The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
Faith and the Holocaust
Yeshivat Har Etzion
Lecture
#11a:
The
Rebbe of Sanz-Klausenburg's Teachings on
Love of
Fellow Jews and Relations with Irreligious Jews
in the
Wake of the Holocaust
(Part
1)
By Rav
Tamir Granot
Introduction
In
the previous lectures we saw that, in the wake of the Holocaust, the
Rebbe of Sanz-Klausenburg changed his opinion regarding Zionism and aliya
to Israel. In this lecture, we will address his attitude towards those who stray
from the way of Torah - the "apostates" and "heretics" who have appeared among
the Jewish nation in modern times, and from whom ultra-Orthodoxy has separated
itself. It is well known that the Nazi murderers made no distinction between one
Jew and another; in the ghettos and camps the righteous suffered and died along
with the wicked; the religious along with the non-observant; Chassidim,
Bundists, Zionists in short, anyone who had Jewish blood. Did this common fate
leave any lasting impression on the religious view concerning the various sorts
of Jewish heretics and apostates? In this lecture we will address the teachings
of the Rebbe of Sanz-Klausenburg in this regard, and the next lectures we will
elaborate further.
A. Love
of Fellow Jews in Chassidism The Various Stages
The
ideal of loving one's fellow Jew was a central element in Chassidic ideology and
leadership from the outset. The element of this love that is emphasized in its
Chassidic form is the appeal also to "the sinners of Israel" that is, those
who deviate from the straight path. This definition applies to a broad spectrum,
stretching from simple Jews who are ignorant and uneducated to those who have
consciously thrown off the yoke of Torah and the commandments. In the writings
of the founding fathers of Chassidism, there are many teachings that develop
this value and award it a place of great importance in the hierarchy of
religious values.
Among
the great Chassidic masters, there were some whose dominant virtue was their
love of fellow Jews including Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev, Rabbi
Yehoshua Heschel of Apta, and Rabbi Moshe Leib of Sasov.
"Love
of fellow Jews," in the early days of the Chassidic movement, rested upon
several foundations:
2.
Justification and Defense One should always strive to achieve a favorable
judgment of the other person, arising from both a complex view of his
personality and motives, and for the sake of one's own character development.
Seeing the good in others is a "positive attribute" in itself, just as seeing
evil in someone else reflects on the seer.[2]
3.
From a tactical point of view, as well, the Chassidic leaders believed that it
would be possible to return estranged Jews to their tradition and to bring them
to repentance by means of social and emotional outreach.
At
the end of the 19th century we find a significant retreat from this
principle; this finds expression both in practical conduct and on the
ideological level. The Chassidic leaders began to adopt a separatist stance,
rejecting any closeness to those who had abandoned the path of Torah, were
permissive in their observance of the commandments, or who were of any sort of
secular persuasion. Some of these leaders offer some very harsh statements
concerning Jews who have separated themselves from "faithful Jewry," concerning
their leaders, and especially concerning their views.[3]
This
disavowal unquestionably arose out of its social and spiritual context. From the
end of the 18th century onwards, new streams appeared among European
Jewry that brought about a renunciation, on various levels, of wholehearted
faith and full commitment to Torah and the commandments, and certainly of
rabbinical authority. This process led to a change in the approach towards
"straying" from the path, as well as in the self-awareness of
Chassidism.
The
"love of fellow Jews" of the beginnings of Chassidism addressed the individual
deviant from the path of Torah, the Jew who had been ensnared by his evil
inclination, who had been drawn after the gentiles, or whose troubles had
weakened him, causing his commitment to falter. The straying individual,
according to chassidut, is deserving of pity and understanding, and there
is always the chance that he may once again return to being a normative Jew.[4]
But the "deviants" of the end of the 19th century were no longer
individual exceptions; rather, they were identified, for the most part, with
ideological movements. This was not a matter of people being tempted by their
evil inclination; the motive was not a personal one, but rather the fact of
belonging to a different system. In other words, it was no longer possible to
isolate the individual wayward Jew and to bring him back to his tradition,
because he himself was not the source of the problem; the chances of success
with him were very small now that he enjoyed ideological backing that actively
promoted his deviation. At this stage some of the Chassidic leaders were
convinced that it would no longer be possible, either strategically or
tactically, to realize the great ideal of loving all fellow
Jews.
This,
in turn, entailed another great change in Chassidic self-awareness. From a
revolutionary movement, Chassidism became, to a considerable extent, a
reactionary movement whose main objective was to save at least its own members.
At the first, revolutionary stage of its appearance, chassidut strove to
draw all Jews to its path and believed in its ability to bring estranged Jews
back to their Father in heaven. When the revolutionary spirit turned defensive,
the Chassidic movement understood that its strategy needed to be directed inward
(that is, towards the Chassidic community), and not outward.[5]
This
change in consciousness had several results, including cooperation between
different Chassidic courts and the establishment of large Orthodox bodies with a
common stance, or at least addressing a common problem. Of particular
importance, for our discussion, is the recognition that the approach of
separating from the community at large thereby relinquishing the ideal of
appealing to all Jews was essential for the success of the Chassidic defense.
