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The Israel Koschitzky
Virtual Beit Midrash
Surf A Little Torah PARASHAT BEHAR - BECHUKOTAI By Rav David Silverberg Parashat Behar presents the laws of the yovel (jubilee year), during which all lands and homes (with the exception of houses in walled cities) are returned to their original owners. This discussion concludes with God's declaration, "And the land shall not be sold permanently, for the land is Mine" (25:23). Rashi explains this verse as adding a mitzvat lo ta'aseh ("negative command," or prohibition) onto the mitzvat asei (affirmative command) to return purchased property with the advent of the yovel. A buyer not only bears an obligation to return the land, but also faces a prohibition that forbids retaining his possession over the property. The Meshekh Chokhma disputes Rashi's understanding of the verse, claiming that a buyer who refuses to return the property to its original owner in any event transgresses the prohibition of theft (lo tigzol). Chazal describe the onset of yovel as afk'ata de-Malka ("the King's appropriation"), which means that legal ownership over purchased land automatically returns to the seller. Therefore, if a buyer refuses to cede control over the property, he in effect lives on stolen land and transgresses the Torah prohibition against theft. There is thus no need for the Torah to impose yet another prohibition – "the land shall not be sold permanently" – to forbid retaining purchased property after the onset of the jubilee. The Meshekh Chokhma therefore suggests a different explanation of this verse, claiming that it refers to the laws presented in the next section, concerning the "redemption" of purchased fields. If a person came upon financial straits and was forced to sell his property, he is entitled to repurchase the land when he or a relative has the means to do so. The Torah writes, "Throughout the land of your holdings – there shall be redemption for the land" (25:24), requiring the buyer to agree to resell the land to its original owner. According to the Meshekh Chokhma, the prohibition against "selling the land permanently" forbids a buyer from refusing to sell the land back to the original seller when his financial situation improves (or when a relative offers to purchase the property for him). Rav Avraham Yitzchak Sorotzkin, in his Rinat Yitzchak, suggests three approaches to resolve Rashi's interpretation of the verse. Firstly, a famous halakhic principle states that karka eina nigzelet – real estate is not subject to the laws of theft. Unlike moveable property, land cannot be seized; as such, it can never be truly said to be "stolen." The Mishneh Le-melekh (Hilkhot Malveh Ve-loveh 4:1), based on a Tosefot in Bava Metzia, extends this rule to mean that a person who takes his fellow's land does not transgress the prohibition of lo tigzol. Hence, the Torah had to introduce a separate prohibition against refusing to yield purchased property with the onset of the jubilee year. Secondly, even if the prohibition of lo tigzol indeed applies to the unlawful seizure of land, one would violate this prohibition only by performing some act of possession. In the case of yovel, however, the buyer legally lived on the land until the advent of the jubilee year, and does not perform any new act of possession when the yovel begins. As such, he would not transgress the prohibition of lo tigzol, and the Torah therefore established a separate prohibition against refusing to surrender purchased land in the yovel. Finally, the Rambam rules in Hilkhot Shemita Ve-yovel (10:13; based on the Gemara's discussion in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah 9b) that the status of the jubilee year depends on a number of factors, including the return of purchased lands. Meaning, if nobody returns purchased land, the special laws of yovel do not take effect. (The Minchat Chinukh – 42, 335 – discusses whether this requires the return of the majority of purchased lands, or if it suffices for even one buyer to return his property for the laws to take effect.) Seemingly, then, if nobody returns purchased land during yovel, such that the yovel laws do not take effect, buyers live in their legally owned properties, but nevertheless transgress the prohibition against refusing to yield purchased property during yovel. Thus, it was necessary for the Torah to issue this prohibition despite the fact that it had already forbidden theft. ****** Parashat Bechukotai begins with the description of blessings God promises to bestow upon Benei Yisrael in reward for their observance of the Torah. One verse in this section reads, "I shall place My residence in your midst, and My soul shall not abhor you" (26:11). As the Ramban notes, the promise, "My