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In his Sefer ha-Mitzvot (mitzvat asei 73), the Rambam cites a passage from Chazal (he refers to the source as the Mekhilta; it appears, however, in the Sifrei Zuta, Naso 5:7) discussing the mitzva of "viduy" (to verbally confess one's sin). The Midrash asks, perhaps this obligation applies only in Eretz Yisrael; how do we know that it applies in the exile, as well? The Midrash responds by citing a verse from Parashat Bechukotai, describing Am Yisrael's reaction to the calamities they will suffer as a result of their misdeeds: "And they shall confess their iniquity and the iniquity of their fathers…" (26:40). It is clear from context that this verse describes a situation of exile, when Benei Yisrael have been banished from their land and dispersed among the nations. Thus, from here the Midrash concludes that the requirement of confession takes effect everywhere, not only in Eretz Yisrael.

The obvious question, of course, is why initially the Midrash thought differently. The mitzvot that apply only in the Land of Israel generally fall under the category of "mitzvot ha-teluyot ba-aretz" - agricultural laws. The mitzva of confession, however, appears to have little direct connection to the Land in particular. Previously, the Midrash entertained the possibility that this mitzva would apply only when bringing a sacrifice to atone for one's sin. This possibility is readily understood in light of the fact that the Torah introduces the obligation of "viduy" in the context of its discussion of the guilt-offering (Bemidbar 5). But once the Midrash rejects this dependence of the mitzva on the sacrifice, on what basis did it consider limiting the obligation to within the borders of Eretz Yisrael?

The Lubavitcher Rebbe zt"l answered that the Midrash here distinguishes not between geographic locations - the Land of Israel and the Diaspora, but rather between different circumstances - a situation of exile, and a situation where Benei Yisrael live in their Land. Support for this interpretation may be drawn from the simple fact that the Midrash here does not mention the term, "chutz la-aretz," the geographic description of areas outside Eretz Yisrael, but rather "galut" - exile. The possibility raised by the Midrash limited the obligation of "viduy" to the time when Benei Yisrael dwelt in its Land. Once the nation was exiled, the Midrash suggested, the obligation of "viduy" would perhaps not apply. The Rebbe explained that in exile, repentance emerges in large measure from the depths of despair, pain and suffering. The experience of oppression often compels the nation to undergo the process of teshuva, as they face no other alternative. The Midrash considered the possibility that the mitzva of teshuva is limited to situations where a person seeks to return of his own volition, having realized and regretted his error. Verbal confession must express genuine feelings of remorse and a desire to change. When this confession results naturally from pain and suffering, no mitzva is involved in such "viduy."

However, based on the verse in Parashat Bechukotai, the Midrash reaches a different conclusion. The requirement of confession as mentioned in this parasha broadens its scope to include situations of exile. This verse reveals an additional component to confession, beyond its expressing one's sense of regret for his wrongdoing. The rebbe points to two additional functions served by verbal confession. First, as the Sefer ha-Chinukh (364) mentions, verbal confession can often lead to, or reinforce, feelings of regret. At times, rather than expressing preexisting emotion, it can trigger that emotion. Additionally, the Rebbe noted, confession in and of itself constitutes an act of repentance. One who does not feel regret for his wrongdoing but verbally confesses will, in all likelihood, experience a sense of shame over this discrepancy between his speech and thought. This shame itself is considered a form of repentance.

Thus, the concept of "viduy" as introduced in Parashat Bechukotai reflects a further dimension of confession. "Viduy" is significant and meaningful even before the internal change that ideally should precede it. Verbalization has the power of triggering thought and introspection, and is thus valuable even before one has made a resolve to improve.

*****

Parashat Bechukotai opens with a description of the magnificent blessings God promises to bestow upon Benei Yisrael should they obey His commandments. The first condition He stipulates is, "Im be-chukotai teileikhu," which literally means, "If you walk in accordance with My statutes." Rashi, citing Chazal, claims that this clause does not actually refer to the observance of mitzvot; rather, it means "that you toil in Torah study." This Midrash teaches a critical lesson, one which we would not have derived ourselves from the straightforward reading of the verse: compliance with God's laws is insufficient; we must also make a concerted effort to study the Torah and acquire as comprehensive and thorough knowledge as we can.

