The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
The
Connection between Reclining and Freedom
By
The Pesach
Seder experience challenges us not merely to recall the events of our departure
from Egypt or to capture in ritual the various memories of that great day; as
the mishna (Pesachim 10:5) teaches, each Jew must recreate the imminent sense of
liberation and imagine himself or herself as undergoing the same process of
emancipation. The Torah gives us
several mitzvot to help us reenact the Exodus, Yetziat Mitzrayim, and Chazal complement
these mitzvot with several ideas of their own. One feature which Chazal knit into the
fabric of the Seder is the mitzva of heseiba, reclining.
Presumably,
this practice evokes a personal attitude of cherut, sovereignty and
freedom. By reclining during
eating, a person demonstrates - to oneself as well as to others - his or her
newfound state of liberty. In fact,
the Rambam prefaces his description of heseiba with the aforementioned
directive to recreate the Exodus experience. Evidently, heseiba undoes the rigid and controlled
dining environment, displaying as well as generating
autonomy.
If this were
true, we might question the continuing relevance of heseiba. Most modern cultures do not view this
form of eating as luxurious or royal; indeed, at a very practical level, many
actually struggle to dine in this unorthodox fashion. In fact, some medieval commentators
already regard heseiba as irrelevant
and allow or even encourage its suspension. Both the Ra'avya (Chapter 525) and the
Maharil (18:2) recognize the awkwardness of this form of eating and instruct us
to eat and drink in our standard manner, but the Shulchan Arukh does not adopt
their position and instead mandates standardized heseiba (see Orach Chayim
472). It appears that this debate,
regarding a situation wherein heseiba
may not necessarily convey liberty, is already found in the Gemara
itself.
The first
mishna of the tenth chapter of Pesachim describes the prohibitions of
working and eating on erev Pesach.
A certain degree of withdrawal creates both emotional anticipation and
physical hunger to enhance one's eagerness for the Seder. The mishna concludes by declaring that
even a poor person (ani) must not eat [after a certain time on erev
Pesach] until he has eaten with heseiba." There are several interpretations of
this statement. Tosafot claim that
one might have excluded an impoverished person from heseiba since he cannot truly experience
freedom; thus, the mishna intends to discredit this idea and demand heseiba from rich and poor alike. Is this mishna mandating heseiba even for those who will not
taste freedom? Or should we read
the mishna as assuring us that even disadvantaged people can and should strive
to taste freedom? The differing
readings of the mishna would yield different impressions of a case of heseiba which cannot stimulate cherut.
A second
example concerns women, who, according to the Gemara (108a), are excused from heseiba in the presence of their
husbands. Would this not indicate
that heseiba is only applicable if it
creates a sense of independence, which may not emerge in the presence of a
woman's husband (at least in past social settings)? Should this gemara not exempt us from heseiba in the modern context, since we
too may not sense liberty through reclining?
Several
authorities offer different reasons to excuse women from heseiba; interestingly, these reasons do
not assert that women are incapable of experiencing cherut through heseiba. For example, the Or Zarua cites an
opinion which exempts women since reclining would be disrespectful to their
husbands. A woman would have been
obligated if not for the 'insult' to her husband; concerned with this slight,
Chazal never extend the obligation of heseiba to women. Other opinions (see Rabbeinu Manoach in
his commentary to the Rambam) exclude her since she is busy supplying the
meal. It seems that her exclusion
is based upon some more important value superseding the mitzva, rather than
suspending heseiba in the absence of cherut. The fact that the gemara demands heseiba from an isha chashuva a
notable woman merely reinforces the uncertainty. Is she an exception because she is
capable of sensing cherut, which is a
precondition for an obligation of heseiba? Or is she included within the heseiba experience because her demeanor
will not insult her husband?
Just as the
mishna regarding an ani may be read
in two different ways, so may this gemara; the question of heseiba without cherut is not categorically solved by
either of these sources.
The following
gemara addresses a situation of a student in the presence of his rabbi. The gemara seems to present a dispute:
Abbayei and his fellow students, on the one hand, recline when they visit their
rabbi, Rav; Rav Yosef, on the other hand, informs his students that it is
unnecessary to do so. Rav's
position is less revealing because presumably his students are able to achieve
cherut in his presence; in fact, the
same gemara obligates a child to perform heseiba in his father's presence, as the
Rashbam explains, because the child is not that subservient to the parent. Rav's students are of a similar
mentality and are able to experience freedom and therefore recline.
Rav Yosef's
admonition is intriguing. When
instructing his students, he does not claim that they should not recline
out of respect to his station; instead, he tells them that they are not
obligated, which implies that their submissive attitude may prevent the
achievement of cherut and that they
are therefore excused from heseiba. The Bet Yosef (Orach Chayim 472)
claims that if a rabbi exercises mechila and waives his honor thereby
absolving his students of the mitzva of honoring their master they are
obligated to recline. Apparently,
he reads Rav Yosef's admonition as stemming from their mitzva to honor him; once
this mitzva is cancelled, they are as obligated as every man in heseiba. Were the heseiba exemption based upon their
inability to taste freedom in the presence of their rabbi, they might be
absolved of heseiba even if their
rabbi condones it; even if their halakhic obligation is suspended, they may
still naturally feel uncomfortable in his presence. Of course, the counterclaim can always
be raised: once the mitzva of honor has dissolved, the mentality of the students
changes, and they are now rendered capable of actually sensing the perspective
of cherut.
