Can a Child Light Chanuka Candles for the Household?

By Harav Aharon Lichtenstein

Translated by David Silverberg

A. THE POSITION OF THE SEFER HA-ITTUR

            The Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat discusses the issue of "hadlaka/hanacha osa mitzva" – whether one fulfills the mitzva of Chanuka candles when he lights the candle, or when he places it in its proper place.  Towards the end of this sugya, the Gemara (23a) posits:

"Now that we have determined that the lighting fulfills the mitzva, if a deaf-mute, mentally disabled person, or minor lit it, he has accomplished nothing.  A woman certainly lights, for Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi said, 'Women are obligated in Chanuka candles because they, too, were included in that miracle.'"

The Gemara does not clarify whether any distinction exists in this regard between a child who has reached the age of chinukh (training in mitzvot) and a child below the age of chinukh.  Seemingly, the absence of any explicit distinction in the Gemara indicates that this rule applies to all minors.  Thus, although a child who has reached the age of chinukh presumably must light candles due to the obligation of chinukh, nevertheless, his lighting achieves nothing in terms of fulfilling the obligation on behalf of the household.

            In spite of this implication, the Sefer Ha-ittur (Hilkhot Chanuka, 115b-116a) comments:

"It stands to reason that when he has yet to reach the age of chinukh, there is a custom, and we follow the custom." 

Our texts of the Sefer Ha-ittur contain no reference to the source or root of this custom; in the comments of the "Petach Ha-devir" to this passage in the Sefer Ha-ittur, Rabbi Meir Yona adds to the text the words, "as it is written in Megilla."[1] Indeed, the Ran (Shabbat, 10a in the Rif) paraphrases the Ittur as follows:

"However, the author of the Ittur z"l wrote that if he has reached the age of chinukh, it is permissible [for him to light], and it all depends on the custom, as it says in the Yerushalmi in Megilla, 'from this point on they established that minors read on behalf of the congregation.'" 

The Ran refers to the conclusion of the Yerushalmi (Megilla 2:5) regarding the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the Tanna Kama recorded in the mishna towards the end of the second chapter of Megilla (19b):

"Everyone is suitable for the reading of the Megilla, with the exception of a deaf-mute, mentally disabled person, and minor.  Rabbi Yehuda permits [a reading performed] by a minor." 

            Most Rishonim understood Rabbi Yehuda's lenient ruling as applying strictly to a child who has reached the age of chinukh, whereas the Tanna Kama disqualifies even such a minor from Megilla reading.  It is indeed reasonable to assume that the mishna refers to a child above the age of chinukh, for a child capable of reading the Megilla presumably has reached the stage where he can be educated in mitzvot.  The Ittur, in Hilkhot Megilla (113b), brings this debate and the Rif's ruling, which follows the position of the Tanna Kama.  The Ittur, however, concludes:

"It stands to reason that they argue with regard to a child who has reached the age of chinukh, and the Halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda that a rabbinic obligation [of chinukh] can come and fulfill a rabbinic obligation [of Megilla reading].  We indeed find that the custom follows Rabbi Yehuda, as written in the Tosefta."[2] 

In light of these comments regarding Megilla, he determined that the same applies regarding Chanuka candles, and a minor who has reached the age of chinukh may light on behalf of others.

B. RISHONIM WHO OPPOSE THE ITTUR'S POSITION

            Most Rishonim, however, remained silent on this issue, and thus appear to maintain that we draw no distinction in this regard between different ages of minors, as the simple reading of the Gemara implies.  For example, the Rambam writes plainly (Hilkhot Chanuka 4:9),

"A Chanuka candle lit by a deaf-mute, mentally disabled person, minor, or gentile – he has accomplished nothing, until somebody obligated in lighting performs the lighting."

Similarly, the Meiri (Shabbat 23a s.v. af al pi), after citing the position of the Ittur, comments, "This does not seem correct." 