We may perhaps enhance our appreciation of this message by examining how the words, "be-chukotai teileikhu" yield this novel, Midrashic interpretation. True, a solid line must be drawn between "peshat" - the straightforward level of interpretation - and "derash" - the homiletic meaning developed in the Midrashim. This does not, however, imply that "derash" works independently of the text; presumably, Chazal found some reference to intensive Torah study in the clause, "be-chukotai teileikhu," which, on the surface, speaks of observance and obedience.

A characteristically ingenious explanation as to how this interpretation is extrapolated from these words is suggested by Rav Yosef Rosen, known as the "Rogotchover Gaon," in his work of responsa, "Tzofnat Pa'nei'ach" (6). In Masekhet Bava Batra (100a), the Gemara records a dispute among the tanna'im as to whether or not treading on property constitutes a legal acquisition. The halakha follows the view that it does not. Hence, someone receiving a piece of land as a gift, for example, does not make his formal acquisition by walking through the property. He must rather perform a more significant, demonstrative act of ownership to execute the transaction. (The handing of a deed of transaction from the giver to the recipient would suffice, as well; in the case of a purchase, the transfer of money can also effectuate the sale). The Rambam, however, in his commentary to the Mishna towards the beginning of Bava Batra, qualifies this halakha. He claims that this applies only to the establishment of ownership; if, however, one owns a share in a given piece of land and wishes to delineate a specific section for his exclusive ownership, treading on the land is sufficient.

Rav Rosen suggests that we interpret the Midrash on this basis. All of Am Yisrael collectively "owns" the Torah - "Moshe charged us with the Torah - an inheritance to the congregation of Yaakov" (Devarim 33:4). We are bidden, however, to determine our individual shares within Torah. This is done through exertion and toil in Torah study. Applying one's unique intellectual faculties to the study of Torah, rather than just superficially reviewing material, affords him his personal portion in Torah knowledge. To this Chazal referred when they interpreted "if you walk in accordance with My statutes" as speaking of exertion in Torah study. Just as one determines his personal portion of land by "walking," so does one establish his personal ownership over Torah through hard work. Through willingness to expend the time and effort to acquire our personal share in Torah, we will be deserving of the blessings described in Parashat Bechukotai, culminating with, "I will be ever present in Your midst: I will be your God, and you shall be My people" (26:12).

*****

Yesterday we discussethe opening phrase of Parashat Bechukotai, "Iyou walk in accordance with my statutes," which introduces the series of blessings promised to Benei Yisrael as reward for their obedience. As we saw, Chazal interpreted this clause, which appears to refer to observance of mitzvot, as a reference to intensive Torah study. Today we will suggest a different explanation as to how the words, "be-chukotai teileikhu" can yield this Midrashic interpretation.

Generally, we associate the word "chok" (the root of "be-chukotai") with a mitzva whose underlying rationale lies beyond human comprehension. (See, for example, Rashi's comments to Vayikra 19:19 and Bemidbar 19:2.) We may, however, identify another connotation of this term, one which emerges from a verse in Sefer Mishlei, where the author pleads, "hatrifeni lechem chuki" - "provide me with my daily bread" (Mishlei 30:8). Here, "chok" describes something constant, a daily ration. Similar usage of the term is made by the Egyptian taskmasters as they scold the Hebrew overseers for not supplying the required amount of bricks: "madu'a lo khilitem chok'khem" - "why have you not completed your prescribed amount… " (Shemot 5:14). Thus, when God speaks of "chukotai," He refers to the daily obligation of the Jew, the constant requirement that follows him every day of his life. Chazal identify this obligation as Torah study. Beyond the specific do's and don'ts of the Torah, the particular requirements and prohibitions, we are charged with the general, overarching obligation to allocate substantial time for Torah learning.

This brings us to the second word of the clause, "teileikhu," literally, "you walk." The mitzva of Torah study is one with which a person "walks," an obligation that applies under all circumstances and to all people. In the first chapter of Hilkhot Talmud Torah, the Rambam elaborately emphasizes that this mitzva applies to one and all, regardless of his family, financial or medical statuses. We "walk" in life with an obligation to acquire Torah knowledge. This is our "chok," the daily, spiritual "ration" demanded of us throughout our lives.

(Based in part on an article by Rav Yehuda Shaviv)

*****

Over the last two days, we have discussed Rashi's opening comments to Parashat Bechukotai. Among the conditions established for Benei Yisrael's receiving of God's blessing is, "im be-chukotai teileikhu," which literally translates as, "if you walk in accordance with My statutes." Rashi, however, citing Chazal, interprets this clause as a reference to intensive Torah study. In the last two editions of "S.A.L.T.," we suggested various approaches as to how "im be-chukotai teileikhu" could yield such an explanation.