soul shall not abhor you" seems superfluous. If God is promising to "reside" among Benei Yisrael, in addition to the previously mentioned blessings of peace and prosperity, is it not obvious that He will not "abhor" them? (The Ramban interprets this verse as a reference to a sod mi-sitrei Torah – one of the profound Kabbalistic "secrets" of the Torah.) The simplest explanation, perhaps, as suggested by Seforno and others, is that God here promises to never again become enraged with His people. This verse refers to the time when God will have His Shekhina reside among the people permanently, without there ever being the possibility of destroying the Mikdash as He had done previously. According to this reading, the phrase "and My soul shall not abhor you" refers to the future, rather than to the time spoken of in this section. The Panim Yafot explains differently, claiming that the Torah refers here to the demanding religious standards that God's presence imposes. For example, the tribe of Levi reportedly suffered numerous tragedies because of their exposure to the ark (Rashi, Berieshit 29:34). Those who worked with the aron but failed to meet the demands entailed by the closeness to the Shekhina were subject to immediate and harsh punishment. Similarly, after the sin of the golden calf God informs Moshe that His presence will not accompany Benei Yisrael in the wilderness directly, "lest I consume you along the way" (Shemot 33:3). Thus, God here guarantees Benei Yisrael of their ability to meet the standards imposed by His presence among the nation. If they truly and sincerely commit themselves to obeying His word, He will assist them to ensure that they live in strict accordance with the demands associated with the Shekhina's residence among the people.
The Netziv suggests an entirely different approach, claiming that
God refers here to His reaction to isolated instances of wrongdoing by
individuals. This entire section
speaks of Am Yisrael's collective obedience to God and
commitment to the Torah, in response to which they are promised peace, success
and prosperity on the national level.
God here promises that even should individual members of the nation
disobey His word, He will nevertheless "not abhor you," He will continue to
treat the nation favorably in the collective merit of the majority. Although certain individuals may be
privately deserving of punishment, their liability will not affect God's general
treatment of the nation, who will continue to benefit from His blessing and
kindness. ****** Yesterday, we discussed God's promise to Benei Yisrael in Parashat Bechukotai that in reward for their obedience, "I shall place My residence in your midst, and My soul shall not abhor you" (26:11). As we mentioned, God's promise not to "abhor" Benei Yisrael seems self-evident and superfluous, given His willingness to reside among them. Why must God promise not to "abhor" the nation after promising to have His Shekhina dwell in their midst?
The Keli Yakar suggests that the term tig'al – generally
translated as "abhor" – actually means "expel." Already Rashi noted the linguistic
association between tig'al and the Aramaic term hag'ala, which
refers to the immersion of a utensil in boiling water for the purpose of
expelling the taste of food embedded within its walls. Unlike Rashi, however, who explains
tig'al in this context to mean "repulsed," the Keli Yakar contends
that it refers to actual "expulsion."
God here promises that His presence in the Beit Ha-mikdash will
not require banning Benei Yisrael from the site to make room for the
Shekhina. God will somehow
"constrict" Himself to reside in the
One might develop this notion, of the possible misconception that God's
residence in the Mikdash "leaves no room" for Benei Yisrael, a bit further. Whenever two people grow closer to one
another, the differences between them become more evident and jarring. The notion that "familiarity breeds
contempt" is due, in part, to the contrast that comes to the fore as a result of
familiarity. In the case of the
Shekhina's residence among Benei Yisrael, this phenomenon could have served to
highlight the vast difference between man and God. The concern addressed here, as explained
by the Keli Yakar, is perhaps that God's presence among the
nation will serve to further distance them from the Almighty, and Him from
them. It might reinforce the
mistaken notion that God's infinite power and greatness make it impossible for
man to relate to Him, for Him to play a role in our lives. Rather than fostering a sense of
connection between man and God, between the finite and the infinite, the
Shekhina's presence could be seen as doing just the
opposite – convincing skeptics that the entire notion of a man-God relationship
is a fallacy.