An interesting
dispute among the Rishonim may shed some light on the basis of Rav Yosef's
exemption. This dispute lies
between those Rishonim who extend the exemption to any rabbi and those who limit
it to a rav muvhak - the individual
who has taught a person the majority of his Torah knowledge. If the exemption is based upon the
formal obligation to honor one's rabbi, it would extend to all of ones rabbis;
indeed, in Hilkhot Talmud Torah (5:6), when the Rambam cites the
prohibition to recline in the presence of a rabbi, he seems to apply this
prohibition to all rabbis. If
however, the clash between heseiba
and the presence of a rabbi is not halakhic but existential (i.e., cherut is unattainable), it may only
apply in the presence of a rav
muvhak, whose company truly limits the freedom of his student's
behavior.
Until now, we have examined cases of heseiba which may not
generate cherut. Perhaps
modern-day heseiba does not generate actual experience of freedom but
at least according to the Shulchan Arukh it is still mandated. We might explain this phenomenon of
cherut-less heseiba in three ways.
First, we may
acknowledge the actual establishment of heseiba as a takkana
(enactment) of Chazal. Once
they institutionalize it as part of the Seder ritual, it cannot be waived even
if it no longer expresses cherut.
We do not have much record of an actual takkana; the mishna (10:1)
merely states in passing that even a poor person must perform
heseiba. This mishna and the
ensuing gemara detail the application of heseiba, but no gemara ever
articulates, in so many words, that one is obligated to recline while eating at
the Seder, which would have indicated an actual legislation.
A second solution may be to claim that even if our own eating habits do
not favor heseiba as a comfortable position, we are still enjoined to sit
that way and attune ourselves to latent cherut, which may no longer be
common but is still accessible.
True, our natural behavior does not include heseiba; nevertheless,
though it may demand greater imaginative effort to draw a sense of freedom from
a reclined eating posture nowadays, we are still required to do
so.
Yet another approach would attribute heseiba to an entirely
different source. The beginning of
Beshalach describes the initial departure from
This source for heseiba may justify its performance in a modern
cherut-less context. We do
not - through our heseiba - seek to generate cherut. However, we do commemorate the original
experience of our ancestors with an experience that is historically evocative,
albeit personally outdated. Just as
they reclined, we must, even if it does not trigger cherut.
The question of how to justify modern-day heseiba and the source
and reason for heseiba may relate in a fascinating fashion to a separate
structural question. The Brisker
Rav examines whether Chazal instituted heseiba as a style of
eating, or merely as an added element.
Namely, did they restructure the manner in which we are meant to eat,
demanding not merely ingestion but reclining? Or did they merely demand that in
addition to eating and drinking we are instructed to recline?
Rav Velvel addresses several interesting consequences of this structural
issue. Both the Rambam and the
Me'iri extend heseiba beyond the four cups of wine and matza; the Rambam
advocates heseiba for the entire meal, while the Me'iri extends it even
further, suggesting it as the posture for the entire evening -
even for the non-eating narrative sections of the Haggada. These expansions of heseiba
clearly indicate that it was included as an add-on, rather than being inserted
in an attempt to redefine the preferred manner of eating. Had the latter
been the case, it could not possibly extend beyond the halakhically ordained
food, nor could it have applied to phases of the Seder that do not include
eating.
Tosafot (Pesachim 108a) pose a question which the Brisker Rav
associates with his query: if a person mistakenly eats matza or drinks a cup of
wine without heseiba, would he at least have fulfilled the eating aspect
of the mitzva (without succeeding at heseiba), or would he be forced to
eat a second portion of matza or drink a second cup of wine? Presumably, if heseiba were an
add-on, its non-performance should not hamstring the base mitzva of matza or
wine. However, if Chazal
restructured the mitzva of eating to include a certain posture, we may claim
that in the absence of this newly required element, the act of eating itself
remains deficient.
Perhaps the question of eating maror while reclining may be
affected by the Brisker Rav's question.
The Gemara (108a) clearly states that maror does not require
heseiba, since it is eaten in memory of suffering and should not be
accompanied by symbols of freedom.
Would heseiba actually 'ruin' the experience of maror,
perhaps requiring a second attempt at eating maror properly? The Bet Yosef specifically claims that
heseiba does not disqualify one's eating maror implying that a
legitimate question may have been raised regarding the detrimental impact of
heseiba upon maror.
The Tur (O.C. 475) cites a question in the name of his brother, Rabbeinu
Yechi'el: should Korekh, the matza-and-maror sandwich, be eaten
while reclining? As Korekh
includes matza, which alone warrants heseiba, presumably the entire
question is based upon the potential deleterious impact of heseiba upon
maror. Perhaps he is
concerned that a reclining position may spoil the experience of
maror.
The potential harmful impact of heseiba upon maror may
indicate that heseiba forms an integral element of the act of
eating. Had it merely served as a
subsidiary accompaniment, it would not hamper the basic act of eating
maror. Certainly,
maror would not be disqualified by someone who listens to upbeat music
while eating; even though he may compromise the spirit of the experience, the
fundamental activity is unaffected.
However, if heseiba reconfigures the type of eating, it may
preclude the fulfillment of the mitzva of maror, which cannot be eaten in
an ecstatic fashion.
It is
intriguing to consider the correlation between the source of heseiba and
the Brisker Rav's question regarding its structural dynamic. Assuming Chazal merely introduced
heseiba to induce cherut, we can easily imagine its remaining
external to the actual activity of eating. Chazal demanded that while we
eat, we should engage in postures which generate and reflect liberty. Alternatively, we can easily envision a
heseiba which becomes incorporated into the act of eating. If heseiba were instituted in
memory of the original festive meal which God afforded us, it would likely
constitute an essential component of our eating. Just as the original generation
experienced a distinctly redemptive form of se'uda, so may we be
instructed to recreate that form of eating. Quite possibly, the question of source
is related to the issue of function.