Today, we will consider the implications of this Midrashic interpretation in light of the general context of these blessings in Parashat Bechukotai. This section (chapter 26) is often referred to as the "tokhecha," literally, "the reproof." It describes - in rather graphic detail - the blessings that God will bestow upon Benei Yisrael if they obey His commandments, and, conversely, the curses that threaten to befall them if they disobey. This chapter corresponds to a lengthier but parallel presentation in Sefer Devarim (in Parashat Ki-Tavo - chapter 28). Unlike in Sefer Devarim, however, the "tokhekha" in Parashat Bechukotai appears to point to the specific transgression on account of which Benei Yisrael will, Heaven forbid, suffer calamity: "Your land shall become a desolation and your cities a ruin. Then shall the land make up for its sabbath years throughout the time that it is desolate and you are in the land of your enemies; then shall the land rest and make up for its sabbath years. Throughout the time that it is desolate, it shall observe the rest that it did not observe in your sabbath years while you were dwelling upon it" (26:33-35); "For the land shall be forsaken of them, making up for its sabbath years by being desolate of them, while they atone for their iniquity" (26:43). (See also the end of Divrei Hayamim II - 36:21.) Quite clearly, these curses will befall the people specifically for their neglect of the laws of shemitta - the requirement to let the land lie fallow once in seven years, as described at length in Parashat Behar (the previous chapter - Vayikra 25). It stands to reason, then, that the blessings, as well, are promised as a reward for proper observance of shemitta.

Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky (in his "Emet le-Yaakov") suggests that we read Chazal's interpretation of "im be-chukotai teileikhu" in this light, beautifully demonstrating the complementary relationship between "peshat" and "derash." Among the reasons given for the prohibition against agricultural activity during the shemitta year is that it allows and encourages otherwise preoccupied farmers to involve themselves in Torah study. (See, for example, Ibn Ezra on Devarim 31:10-12.) In Parashat Bechukotai, then, God promises to reward Benei Yisrael "im be-chukotai teileikhu" - if they observe the laws of shemitta, which also involve the intensive study of Torah. Chazal did not reinterpret the clause, but rather added a level of interpretation that takes into account one of the basic principles underlying the institution of shemitta.

More generally, these blessings and curses bear relevance even in times (such as the post-Temple era) and places (such as in the Diaspora) when and where the laws of shemitta do not apply (at least on the level of Torah law), and even to those who do not earn a living from agricultural pursuits. The fundamental lesson of shemitta relates to the requirement to take time off from one's professional activity to involve himself in Torah study. In a predominantly urban culture, it is hard to fully appreciate what it meant to a farmer to bring his work to a halt for an entire year. But it would seem that the Torah demands something along those lines of every individual - to make some sacrifice, perhaps even considerable sacrifice, for the sake of spiritual growth. It is to this, perhaps, that the phrase, "im be-chukotai teileikhu" refers.

*****

Parashat Behar opens with the institution of "shemitta," the laws concerning agricultural activity on the seventh "sabbatical" year. There are essentially two categories of prohibitions concerning agricultural activity during shemitta. First, one may not cultivate the land, or, more specifically, one may not do anything that helps his produce grow (25:4). Additionally, one may not harvest the land's yield as he normally would (25:5). The precise definition of this second prohibition is subject to a dispute among the Rishonim. According to Tosefot (Rosh Hashanah 9a, Sukka 39b), one must introduce some "shinuy," or deviation, from his usual mode of harvesting, meaning, he must use a tool other than that normally used for this purpose. The Rambam (Hilkhot Shemitta ve-Yovel 4:24), by contrast, understood this prohibition as involving the quantity of harvesting: one may not harvest his entire field.

While the first of these two prohibitions poses a difficult challenge specifically for the farmers (as the Torah itself acknowledges - 25:20), the second creates some difficulty for consumers, particularly in urban areas, and, all the more so, nowadays, in the industrial age. If conventional harvesting may not proceed as usual, how will the produce reach the population centers? Additionally, the Torah also forbids commercial activity with shemitta produce. Thus, a farmer may not sell any of his yield. As a result, he has no incentive to make any effort to tend to the needs of the crops, even as permitted within the parameters of shemitta. This, too, threatens the supply of food to the general public.