God therefore guarantees Benei Yisrael that He will not "expel" them from the
******
Parashat Behar begins with the laws of shemita, the "sabbatical" year during which
agricultural work is forbidden, and then proceeds to outline the laws of
yovel, the jubilee. Yovel, too, features a ban on tilling the fields,
but, in addition, requires the return of all purchased property to its original
owners and the release of all Hebrew servants. In this context the Torah discusses the
ramifications of this law on commercial activity generally, as the price of
property and servants must be adjusted in consideration of the inherent time
limitation on all such transactions.
Interestingly, this section includes as well a restatement of the
prohibition against lending on interest (25:36-37), which had already been
introduced earlier, in Sefer Shemot (22:24). Wherein lies the connection between the
institution of yovel and the prohibition against taking
interest, on account of which the Torah chose to restate the latter amidst its
discussion of the former?
Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch, in his commentary, suggests that these two
mitzvot serve as reminders of God's ultimate
ownership over our property.
Yovel, of course, prevents a purchaser from ever
feeling a sense of complete ownership or control over any property or human
being. The ban on interest, too, as
Rav Hirsch explains, relates to this theme of man's limited control over his
assets: Were we the real owners of our money, and if the loaning of it was completely an act of our own free will, then possibly the interest on loans which we take after a time might be considered neither as neshekh [usury] towards our debtors nor tarbit [increase] on our part. Our debtors may have earned money with our money (and it is just of such a loan for business purposes that our text speaks, see verse 35). The interest which he gives us is…no loss of any of his fortune, it is only a part of the fruit which our capital has begotten in his hands… For we were not bound to lend him our money. Had we kept it in our own hands it could also have been fruitful capital, we could also have earned with it, and the interest we receive is of no real increase of our fortune, it is only compensation…for an increase which we have lost… But now, looking at it from the Jewish point of view, our money is not absolutely our own property, it is only conditionally ours. God has the real right of disposal of it, and "He" has made it our duty to place some of "His" property that happens to be in our hands into the hand of our brother, not only to provide the necessities for his life, but also for the upkeep and continuation of his business…. The profit made is the product of his activity with his own money and consequently exclusively his. The prohibition against interest thus reflects the fundamental tenet that any wealth a person possesses in truth belongs to the Almighty and has merely been entrusted with the individual. And since God has ordained that one must lend money to those in need, any profits earned by the borrower should not be seen as the product of the lender's investment, but rather the product of the borrower's own efforts with the assets God assigned to him. As such, the lender has no right to demand interest as compensation for investment opportunities he lost during the period of the loan. Rav Hirsch's comments elsewhere concerning the prohibition against interest (Shemot 22:24) might form the basis for yet another point of connection between this prohibition and the institution of yovel: This law takes away the worst effect of the power of money, that most potent factor in causing social inequality. It breaks the too great power of capital. If this prohibition is strictly kept, all capital is in itself dead and unproductive, and can only be of use by wedding it to labor. It raises labor to the primary and essential factor of social well-being. Capital is forced to recognize the equality of labor. The rich man must either bring his otherwise dead capital to production by his own powers of work, or he must associate himself with the powers of labor of the poor man, share profit and loss with him, and in his own interests further the interests of labor. In other words, as a result of this prohibition, a wealthy man can use his capital to increase his wealth only by hiring work, or by investing in the form of a partnership whereby he shares the partner's profits and losses. Money will not be guaranteed to earn more money, as it can be invested only on the basis of a percentage arrangement, and not on unconditional interest. This prohibition thus serves to narrow the social gap between rich and poor, and maintain a degree of equality among the members of the various economic groups. Of course, this theme constitutes a central pillar of the institution of yovel, as well. During the jubilee, as during shemita, all lands are rendered ownerless and are legally accessible to all members of the nation. But in addition, the jubilee year annuls