We may suggest two explanations for their position.  Perhaps they, like the Ba'al Ha-ittur, compare Chanuka candles to Megilla reading, but they disqualify all minors from Megilla reading, as well, in accordance with the position of the Rif and Rambam (Hilkhot Megilla 1:2).  According to this approach, these Rishonim may have felt that a minor, who is obligated in mitzvot only mi-de'rabbanan, and thus for whom Megilla reading constitutes a "double de-rabbanan," cannot read on behalf of adults, for whom Megilla reading constitutes but a "single de-rabbanan."  Tosefot express this view in several places.[3] 

Alternatively, they might hold, as does Rashi[4], that a child bears no personal obligation whatsoever, as the chinukh obligation rests upon the shoulders of the parents, rather than on the child himself.  Or, even if the obligation is, indeed, cast upon the minor himself, it is a qualitatively lesser obligation than that cast upon adults, as the requirement of chinukh differs fundamentally from an actual obligation in the mitzva itself.  In any event, this approach would claim that these Rishonim accept the Ba'al Ha-ittur's equation between Chanuka candles and Megilla reading, only they disagree with his position concerning Megilla reading, and thus naturally dispute his position regarding Chanuka candles, as well.

            A different explanation might be that these Rishonim agree with the Ba'al Ha-ittur's ruling allowing a child to read the Megilla on behalf of adults, but in their view, we cannot compare Megilla reading and Chanuka candles. 

            One possible distinction between these two obligations is suggested by the Magen Avraham; however, he himself distinguishes in the opposite direction, and is inclined to reject this distinction.  In the context of Chanuka candles, the Mechaber (675:3) cites the position of the Ittur without further comment: "There is someone who says that for a minor who has reached the age of chinukh – it is permissible."  In presenting the laws of Megilla reading, by contrast, the Mechaber omits the Ittur's position entirely and establishes unequivocally that a child cannot read the Megilla on behalf of others (689:1).  The Magen Avraham comments:

"This requires explanation, for the Bet Yosef ruled at the end of siman 675 in accordance with the Ba'al Ha-ittur, who allows a minor [to light Chanuka candles for the household], whereas here he rules unequivocally in accordance with those who forbid [a minor to read the Megilla for others].  It is far-fetched to distinguish in this regard between Megilla and Chanuka candles.  The Ran likewise implies that they resemble one another in this respect."

It behooves us, then, both to explain the position of the Ittur, and to assess the extent to which we may distinguish between these two mitzvot, in either direction.

C. THE MINOR'S OBLIGATION IN MEGILLA READING AND CHANUKA CANDLES

            As regards the actual obligation of a minor in the mitzvot of Chanuka candles and Megilla reading, we may raise two possible suggestions. 

i)            He is obligated solely by force of the requirement of chinukh, just as he is with regard to tzitzit and lulav, as established in the Gemara (Sukka 42a). 

ii)           In these two mitzvot, a child's obligation also stems from his having been included in the miracle commemorated, parallel to women's obligation in these mitzvot.

At first glance, it would appear that this second possibility hinges on a debate among the Rishonim regarding the clause, "for they, too, were included in that miracle."  Most Rishonim explained, based on the parallel formulation in the Yerushalmi (Megilla 2:5) – "for they, too, were included in that threat [of annihilation]" - that this refers to the inclusion within the danger from which we were saved.  Clearly, this would apply to minors, as well.  By contrast, Rashi and Rashbam[5] explained that women played a significant role in the process of the miracle's unfolding; seemingly, this would exclude children.[6] 

On a more fundamental level, however, one might question whether the factor of "af hen hayu be-oto ha-nes" ("they, too, were included in that miracle") can serve as a basis for obligating minors, even if they have reached the age of chinukh.  It stands to reason that this principle applies strictly to women, who generally are obligated in mitzvot like men, but would have been exempted from Chanuka candles and Megilla reading for the specific reason that these two mitzvot are time-bound ("mitzvot asei she-ha-zeman geraman"), and Halakha generally exempts women from this type of mitzva.  The consideration of "af hen hayu be-oto ha-nes" overrides the principle exempting women from time-bound mitzvot, resulting in their obligation in Chanuka candles and Megilla reading.  Minors, however, are excluded entirely from the general level of mitzva obligation, and even when they reach the age of chinukh, their obligation is of a shallower nature.  It follows, then, that their inclusion in the miracle would not affect their general exemption.[7] 

