2). Rashi quotes the midrash which understands that this holiness relates to abstention from the forbidden sexual relationships. Ramban disagrees and understands that it relates to a positive attempt to abstain beyond the command, however, he does not disagree with the understanding that holiness relates to abstention, and so even according to Ramban these verses seem to be a direct continuation of the previous chapter.

Chazal learn from the formulation of the command to be holy that if we sanctify ourselves God considers it as if we had sanctified Him. "'For I am holy' that is to say that if you sanctify yourselves I consider it as if you had sanctified Me" (Torat Kohanim). We therefore see an interesting relationship of our actions to the world. If we let ourselves become impure we make the land impure (resulting in its exiling us), however, if we sanctify ourselves (by abstention from those very actions which would make us impure) we are considered to have sanctified Hashem! Perhaps this is because one cannot affect God in any negative way. Therefore profaning ourselves does not result in a profanation of God; instead the land is made impure. If so we must ask ourselves if sanctifying oneself results also in the sanctification of the land, and also what that would mean.

Rish Lakish says in the Gemara (Yoman 9b) that the reason why the Shechinah (God's glory and "presence") did not return to Eretz Yisrael and the Beit Hamikdash during the period of the Second Temple is because the people of Israel did not return to Israel from the Diaspora (see Rashi). This means that God's "presence" depends upon our willingness to return to the land even at a time of redemption!

The Nodah Biyehudah (in Drashot Hatzlach, drash 31) argues that the redemption is to be understood as the returning of the Shechinah to the Jewish people in Israel. He explains that while the Shechinah never leaves us even in exile, its revelation is completely different in Eretz Yisrael. Hashem's redeeming us means that He Himself returns - with us. The Nodah Biyehudah explains that during the period of the Second Temple the Shechinah did not return - it therefore was not a redemption. I think that this idea helps us appreciate Rish Lakish's claim that the reason why the Shechinah did not return to the Second Temple is because the Jews did not return to Israel from the Diaspora.

Perhaps this idea can help us in our discussion of this week's Parshiyot. Sanctifying oneself by holy behavior is to be considered as if a sanctification of Hashem. If we profane ourselves when in Israel the land becomes profaned and sends us away. If we succeed if sanctifying ourselves and also return to the land this returns the Shechinah to the land which is the meaning of redemption - the opposite of exile, which results from impure behavior when in the land of Israel.

Holy behavior is a sanctification of God. When one also returns to the land of Israel the result is the reinstatement of the Shechinah in the land of Israel - which is the opposite of the idea of exile, and the meaning of redemption.

Shlomo Dov Rosen

*****

At the outset of Parshat Acharei-Mot, Hashem commands Moshe to tell his brother Aharon that he may not enter the Holy-of-Holies whenever he wishes, but only on Yom Kippur, and even then only with the necessary preparation. Moshe is told that Aharon would be in danger of losing his life if he were to do so - "for in a cloud I am revealed (or "I shall be revealed") over the Kaporet (the covering of the ark)" (Vayikra 16:2). It is unclear whether this last point is an explanation of the reason for the prohibition and the danger, or an opening to the next verse, which informs us with what preparations the High Priest is permitted to enter on Yom Kippur.

Rashi explains that this phrase should be read in its Pshat (i.e. in its literal sense) as an explanation of the source and rationale of the danger. Since Hashem always reveals His Shechinah, His spiritual glory and 'presence', over the ark in the Holy-of-holies in conjunction with a cloud, it would be dangerous to frequent the place.

However, this explanation does not seem to satisfy Rashi and so he continues by quoting an alternative explanation given by Chazal, in Masechet Yoma 53a, by which this phrase is understood to refer to the small "cloud" of incense which would be made by the High Priest upon his entry on Yom Kippur as a part of his service. Thus, the verse tells us that Aharon must not enter at just any time, but only with this "cloud", by which Hashem shall be "revealed". This is a typical case of Rashi trying to keep close to a literal explanation, but seeming not to find it fully satisfying and therefore appending to it a less literal Drasha. In this case both explanations are possible readings of the text, both grammatically and contextually; Rasag and Rashbam bring the first explanation, while the Ramban brings only the second and the Ibn Ezra mentions both. In such cases we naturally ask ourselves whether these are merely two alternative exegetical readings, or whether they can be understood by a joint understanding, incorporating two simultaneous readings of the text, on two levels of interpretation. As in a poetic reading, by which one considers the multiple possibility in the reading of a text to point in more than one direction simultaneously, and to suggest relationships between those varying readings. I would suggest that there is an inherent relationship between these two explanations which makes them complimentary and two parts of one whole.