servitude and restores property to those whom financial straits had forced to sell. These two laws thus remind Benei Yisrael to look upon one another as equals, as members of the same social stratum, and, indeed, as members of the same family. ****** The opening verse of Parashat Bechukotai states the conditions for the bestowal of the blessings enumerated in the subsequent verses: "If you walk in accordance with My statutes, and observe My commandments and perform them." Rashi famously comments that since the second clause – "and observe My commandments" – speaks of mitzva observance, the first clause – "if you walk in accordance with My statutes" – must refer to something else. Rather than performing mitzvot, Rashi explains, this opening clause speaks of Benei Yisrael's intensive Torah study: she-tiheyu ameilim be-Torah. The Keli Yakar elaborates on Rashi's comment and proposes an explanation for the linguistic basis of this interpretation. He notes that the word chok often refers to a daily routine, an ongoing regimen, as in the phrase "lechem chuki" (Mishlei 30:8), which means "my daily bread." Thus, the word chukotai in this verse denotes the uninterrupted adherence to a daily routine. According to the Keli Yakar, when Rashi speaks of "ameilut" – rigorous involvement in Torah study – he refers to the commitment to a daily learning program. It does not require full-day learning on the part of the entire nation, but rather a daily scheduled session that is followed consistently without fail. The Keli Yakar adds that this might also explain the meaning of the word teileikhu – "walk" – in this verse. The Torah speaks here of a steady, day-to-day commitment that one fulfills throughout his life, and thus describes the nation as "walking," living their lives, with this devotion to Torah learning. Furthermore, the Keli Yakar notes, this approach might also explain an otherwise perplexing passage in the Midrash (Vayikra Rabba 35:1). Commenting on this verse, the Midrash describes how King David would plan each day to go one place or another, but inevitably his legs would bring him to the study halls to learn Torah. What kind of experience does the Midrash seek to describe, and of what relevance is it to this verse? The Keli Yakar explains that the Midrash refers to King David's unwavering commitment to his daily schedule of Torah study. His attendance at his scheduled sessions became habitual; these study periods were built in to his daily routine such that everything else was scheduled around them. Regardless of his other duties and interests, he was naturally drawn to the study hall for his daily learning regimen. The Midrash points to the inviolability of David's study sessions as an inspiring example of im be-chukotai teileikhu, of maintaining one's daily routine of learning with fervent devotion. The first reward listed here in Parashat Bechukotai is that of "ve-natati gishmeikhem be-itam" – "I shall provide your rains in their times" (26:4). The Keli Yakar explains that in reward for Benei Yisrael's commitment to their daily schedule of Torah learning, God will likewise remain committed, so-to-speak, to the schedule of nature. Just as they adhere to their routine, so will God ensure that nature follows its routine and water the earth and the proper times. Thus, according to the Keli Yakar, these verses speak of the importance of kevi'at itim le-Torah, of allocating daily periods for Torah learning, and devotedly keeping to that schedule with consistency and determination. ****** Parashat Behar concludes with the command, "You shall observe My Sabbaths and revere My Sanctuary" (26:2). According to Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni, the terms "sabbath" in this verse refers not to the weekly Shabbat, but rather to shemita, the observance of the "sabbatical" year. Other commentators struggle to explain the relevance of Shabbat observance to this context; according to Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni, this command simply summarizes and concludes the Torah's discussion concerning the laws of shemita. Even more surprisingly, Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni also cite an interpretation claiming that "revere My Sanctuary" ("mikdashi tira'u") refers to the observance of the jubilee year. Earlier in Parashat Behar the Torah describes the yovel as kodesh – "sacred" (25:12), and this description, according to this view, justifies the association between the term mikdash and the jubilee year. Thus, when the Torah here admonishes Benei Yisrael to "revere My Sanctuary," it reiterates the obligation to observe the aforementioned laws of the yovel.
Already the Meshekh Chokhma notes the peculiarity of this
interpretation, whereby the word mikdash – which throughout the Torah
refers to the Mishkan or Beit
Ha-mikdash – is now used to
describe a period of time, the jubilee year. This explanation indeed seems difficult
to accept, but it nevertheless might invite some thought concerning a possible
connection between the Mikdash and yovel.