Even should we assume (as I heard from my teacher and father-in-law, Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik zt"l, in the name of his grandfather, Reb Chayim Brisker) that a minor's performance of mitzvot has the formal status of a mitzva act, and for this reason the Rambam rules (Hilkhot Korban Pesach 5:7) that a child who reaches bar mitzva age between Pesach and Pesach Sheni need not observe Pesach Sheni if a korban was slaughtered on his behalf on Pesach,[8] this relates only to his fulfillment of mitzvot.  When it comes to a child's obligation in mitzvot, however, according to all opinions he is entirely excluded.  It stands to reason, then, that we cannot apply to minors the principle of "af hen hayu be-oto ha-nes," and we must confine a child's obligation to the realm of chinukh.

D. EXPRESSIONS OF THIS ISSUE IN THE RISHONIM

            We might suggest that this issue underlies a debate among the Rishonim concerning the obligation of arba kosot (the four cups of wine at the Pesach seder).  The Gemara (Pesachim 108b) writes,

"Everyone is obligated in these four cups – men, women and children.  Rabbi Yehuda said: What purpose is there for children to drink wine?" 

The Rashbam explains:

"'And children' – for they, too, were redeemed. 

'What purpose is there for children' – aren't they exempt from mitzvot?" 

It appears that according to the Rashbam, the Tanna'im debate the issue of whether an obligation applies to children due to the external factor of their inclusion in the redemption.  Although in the Rashbam's view we are not dealing here with the concept of "af hen hayu be-oto ha-nes," for according to the Rashbam, "af hen hayu" has to do with women's participation in bringing about the redemption, nevertheless, according to the Tanna Kama, we have a parallel progression.  By contrast, Rabbenu David (ad loc.) takes issue with the Rashbam and writes,

"This is incorrect; for although they were redeemed, what obligation is there for children?" 

In truth, however, one might claim that this debate has no relevance to our issue.  For it appears from the Rashbam's commentary on Rabbi Yehuda's position that he refers to a child who has yet to reach the age of chinukh.  Therefore, if the Tanna Kama holds that we apply here the rule of "af hen hayu be-oto ha-nes," we have here a far more novel ruling than that which we suggested earlier regarding Chanuka candles and Megilla reading. 

It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that the Rashbam never intended to base the minor's obligation on the concept of "af hen hayu."  Rather, he refers to the obligation upon the parent to have the members of his household drink the arba kosot, not as part of their training in mitzvot, but rather as part of his own obligation.[9] 

Conversely, we might confine Rabbenu David's objection to the application of this factor, of inclusion in the redemption, to a child below the age of chinukh.  When it comes to a child who has reached this age, however, Rabbenu David might concede that there exists a level of obligation due to the factor of "af hen," and not merely stemming from the obligation of chinukh.

            Truth be told, we need not look far and wide for a discussion among the Rishonim relevant to our issue, for our question was addressed explicitly by the Rishonim in the context of Megilla reading.  The Ramban, in his Milchamot Hashem in Berakhot (12a in the Rif), writes:

"A minor, even if he has reached the age of chinukh, cannot fulfill the obligation on behalf of others, even regarding a rabbinic [obligation], as it says in the mishna, 'Everyone is suitable for the reading of the Megilla, with the exception of a deaf-mute, mentally disabled person, and minor.'  The reason is that chinukh is the obligation of his father, whereas he bears no obligation whatsoever." 