The Tosefta in Masekhet Shevi'it (8:2) records that to address this problem, the Bet Din (rabbinical court), acting less as a rabbinical authority than as a representative body of the public, would assume responsibility for the farmlands. They would hire workers to harvest the entire produce - which is normally forbidden - and collect it into an "otzar," or public treasury, from where it was then distribamong the populace. This system ensured that crops will reach the marketplace without any uninvestment on the part of the farmer and without any violation of halakha.

The obvious question is, what permits the employees of the Bet Din to harvest without any deviation from standard procedure? If the Torah forbade regular harvesting (whether with regard to manner or amount, as discussed earlier), on what basis may Bet Din hire these workers? And if, for some reason, Bet Din has the authority to override the laws of shemitta, then why can't they also hire workers to plow and sow, as well?

The Chazon Ish answers, quite simply, that the Torah never forbade the act of standard harvesting per se. Rather, it issued a far more general prohibition, forbidding exhibition of ownership over the land. One cannot harvest his yield as an owner would, but rather as a guest invited into the land to help himself to some grain or fruit. Therefore, as Bet Din commissions the harvest as a representative of the community at large, rather than as an expression of personal ownership over the land, no prohibition is violated. The prohibitions against plowing and sowing, by contrast, are more specific prohibitions, whereby the acts themselves are forbidden.

Tomorrow we will iy"H discuss the contemporary implementation of this system.

*****

Yesterday we discussed the laws of shemitta (the seventh, "sabbatical" year), introduced in Parashat Behar, specifically the prohibition against standard harvesting during the shemitta year. As we saw, the Tosefta in Masekhet Shevi'it records a method by which this prohibition can be circumvented in order to allow for shemitta produce to reach the marketplace in urban population centers. As the Torah forbids only harvesting performed in a manner reflecting personal ownership, Bet Din, acting on behalf of the consumers at large, would hire workers to harvest the produce and store them in urban warehouses, from where it was distributed to the public.

This procedure, known as "otzar bet din," or "the court's storehouse," is used by many observant farmers and consumers in Israel today. This provides employment for observant farmers during the shemitta year, as well as access to the produce on the part of the public. Over the years, however, considerable controversy surrounded its validity. One authority, cited by Rav Menashe Klein in his Mishneh Halakhot (9:319), argued that as the notion of "otzar bet din" is mentioned nowhere in the Talmud, and appears only in the Tosefta, we cannot necessarily accept this ruling as authoritative. In fact, several sources (including the Rashbam, Bava Batra 130), indicate that rulings in the Tosefta are not to be presumed halakhically conclusive. However, Rav Klein rejects this argument, claiming that only when a ruling of the Tosefta conflicts with a conclusion in the Gemara itself must we ignore the former. This principle is established by the Shakh, Choshen Mishpat 81:56. What more, the Noda Bi-Yehuda (Y.D. 161) writes explicitly that the Tosefta was composed as an authoritative halakhic work. Another basis to question the validity of "otzar bet din" is its suspicious omission from the Rambam's Hilkhot Shemitta. Seemingly, the Rambam did not view this practice as legitimate. Others responded that the Rambam felt no need to codify the institution of "otzar bet din" because it was introduced in the Tosefta as a suggestion, rather than rabbinic legislation. As no prohibition is violated by its implementation, its absence from the Rambam's halakhot cannot be assumed to indicate his disapproval of the practice. Moreover, the Ramban, in his commentary to Parashat Behar, records the passage from the Tosefta and appears to accept its validity.

Another objection to the contemporary implementation of the "otzar bet din" system relates to one important element involved that the Tosefta never mentioned. In order to cover the cost of the harvest, shipment and distribution of the crop, consumers are charged for the produce (albeit a price much lower than corresponding, non-shemitta products). The Tosefta, by contrast, described the free distribution of the produce to the urban populations.

Nevertheless, despite the various objections, the system has been upheld repeatedly by leading halakhic authorities. The first modern "otzar bet din" was arranged on Erev Rosh Chodesh Iyyar, 5670 (92 years ago) for the private fields of Rav Tzvi Kahn, a Talmud scholar (and grandson of Rav Chayim of Volozhin) who also owned vineyards in the city of Rechovot. Among the prestigious rabbis who signed the document authorizing the Bet Din were such renowned personalities as Rav Chayim Berlin, Rav Yosef Chayim Zonenfeld, and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank. In the shemitta year of 5747 (1986-7), a letter urging consumers to purchase fruits and vegetables from the otzar bet din was signed by leading rabbinical figures such as Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l and yabla"ch, Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv.