In this regard, Chassidism operated in the same way as most of Orthodoxy. At a
time of spiritual storm and upheaval, mingling and mixing with Jews who have
abandoned Torah and the commandments may bring more damage than blessing.[6]
B.
Apostasy and the Hiding of God's Face
As
we saw in the previous lecture, the Rabbi of Sanz-Klausenburg perceives the
significance of the era as a reflection of the prototype set forth in
Megillat Esther. The issue of the proper attitude towards those who stray
from Torah is likewise treated in his Purim sermons. We shall examine one of
them (Shefa Chayim, Purim, pp. 113-116).
The
sermon begins with a discussion of the formulations of the "cursed" and the
"blessed" that are recited after the reading of the Megilla. In the
Tur and in the Shulchan Arukh (590:16), the formula is "Cursed be
all the idolaters; blessed be all of Israel," while in the printed version of
the poem "Shoshanat Yaakov," we find "Cursed be all the wicked, and
blessed be all the righteous." Our text of the Talmud Yerushalmi offers
the same version as the Shulchan Arukh, but the Tosafot and the Rosh
(Megilla 7b) quote the Yerushalmi as following the printed version
of "Shoshanat Yaakov."
The
Rebbe notes at the outset that it must be assumed that the original formula
referred to "idolaters," and that the change to "wicked" was introduced out of
fear of the censors. This historical explanation, while satisfactory on the
traditional level after all, this is the formula of the prayer with which we
are familiar certainly in no way nullifies the deeper significance of the
differences. According to the version in the siddur, our intention is to
curse the wicked among Israel along with the wicked of the other nations! The
Rebbe also points out that cursing the wicked, according to strict halakhic
standards ("One who violates a rabbinical enactment can be called a
transgressor" Shabbat 40a), would mean that almost every Jew would be
cursed. And if the formula "cursed be the wicked" was an "evil custom," God
would certainly have brought about a way to nullify it so that it would not be
uttered as part of the prayer.
The
Rebbe explains (ibid., p. 114) that the rigid definition of "wicked" applies
only in an era where God's presence in history is unequivocal and irrefutable.
Whether such a situation is a theoretical fiction or whether the Rebbe indeed
believed that during the era of prophecy, for example, the manifestation of
God's presence in the world was unequivocal, his teaching implies that in a
generation of "hester panim" (the "hiding of God's face"), and in the
absence of prophecy and of God's word, even if we claim that day is night (i.e.,
we are unable to distinguish between a transgression and the fulfillment of a
commandment) it is not our fault. There is no one in our generation who can
properly be called wicked or a transgressor:
This
is what our Sages taught concerning the verse, "And He called the name of the
place Masa u-Meriva, because of the strife of Bnei Yisrael and because
they tested God, saying: 'Is God in our midst or not?' And Amalek came and waged
war against Israel in Refidim" (Shemot 17:7-8). Rashi explains: "The
latter episode [concerning Amalek] is juxtaposed with the former [Masa
u-Meriva], so as to say: I am always in your midst, ready to provide for all
your needs, yet you say, 'Is God in our midst?'! By your lives, this dog will
come and bite you, and you will cry out to Me and you will know where I am. This
may be compared to a man who puts his son onto his shoulder and then sets off on
the way. The son sees some object and says: Father lift up that object and
give it to me and he gives it to him, and thus a second time and a third time.
They then meet another person, and the son says to that man: 'Have you seen my
father?' His father says to him: 'Don't you know where I am?!' He casts him down
from atop his shoulder, and a dog comes and bites him."
And
this is understood, because this was after Bnei Yisrael had left Egypt
and had seen miracles and wonders, and they experienced a revelation of God, and
Moshe and Aharon were with them. Since, despite all of this, they asked, "Is God
in our midst or not?" therefore immediately "Amalek came and waged war against
Israel," and they received their punishment. But in
our times, darkness covers the earth, and a great hiding of God's face, as it
says in the Gemara (Ta'anit 25a), "Levi said before Him: 'Master of the
universe, You have gone up and taken up residence on High, and You do not have
mercy on Your children.' Therefore
it is no wonder that Bnei Yisrael ask where their Father is for from
where shall they know where their Father is?!(ibid.
p. 115)
In
terms of our intention in prayer, then, every Jew is to be considered righteous,
for it is impossible to define him as wicked; only non-Jews can fall into that
category:
Therefore,
it is clear that when we say, "Cursed are all the wicked," we can only be
referring to non-Jews,
"and blessed are all the righteous" refers to all of
Israel, who, on the basis of the quality of the generation, are all righteous,
as explained above, (ibid.)
In
social terms, the conclusion is that in our days there is no Jew whom we can
curse. Once the element of brazenness is removed from the straying and heresy
and deviance is understood as being the result of the hiding of God's face, we
are speaking of the category of "one who is forced he is exempt from Divine
punishment." While up until the Holocaust one could still demand of a Jew that
he believe or that he observe the commandments of the Torah, and leaving
religion could be regarded as a normative or even moral deviation, the Holocaust
changed this assumption.