The Ramban omits any explanation of Rabbi Yehuda's position.  But the Ran in Megilla (6b in the Rif) adds the following approach in the Ramban's name:

"Rabbi Yehuda himself permitted a minor only with regard to Megilla, because they were all included in that miracle." 

The Ran then proceeds to dispute the Ramban's approach:

"I am not satisfied with this answer, for if he bears no obligation with regard to mitzvot, even mi-de'rabbanan, then what difference does it make that they were included in that miracle?  This reasoning applies only to someone who bears an obligation regarding other mitzvot, like women, whom we obligate in this case as well, because they too were included in that miracle.  But someone for whom no obligation applies – how can we obligate him on this basis?"

The Ran establishes quite clearly that no obligation can possibly apply to a minor.  Within the Ramban's position, one might question whether the Tanna Kama follows the Ran's position on our issue, or if even he maintains that there exists a dimension of "af hen" with regard to the minor's personal obligation, and we should not restrict it to the mitzva of chinukh.  However, in his view, this does not suffice to allow the child to read on behalf of others, somewhat similar to the Behag's position that women cannot read the Megilla on behalf of men.  In any event, the Ramban's own position on this matter is quite clear.

            It would appear that this issue finds expression in a different context as well.  The Ravya brings the aforementioned view of the Behag that a woman cannot fulfill the obligation of Megilla reading on behalf of men.  The Behag bases his position on the fact that women are not obligated in keri'a, reading the Megilla, but rather in shemi'a – hearing the Megilla read.  Later, the Ravya writes (2:569, p.293):

"I am uncertain as to whether a minor can fulfill the obligation on behalf of women, or women for a minor, regarding both Megilla and lighting [Chanuka candles].  For perhaps although both are exempt [from keri'a] and obligated in listening to the Megilla, they may not be equally obligated, as we say in Masekhet Shabbat [beginning of the 24^th chapter, regarding a deaf-mute, mentally disabled person, and minor], 'Which one takes precedence?' despite the fact that it always mentions them together as a single group."

We may explain the Ravya's question in one of two ways. 

First, his uncertainty may have to do with the scale of different levels of the same mechayev (source of obligation).  This question itself reduces to one of two issues:

i)           Is there any difference at all in terms of level of obligation between a minor and a woman?

ii)         Does this difference preclude the possibility of one fulfilling the obligation on behalf of the other? 

Alternatively, the Ravya's question may have to do with distinct mechayevim.  This approach, too, divides into two possible understandings:

i)           Do we have here two different mechayevim, or only a single mechayev?

ii)          Assuming the mechayevim are distinct, what weight does this distinction carry with respect to the ability of one to fulfill the obligation on behalf of the other?

            The Gemara he cites as an example raises a question concerning a case of extenuating circumstances, where Halakha permits one to perform an activity forbidden on Shabbat through a person with a lower level of obligation.  The Gemara asks if one should afford preference to a deaf-mute over a minor or vice-versa in such a situation (Shabbat 153b):

"Should he give it to a deaf-mute, because a minor will eventually attain intelligence, or should he give it to a minor, because a deaf-mute may be confused with an adult?"[10] 

A clear gap exists between the two arguments posed.  The stringency of the minor can be viewed as fundamental in nature, meaning, forbidden activity performed by a minor is forbidden in the sense of an early adulthood of sorts.  The stringency of the deaf-mute, by contrast, results from merely a peripheral concern.  It would thus appear that the Gemara's question hinges on the aforementioned issue as to the nature of the preference.  Clearly, however, one may explain the Gemara differently.

            Now, if we assume the second possibility posed, that the Ravya's question involves the nature and level of different mechayevim, then we clearly understand why a woman might not be able to fulfill the obligation on behalf of a minor.  For in his view, a woman is obligated only to hear the Megilla, whereas a minor, presumably, bears an obligation to read as well, just as he will when he becomes an adult.  When the Ravya writes as a self-evident fact that both women and minors are obligated only in shemi'a, he did so only in presenting the possibility that one can, indeed, fulfill the obligation on behalf of the other. 