Needless to say, this and all shemitta produce possesses the status of "kedushat shevi'it," which generates certain restrictions on the mode of its consumption, most notably that it must entirely eaten; that which is left over must not be actively destroyed, but rather disposed of in a respectful manner.

(Taken from the weekly, Mi-saviv La-shulchan, Parashat Behar-Bechukotai 5761)

*****

The first half of Parashat Bechukotai comprises the section known as the "tokhecha," the blessings that God promises Benei Yisrael in reward for their observance, and the curses that threaten to befall them should they rebel. This description of the blessings and curses corresponds with a parallel presentation in Sefer Devarim (Parashat Ki-Tavo - chapter 28). In a lengthy passage in his commentary to Parashat Bechukotai, the Ramban contrasts the two descriptions of curses, and arrives at a fascinating conclusion. He claims that the "tokhecha" here, in Parashat Bechukotai, foresees the Babylonians' destruction of the First Temple, while the parallel chapter in Parashat Ki-Tavo tells of the destruction of the Second Temple at the hands of the Romans. This, the Ramban writes, explains many differences between the two "tokhechot." For one thing, Parashat Bechukotai concludes its "tokhecha" with the promise of consolation, as a handful of Jews returned to rebuilt the Temple just seventy years after the First Temple's destruction. The exile begun by the Romans' destruction of the Second Temple, has yet to reach its conclusion. The Ramban adds that Sefer Devarim does not conclude its "tokhecha" with consolation because our redemption from this, second exile depends solely on the nation's repentance. The first exile, on the other hand, was destined from the outset to end after just seventy years. Therefore, the words of comfort presented towards the end of the "tokhecha" of Parashat Bechukotai do not involve any prediction of the nation's repentance, as the return to Zion occurred regardless of the people's change of heart. Although the Torah does mention in this context the nation's confession of guilt (26:40; we discussed this verse earlier this week), this falls far short from full repentance, as required for the redemption from our current exile. Furthermore, only the description in Sefer Vayikra mentions the nation's having worshipped idols, rendering them deserving of punishment and exile. Indeed, as we know from the prophets, pagan worship was the primary transgression on account of which the First Temple was destroyed. No such mention is made in Parashat Ki-Tavo, as the Jews of the Second Temple era did not worship idols. (As we know, Chazal attribute the destruction of the Second Temple to the baseless hatred among the people.) And so on.

The Abarbanel, however, in his commentary both here and in Sefer Devarim, posits a much different perspective on the Second Temple period. He claims, as opposed to the Ramban, that the return and rebuilding of the Mikdash constituted not "ge'ula," redemption, but rather "pekida," or a unique opportunity to earn redemption. In essence, there was but a single exile,which began with the Babylonians' destruction of the First Temple. Seventy years later, God afforded the Jews the opportunity to prove themsworthy of redemption, by allowing them to return to Judea and rebuilt the Temple. As we know from Sefer Ezra, only 40,000 Jews returned. The Abarbanel notes further that with the exception of the relatively brief period of the Chashmonaim, the Jews during the Second Temple period lived under foreign rule. Even when they did enjoy their sovereignty, their rulers by and large did not descend from the royal, Davidic line. (The Chashmonaim, of course, were kohanim.) Additionally, the Second Temple Period lacked certain basic elements such as the presence of the Shekhina, the ark, and prophecy.

After presenting these two views as to the nature of the Second Temple period, Rav Yehuda Nachshoni (Haggot be-Parshiyot ha-Torah, vol. 2, p.543) concludes with an interesting comment concerning modern times. This debate between the Ramban and the Abarbanel as to the status of the modest return of Jews to Eretz Yisrael in the time of the Second Temple, perhaps reflects a similar ambivalence towards the nature of the return to Zion over the last century. We, too, have seen a phenomenon which in many ways has the clear characteristics of redemption, while at the same falls far short of our dreams for a complete "ge'ula." There seems to be no precise, clear-cut method of defining "redemption"; in any event, we can only pray and improve ourselves to the best of our ability so that we are deserving of the "ge'ula sheleima"- complete redemption, speedily and in our times.

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