Obviously,
a person who is whole in his faith has no need for the Master of the universe to
bring proof of His existence. But after the Holocaust, is it still possible to
make any claim against a person who does not believe? After the Holocaust,
should we still be astounded by heresy, or is it faith that is astounding? The
Rebbe says, "We are compared to a blind man who has never seen light in his
life, and he says of the day that it is night." In other words, in our state of
blindness following the Holocaust, faith is something of a wager. A person who
has never experienced a sense of God's closeness or revelation can not be forced
to decide the wager in favor of faith.
In
a different sermon, the Rebbe directs his great pain towards
Heaven:
I
am forced to say: Father, thus it is written in the Torah
Why are we deserving
of punishment at a time when our eyes are unable to see, and our hearts are
incapable of understanding? What will it help that we shout to him, "I am the
Lord
" when he is blind and does not see? Is it possible to strike someone who
is blind for not being able to see?!...
Our
Father in heaven why do You do this? Are they not of limited knowledge? And if
You hide Your face from them, how can they run after You, when they do not know
where the place of Your glory is
[7]
These
words, directed towards God, are reminiscent of the powerful prayers of early
Chassidim, such as Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev. Two strong emotions come
together here: a feeling of distance and hiding of God's face on the religious
level, and a feeling of empathy and compassion towards all Jews who have left
their religion on the social level. Clearly, the Rebbe is not seeking to
encourage the conclusion that if our Father does not reveal Himself, we should
not believe in Him. However, he does want to pray for those wayward Jews;
furthermore, he wants to develop a different, more supportive attitude towards
their negative religious state.
The
view that seeks to remain apart, rejecting those who stray from inclusion in
Am Yisrael the position that was held by the great majority of
Chassidic orthodoxy in Galicia and Hungary prior to the Holocaust is quite
understandable in the context of the anti-Enlightenment and anti-Zionist
controversy and the battle waged by Chassidism to guard itself against these
movements. But after the Holocaust, in the new social and religious situation
that had come about, this approach was rejected in favor of a more unifying and
accepting approach, returning to the "love of fellow Jews" that had
characterized the beginnings of Chassidism.
The
"accepting" approach also had halakhic ramifications. The halakha that permits
indirect harm to one who has deviated from the principles of Jewish faith and
tradition is nullified; as stated, we cannot come with claims against a person
who has not succeeded in obligating himself to believe or to observe the
commandments in a situation of "hester panim" (a hiding of God's
face):
And
because of this, in these times we do not carry out the verdict of those for
whom our Sages prescribed that they be "lowered and not raised up,"[8]
since there are no righteous people in this generation, and also they are not
guilty for having degenerated and reached their situation
[9]
Translated
by Kaeren Fish
[1] See in this
regard M. Piekarz, "The Chosenness of Israel in a New, Relevant Formulation
the 'Inner Spark,'" in his book, Polish Chassidism: Philosophical Trends
Between the Two World Wars and During the Holocaust (hereinafter to be
referred to as Polish Chassidism) (Jerusalem, 5750), 122-153. He cites
several sources from earlier and later Chassidic writers. See also Y. Katz,
below note 4.
[2]
See Degel
Machaneh Efrayim, Parashat Shelach Lekha, concerning tzitzit, and the
parable of the Ba'al Shem Tov ad loc.
[3] See, for
example, M. Piekarz, Polish Chassidism, 152. See also, M. Piekarz,
Ideology vs. Reality: Humility, Nothingness, Nullification of Existence, and
Cleaving to God in the Philosophy of the Chassidic Masters (Heb.),
(Jerusalem, 5754), 187-189.
[4] This is the
classic "heretic" (mumar) referred to frequently in rabbinical
literature. Y. Katz, Halakha Ve-Kabbala (Jerusalem, 5744), 262-263,
demonstrates that in the Middle Ages, the term "mumar" referred to one
who had actually abandoned Judaism in favor of a different religion, while in
rabbinical literature the term simply denotes one who habitually transgresses
the commandments (see Sanhedrin 26a; Gittin 47a; Chullin
4b-6a). Chazal (in the aforementioned sources) also draw a distinction
between one who transgresses for the sake of some pleasure ("out of appetite")
and one who transgresses out of principle ("to anger God"). Early Chassidism was
familiar mainly with the first variety; the encounter with the Enlightenment
introduced the second variety.
[5] See Y.
Alfasi, Ha-Chassidut Ve-Shivat Tzion (Tel Aviv, 1986),
91.
[6] Piekarz and
Schweid discuss the relinquishing of the principle of loving all Jews. Schweid,
Between Destruction and Salvation Responses in Ultra-Orthodox Thought to
the Holocaust at Its Time [Heb.] (Tel Aviv, 1994), chapter 2, also shows
that the right-wing branch of Chassidism even developed an ideology of
hatred.
[7] Shefa
Chayim Divrei Yatziv Le-Yareach Ha-Eitanim, part II (derashot from
5743), 41-42.
[8] See Avoda
Zara 26b.
[9] Shefa Chayim
Divrei Yatziv Le-Yareach Ha-Eitanim, part II (derashot from 5743),
55-