What is less clear, however, is why a minor would be unable to fulfill the obligation on a woman's behalf if they share an identical obligation.  In light of what we have seen, we may suggest a simple explanation, based on the questions raised in the aforementioned comments of the Ramban and Ran.  If a minor's obligation stems from both the mitzva of chinukh as well as the factor of "af hen hayu," then there really is no reason why he cannot fulfill the obligation on behalf of women.  If, however, he is obligated solely due to chinukh, as the principle of "af hen" does not include minors, then there exists a component that applies to women from which a minor is excluded, and he therefore cannot fulfill the obligation on their behalf.

E. CONTRASTING CHANUKA CANDLES AND MEGILLA READING IN LIGHT OF "AF HEN HAYU"

            Let us return to our issue – the position of the Ba'al Ha-ittur that compares Megilla reading and Chanuka candles. If we view the minor's obligation as stemming from the mitzva of chinukh, we have no reason to distinguish between these two mitzvot.  Why would one differ from the other in terms of the obligation to train a child in mitzva performance?  We would thus conclude that those who follow Rabbi Yehuda's view, allowing a child to read the Megilla on behalf of adults, will also accept the Ittur's ruling that candle lighting by a minor who has reached the age of chinukh fulfills the obligation on behalf of the entire household.

            At first glance, the same would apply to the mechayev of "af hen hayu be-oto ha-nes."  However, the Keli Chemda draws a distinction in this regard.  He suggests that if a minor's obligation in these two mitzvot stems from chinukh, then clearly we cannot differentiate between the two with regard to the minor's ability to fulfill the obligation for others, as stated above, and this, he claims, was the Ittur's position.   When it comes, however, to the mechayev of "af hen hay be-oto ha-nes," here, the Keli Chemda argues, we may certainly distinguish between Megilla reading and Chanuka candles, and those who disputed the Ittur followed this view.  The Keli Chemda explains the distinction as follows (Parashat Miketz, p.112):

"It would thus appear that this applies specifically on Purim, when the miracle was that they were saved from death to life, for the decree was to destroy and kill.  Therefore, no distinction exists between young and old, and we may reasonably say about them that they, too, were included in that miracle. 

This is not the case regarding Chanuka, where the decree was to have them violate their religion, and we hold that one must subject himself to death rather than transgress, due to the mitzva of 've-nikdashti be-tokh Benei Yisrael.'  Therefore, this applies specifically to adults; minors, however, who are not included in the positive commandment of ve-nikdashti,[11] are permitted to transgress, and were thus not killed.  On Chanuka, therefore, it cannot be said about minors that 'they, too, were included in that miracle,' since no miracle saving from death occurred for them, because they did not have to surrender their lives for the sanctification of the Name.  Since they cannot be obligated by virtue of 'af hen hayu be-oto ha-nes,' no basis remains for us to obligate them other than chinukh, and so we again say that a 'double de-rabbanan' cannot fulfill the obligation on behalf of a 'single de-rabbanan.'  We therefore never find in Tosefot that Rabbi Yehuda would allow candle lighting on Chanuka by a minor."

His point is clear, but very difficult to accept.  He operates on the basic assumption that the miracle, meaning, redemption from a threat or danger, entails salvation from physical destruction as a result of the obligation to give one's life rather than transgress.  It appears obvious and self-evident, however, that this is not the case at all.  Is release from the grip of religious persecution insufficient salvation to require praise and thanksgiving and commemoration of the event through candle lighting?  Even taking into account the fact that the children permissibly violated their faith rather than surrender their lives, is not the loss of eternal life and all connection to Torah observance a tragic calamity, such that any survivor would be included in the Chanuka miracle?  This point is clear from pure logic, but it has clear evidence, as well, from the famous discussion of the Taz (O.C. 670:3) concerning the difference between Chanuka and Purim with respect to abstaining from food and drink:

"The Levush drew a distinction in this regard, claiming that on Purim lives were saved, whereas on Chanuka no lives were saved, for the Greeks sought not lives but rather submission and violation of the faith.  But this is incorrect, for Rashi commented in Parashat Ki-Tetze that causing another to sin is graver than killing him."