A human being must be prepared for an encounter with the Shechinah; God's spiritual glory, or 'presence', is a revelation which, if related to apathetically, is dangerous. Indifference to Hashem's "presence", treating ultimate spirituality as a common matter, is a profanation of holiness, and a shamefaced response to the relationship of Infinity to the temporal. Therefore, if the High Priest were to enter whenever and however he would be in danger because in a cloud Hashem reveals Himself  over the Kaporet. There is an inherent necessity in a physical manifestation representing, or accounting for, the spiritual presence. If the human being does not come prepared and in a respectful manner he or she is met by the spiritual "presence", demanding accountability. However, if one prepares oneself in an appropriate manner and this respectfulness is expressed also in the choice of occasion for the meeting, there is no danger. There must be an accounting for the greatness of the moment and an expression of the awesome nature of the encounter. If the human being provides this through preparation and the aspect of approach, the revelation, so to speak, is brought forth via the human being's behavior itself. There is therefore no threat upon the human being, for in a cloud Hashem shall reveal Himself over the Kaporet - in the very cloud that the human service provided for that revelation.

There must be a manifestation of the spiritual greatness and an accountability of the greatness of the moment. If the human being brings this forth as an expression of respect and devotion, that very service becomes a vehicle for Divine revelation. In an encounter between the human and Infinity, God will necessarily reveal Himself in a cloud. If the person is able to bring that cloud forward, the human has provided a manifestation of God's greatness in this world. Only if this necessity is ignored does God's "presence" become a threat and God must reveal Himself through a cloud in the presence of which the human being cannot stand.

*****

Parashat Kedoshim relates to us the commandment to give respect to and stand before the elderly and the learned. In the first chapter of the Gemara of Masechet Kidushin (pages 32b-33b) the verse dealing with these commandments is studied closely and several laws relating to these commandments are learnt from it. Firstly one must ask who exactly is included amongst those that must be respected. The verse includes two Hebrew words that are unclear. The verse reads (Vayikra 19:32): "Before a seiva stand, and show respect to a zaken…" Both seiva and zaken can be taken as meaning the elderly. However, when used together superfluously in the same sentence they would seem to have different meanings, relating to different connotations that these words would always seem to conjure up.

The Gemara (Kidushin 32b) explains that the word zaken relates to one that is knowledgeable, while the word seiva is used to indicate one that is elderly. However, the verse means to include both categories together. That is to say that although the obligation to stand is mentioned regarding the seiva - the elderly, and showing respect is mentioned regarding the zaken - the learned, both are obligatory regarding both categories. We therefore find that we are commanded to both stand in the presence of, and generally show respect to, both the elderly and the scholarly.

Because of the fact that this mitzva includes two different groups of people we are to understand that one is not included in the other. One is obligated to show respect to, and stand before, even one that is still young, if learned. This is the position of Rabbi Yossi Haglili, and the accepted Halacha.

In discussion of this mitzva the Gemara (Kidushin 33b) relates that someone was required to stand before a certain Rav Yechezkel since he was a ba'al ma'asim - a person of good deeds. This would at first seem not to fit our understanding of the mitzva. Rav Yechezkel was presumably not elderly (since that was not the reason given for showing him respect) nor was he more learned that the other. In what way would the fact of his being a person of good deeds account for the obligation to stand in his presence? The Ran in his commentary on the Rif explains this Gemara by the use of an idea which has great importance for our general understanding of the relationship between study and action - between learning Torah and doing good deeds. The Ran explains that the real reason why one must stand before one that is learned is because "wisdom brings to action", that is to say that wisdom is considered something to be respected because it causes one to keep that which has been studied. The Ran explains that the Torah should really have commanded us to stand before one that is righteous, however, it is rarely evident in the real world who is and who is not righteous. Since it usually is evident who is learned the command was given relating to such a person and the righteous individual who is not noticeably learned is not mentioned explicitly. However, in delving into the rationale behind the mitzva we find that such a person is assumed - if one must stand for the learned because "wisdom brings to action" one must certainly stand before, and show respect to, one that is noticeably a person of good deeds.

A similar idea may be found in the commentary of the Torah Temima on this week's parasha (note 241). Besides bringing the case in Gemara Kidushin, the Torah Temima also points out that in Masechet Megilah (17b) we are taught that one must pray for the welfare of the convert in the blessing in the daily Amida in which we pray for the righteous. This is learnt from the movement that we find from the one to the other in the context of the mitzva that we are dealing with and the next verse which deals with the commandment not to cause pain in any way to a convert. We therefore see, the Torah Temima argues, that this mitzva includes the righteous, and not only the learned and elderly. This source is very important in adding proof for the Ran's argument and reminding us of the relationship between these two social mitzvot, that of respect for the learned and elderly and that of extreme consideration for the convert. It however does not deal directly with the rationale of the inclusion of the righteous in this mitzva, the idea we find in the Ran - which has great added ramifications.