If, indeed, the term mikdash could be understood as an allusion of sorts
to the yovel, perhaps some meaningful association exists
between the two institutions of the jubilee year and the
When a person enters the Mikdash and beholds and experiences the presence of
the Shekhina, the trivial, petty concerns of life are
put into perspective. His
priorities and attention are refocused onto avodat Hashem, to his responsibilities and obligations to
God. After encountering the
Shekhina, the more mundane concerns of wealth and
social stature begin to fade into the background and give way to a focus on
one's service of God.
It is in this sense, perhaps, that the jubilee year functions as a type
of "Mikdash."
The laws of yovel effectively suspend economic competition
and restore social equality. Land
purchases are revoked, all agricultural fields are rendered ownerless and lie
fallow, and all servants are freed.
During the jubilee year, there is no possibility of working to increase
profits or bolster one's social standing; the concerns and challenges that
occupy much of our lives and drain much of our energies disappear during the
yovel.
Thus, the experience of yovel indeed resembles that of the Mikdash.
It reminds a person of what his primary focus and concerns in life ought
to be, and which areas deserve priority and emphasis. ******
Much of Parashat Behar is devoted to the laws of shemita – the seventh "sabbatical" year – and
yovel – the jubilee. In this context, the Torah presents as
well other laws, particular that of ona'a, the prohibition against charging or paying
unfair prices. The relevance of
ona'a to the subject of shemita and yovel is, on one level, simply coincidental. The Torah introduces the subject of
ona'a by calling upon buyers and sellers to
adjust prices of land depending on how many years remain before the yovel.
Since the purchase is revoked with the onset of the jubilee, lands must
be sold for lower amounts closer to the yovel than they are in the early years of the
yovel cycle. Thus, it could be argued, the laws of
ona'a are only coincidentally relevant to
yovel, in that the institution of yovel will affect the pricing of
land. However, according to Chazal's interpretation to 25:17 (see Rashi), this section speaks as well of the prohibition of ona'at devarim – verbal abuse. The Torah mentions here not only the prohibition against "commercial abuse" by underpaying or overcharging, but also of speaking to one's fellow in a hurtful, insulting manner. Why is this prohibition introduced specifically in the context of shemita and yovel? Rav Moshe Feinstein (Kol Ram, vol. 3) therefore suggested that the inclusion of the laws of ona'a in the Torah's discussion of shemita and yovel extends beyond the practical implications of yovel with regard to charging and paying for land. The obligations of shemita and yovel are particularly drastic and demanding. They entail an enormous sacrifice on the part of masters and landowners, who, overnight, lose their servants and property. Indeed, as we know from Sefer Yirmiyahu (chapter 34), the laws of shemita and yovel were often neglected; people frequently failed to withstand the challenges involved in relinquishing ownership over their lands and servants. Ona'a, by contrast, is a relatively simple, basic halakha. It demands an elementary standard of fairness, honesty and sensitivity when exchanging money, property or words. These prohibitions do not entail any drastic measures, and require instead that one simply treat other people with a basic degree of fairness that every human being deserves.
Rav Moshe suggested that this contrast between shemita/yovel and ona'a accounts for their inclusion in the same
section in the Torah. Often, a
person who involves himself in great, lofty endeavors loses sight of his basic
responsibilities. The Torah's
concern was that those who faithfully observe shemita and yovel, who take the drastic measures of disowning
their fields, returning purchased property and releasing servants, may neglect
their more elementary duties to their fellow Jews. A person's preoccupation with greatness
can, at times, come at the expense of "goodness"; the focus on spectacular
achievements could diminish from the attention paid to the more "ordinary"
achievements of basic decency.
Therefore, as the Torah speaks of the remarkable sacrifices that one must
make during shemita and yovel, it issues as well a reminder regarding
ona'a, warning that our elementary duties to our
fellow man must not be obscured by the drama of shemita and yovel. |