The Levush and Taz agree that the salvation of Chanuka was spiritual, and had nothing to do with the physical ramifications of the spiritual threat.  They argue as to the significance of this fact with respect to the inclusion of a festive meal and celebration on Chanuka.  Clearly, then, we cannot distinguish between Megilla reading and lighting Chanuka candles on the basis of the application of "af hen hayu" to minors; this detail has no connection at all to the debate between the Ba'al Ha-ittur and the other Rishonim.[12]

F. DISTINGUISHING BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE MITZVOT

            We may, however, assess this question from a different angle entirely.  Until now, our discussion concerning the possible equation between the two mitzvot focused on the foundation and level of the personal obligation of the minor who has reached the age of chinukh.  But it is possible to approach this issue from the perspective of the nature and character of each of these two mitzvot, and their particular demands.  We can then examine whether we can distinguish between the two in this regard such that their difference will yield ramifications in terms of the ability of a minor to fulfill the obligation on behalf of others. 

Indeed, the difference in nature between these two mitzvot is clear.  Megilla reading constitutes a "chovat gavra," a personal obligation upon each individual which he himself fulfills.  That one person can read on behalf of another stems from the principle of "shomei'a ke-oneh" (listening is akin to reciting).  Although this concept lends itself to different understandings and interpretations regarding the connection between reader and listener, they all share the basic notion that the listener fulfills his obligation through his direct participation in the process of the mitzva's execution. 

By contrast, the lighting of Chanuka candles was established, on the fundamental level, as a mitzva upon "ish u-veito" – a person and his household.  All members of the household bear the obligation to see to it that a light will be lit in or near the house.  There is no personal obligation cast upon any single individual to perform the act of lighting personally.  One person, who perhaps need not even be a resident of the house[13], fulfills the obligation on behalf of others by bringing about the presence of Chanuka candles in the home.  The sugya excludes from this process the deaf-mute, mentally disabled and minors, to which the Rambam (Hilkhot Chanuka 4:9) adds a gentile, because they are not included at all in the mitzva.

            It seems clear that this difference in the nature of the mitzva's fulfillment may very well affect the ability of one person to fulfill the obligation on behalf of another.  Case in point: the Rishonim disagree as to whether or not a woman can read a Megilla on behalf of men, and many followed the ruling of the Behag that a man cannot fulfill his obligation by hearing a woman's reading of the Megilla.  No such dispute exists regarding Chanuka candles, and the straightforward reading of the sugya (Shabbat 23a), which concludes that women may light Chanuka candles, certainly implies that they thereby fulfill the obligation on behalf of men.  The Gemara establishes for women that which was denied to the deaf-mute, mentally disabled and minor, and what was denied from them clearly is not only their personal obligation - for they are exempt from all mitzvot – but rather their ability to fulfill the obligation for others.  It thus seems clear that women can light for men, unlike the Behag's ruling with regard to Megilla reading. 

The Ravya, in Hilkhot Megilla (2:569, p.293), appears ambivalent on this issue:

"I searched in the Halakhot Gedolot [= Behag] and he made no explicit comment on this, and I do not know if we can view both [mitzvot] together in this regard." 

However, in Hilkhot Chanuka (843, p.580), he decides upon the lenient ruling:

"A woman certainly lights and also fulfills the obligation for a man, for Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi said: Women are obligated in Chanuka candles for they, too, were included in that miracle.  In the context of the laws of Megilla, I wrote that in the Halakhot Gedolot the text reads, 'Women are obligated in hearing the Megilla,' and it does not read, 'in the reading of the Megilla.'"