This Hallacha, when understood in the light of the Ran's explanation, teaches much regarding both the value of study and the importance of action. In direct opposition to those that consider study of Torah to come at the expense of developing oneself in the field of performing good in the world (in the practical sense) we are taught that one must view the study of Torah formative in making one a better person. However, it would similarly be incorrect to consider scholarly pursuits as an exclusive aim, or even as ones ultimate interest. The value of study is in its capacity to bring one to do good.

shlomo dov rosen

*****

In Parashat Kedoshim we are taught many mitzvot relating to interactive behavior between people, including mitzvot that teach us what types of people we must respect and also when we must not do so. Boundaries must be set in our relationships between different groups in society, both in the sense of giving respect when it is correct to do so and in the sense of withholding it when it would be wrong. Just as the Torah requires of us to be modest, kind and respectful, so it teaches us that at times we must know where to draw the line. This idea is found in an explicit Rabbinical teaching at the outset of the Parasha and also seems to lurk in the background throughout.

The third verse of the Parashat Kedoshim reads (Vayikra 19:3): "A man must fear both his mother and his father, and you must keep my Shabbath - I am the Lord your God". The Gemara in both Yevamoth 5b and in Bava Metziah 32a understands the formulation of this verse to teach that respect for the wishes of ones parents is conditional to its not conflicting with any other mitzva. The Gemara mentions two examples of clashing mitzvot, a cohen becoming impure (by coming into the vicinity of a dead body) and an individual withholding himself from returning a lost object. These two examples seem to purposely relate to mitzvot of extremely different natures. Whether the conflict is between respect for ones parents and a social obligation (which is a mitzva - obviously not just any social consideration would override) or between respect and a purely ritual mitzva, one must not let respect for a human being cause neglect of ones personal obligations. This is because, as the Gemara explains, both you and your parent are obligated in the respect of God. There is no conflict, since considerations of other mitzvot are obligations which equally apply to the parent as to the child.

A careful reading of the Parasha shows that this idea is a recurring theme throughout and continuously reappears as we are taught more mitzvot of social import.

Verses 9-14 relate 13 mitzvot of social interaction, including various forms of agricultural charity, laws of theft through dishonest business transactions, and the prohibition to take advantage of another's weakness or blindness. We are then commanded, in verse 15, not to bend justice by showing unwarranted concern for the financially unstable when in court, or by giving respect in such a context for one that is great. We are later taught that we must show respect for the elderly and scholarly (19:32) that we must not cause any pain to a convert, but must consider him or her completely equal ("ke'ezrach mikem yiheye") and must love the convert like ourselves. However, in the context of a court of law all considerations of respect and empathy must fall away. While one must be empathetic in the ruling itself, one must not let oneself deal differently with any of the parties - showing favor or even respect for the one in the presence of the other (Gemara, Masechet Shavuoth 30a). While one is obligated at the door of the courtroom to give charity to the defendant, when on trial he must be judged by the law of the Torah, even if this means that money which will be taken by law will later be in need of being replenished in the form of charity from both the judge and the other party in the case (Torat Kohanim).

Verses 16-18 deal with the mitzvot of not telling lashon hara, not standing aside oblivious of another's danger, not hating another in ones heart, and not taking revenge, but rather, loving ones neighbour as oneself. Yet we are not commanded to simply hold all this in. The second half of the verse prohibiting hate tells us to reprimand the other, so long as this does not cause sin (such as causing embarrassment - Gemara Erchin 16b). This reprimanding may be understood in two ways. Generally this is understood to stand alone, as a mitzva to reprimand another over incorrect behaviour of any sort. However, Rashbam, Ramban and the Chizkuni suggest that one read it as a direct continuation of the first half of the verse. If another wrongs you or causes you pain do not hold it in as hate, rather reprimand the other. Ask him why he behaved in this way to you, as this will bring him to apologise to you, and you will forgive him - Ramban. By reprimanding him over what he has done there shall be peace - Rashbam. Perhaps in this way it will become clarified that it was all incorrect and he never intended what you understood, or he will repair what he has done wrong - Chizkuni.

This is yet another example of boundaries being set. While we must "hold in" our bad feelings generally (the prohibitions of lashon hara and the taking of revenge) we are not expected to love our neighbor by simply holding everything in - this would lead to hate. We must know when to move in the opposite direction and insist upon confronting both the issue and the neighbor in order to set things straight.

After teaching us so much of the importance of social bonding, the next chapter deals with public behavior in a case of finding that a form of child sacrifice idolatry has been practiced ("molech"). The Torah immediately deals with the possibility that society may try to cover up and defend the offender (Vayikra 20:4). If the populace try to ignore and cover up, we are told that God's punishment will not be applied to the offender alone (Vayikra 20:5).

Again, we are taught the importance of consideration for others and standing by them in cases of danger. But we must know the boundaries of these values also. Parashat Kedoshim teaches us social and moral values and sets out practical laws to govern our behavior - at the same time it reminds us to know the limits of these values and how and when to apply them.

 Shlomo Dov Rosen

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