He does not, however, explain the meaning behind his initial uncertainty or the definitiveness of his conclusion.  The Peri Chadash (675:3) brings an additional source for this distinction:

"In the glosses to the Mordekhai it is written in the name of Tosefot z"l that a woman certainly lights, even to fulfill the obligation for others.  Although she does not fulfill the obligation of Megilla reading on behalf of others, despite their having been included in the miracle, perhaps [the obligation of] Chanuka candles is more lenient, just as it says that [a visitor] participates [in the host's lighting] through sharing the expense [of the candles], but when one marries he has no need, as he relies on his wife's lighting outside his city."

Here, too, however, we have but a proof without any explanation.

            We can raise several different suggestions to explain this ruling.  One suggestion among those I heard from my father-in-law zt"l – without these sources being addressed – is built upon the difference in the essence of the obligation.  A woman cannot fulfill an obligation on a man's behalf on the level of interpersonal connection.  If, however, we require merely the creation of the halakhic entity of Chanuka candles, then this can be accomplished through a woman as well.

            Correspondingly, we may easily adopt the distinction raised and rejected by the Magen Avraham, who extracted from the Mechaber's rulings that a minor can light Chanuka candles on behalf of adults, but cannot read the Megilla on their behalf.  We need only assume that a minor cannot perform a mitzva act through which an adult can fulfill his obligation, but is capable of creating the halakhic entity of Chanuka candles, through which all members of the household then fulfill their obligation.  The Mechaber's rulings are then perfectly understood.[14]

            Conversely, as we saw, many Rishonim accept Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding Megilla reading but make no distinction between different stages of childhood when it comes to Chanuka candles, presumably maintaining that even upon reaching the age of chinukh a child cannot light on behalf of adults.  We might explain – though this may depend on how we understand the rule of "shomei'a ke-oneh" – that an adult can fulfill his obligation through his act of listening to the child's reading, for the purposes of which we may consider this reading a reading performed for the mitzva.  When, however, it comes to candle lighting, which is intended to fulfill the obligation for the entire household simply through its constituting a halakhic entity of Chanuka candles for the home – the child does not have the capacity to create this entity on the adults' level of obligation.

            The Peri Chadash, in the continuation of the aforementioned passage, also addresses the different rulings of the Mechaber and offers the following explanation:

"Although the Mechaber in the aforementioned siman [in the context of Megilla] disregarded the Ba'al Ha-ittur's stance and did not mention it, he brings it here, for it is quite possible that even those who disagree [with the Ittur] there agree here, because [the obligation of] Chanuka candles is more lenient, as I wrote in the name of Tosefot."

In light of what he had written earlier in that passage concerning women, he explains the Mechaber's rulings on the basis of somewhat ambiguous levels of stringency and leniency.  But as we have seen, we can explain the distinction based on the difference in the nature and root of the two mitzvot.

            I then discovered that indeed this approach to the distinction is established in brief by the Chakham Tzvi.  Addressing the discrepancy between the two rulings of the Mechaber, the Chakham Tzvi responds (in "Tosafot Chadashim" at the end of the Chakham Tzvi's work, 13):

"He maintains that on Chanuka, the obligation of lighting is not cast upon each individual, but rather one person from among all the members of the household lights at the entrance to the yard, and there is then no obligation upon anyone from among all the members of the household, even though they did not hear the berakha and did not see the lighting.  Rabbi Zeira went even further, saying: Once I married, I said that I no longer need [to purchase a share in my host's Chanuka candles,] for they light on my behalf in my home.  For this reason, it suffices for even a child who has reached the age of chinukh to light at the entrance of the yard. 

Regarding Megilla reading, however, which is cast upon each individual, either to read or to hear the Megilla, a minor – even who has reached the age of chinukh – cannot fulfill the obligation on behalf of others.  This is a very reasonable distinction."[15]

[The Hebrew version of this article appeared in Be-Orkha Nir'eh Or, Essays in Memory of Lt. Danny Cohen Hy"d, eds. Y. Rosenson and A. Ariel, Jerusalem, 5764.]