The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
MidrashThe Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
Forbidden
Matza
Based
on a shiur by Harav
Summarized by Udi
Schwartz
Translated
by
Most of us eat matzot that are kosher, and even exactingly so. Why
should we be interested in matza that is forbidden for consumption (for
example, matza from which one forgot to set aside challa or
terumot and ma'asrot)? Although this issue may not arise
frequently, it touches upon several fundamental principles of the laws of
chametz
and
matza, and illuminates a number of other issues.
We learn in the Mishna
in Pesachim (35a):
These are the
commodities with which one discharges his obligation on Pesach: with wheat, with
barley, with spelt, with rye, and with oats. And they discharge it with
demai, with first-tithe whose teruma has been separated, and with
second-tithe or hekdesh which have been redeemed. And priests [can
discharge their obligation] with challa and teruma. But [one
can] not [discharge his obligation] with tevel, nor with first-tithe
whose teruma has not been separated, nor with
second-tithe or hekdesh which have not been redeemed.
[As to] the [unleavened]
loaves of the thanksgiving offering and the wafers of a Nazirite, if he made
them for himself, he cannot discharge [his obligation] with them; if he made
them to sell in the market, he can discharge [his obligation] with
them.
The latter part of the Mishna clearly establishes that a person cannot
fulfill his obligation with matza that is a forbidden food, for example,
tevel, second-tithe that was not redeemed, and the
like.
The Gemara there tries to clarify the rationale of the Mishna's ruling.
It first notes the close connection between the prohibition of chametz
and the mitzva of matza only that which could potentially become
forbidden as chametz is fit for the mitzva of matza. Of
course, even flour that is tevel or second-tithe can become
chametz, and so at this point, the Gemara turns to the position of
A PROHIBITION DOES NOT
TAKE EFFECT WHERE ANOTHER PROHIBITION ALREADY EXISTS
It is important to note that the rule that a prohibition does not take
effect where another prohibition already exists is not R. Shimon's invention.
The novelty in R. Shimon's position is that a prohibition does not take effect
where another prohibition already exists, even when the new one is a more
inclusive prohibition (issur kolel) or a prohibition that adds (issur
mosif). Let us explain these concepts.
Issur mosif means that the second prohibition expands the scope of
the first prohibition. For example, if a certain food is forbidden only to
Reuven by virtue of some prohibition, and now a second prohibition which would
forbid the food to everybody is about to take effect that second prohibition
can take effect because it is an issur mosif. In a similar manner, an
issur kolel expands not the number of individuals subject to the
prohibition, but rather the number of objects governed by the prohibition.
Consider, for example, the case of eating the meat of a nevela on Yom
Kippur. Prior to Yom Kippur, the meat of an improperly slaughtered animal is
forbidden, but the meat of a properly slaughtered animal is permitted. On Yom
Kippur itself, the meat of both improperly and properly slaughtered animals is
forbidden. In such a case, the issur kolel of Yom Kippur applies to
additional objects, so it can take effect even where another prohibition already
exists.
As stated above, R. Shimon disagrees about these two applications;
according to him, a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition
already exists, even if it is an issur kolel or an issur mosif.[1]
The Gemara in the aforementioned passage cites the view of R. Shimon, because
the cases under discussion here fall into the category of issur kolel. As
Pesach enters, a prohibition applies not only to chametz that is
untithed, but even to chametz that is properly tithed. Therefore,
according to the Sages, the prohibition of chametz can take effect even
on tevel, and thus it is fit to be matza. Only according to R.
Shimon, who maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another
prohibition already exists even if it is an issur kolel, flour
that is tevel on Erev Pesach is not fit to become chametz,
and therefore it cannot be used for the fulfillment of the mitzva of
eating matza.
We see, then, that the
plain implication of the Mishna is that a person cannot fulfill his obligation
with matza that is forbidden for consumption. But according to the Gemara
this is true only according to the position of
It seems to me that a
person discharges his obligation with tevel, first-tithe whose
teruma has not been separated, and second-tithe and hekdesh that
have not been redeemed, for Rav Sheshet established our Mishna in accordance
with the position of R. Shimon. And we maintain that an issur kolel and
an issur mosif take effect even where another prohibition already exists,
and chametz on Pesach is an issur kolel, and also an issur
mosif, for one is forbidden to derive benefit from it. Therefore, one
fulfills his obligation with them.
The Ramban does not rule that lekhatchila one may use matza
that is forbidden for consumption,[2] but he does establish that
bedi'avad one who has eaten such matza has fulfilled his duty,
since we do not rule in accordance with the position of R.
Shimon.
A MITZVA WHOSE
PERFORMANCE IS MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH A TRANSGRESSION
Several Rishonim had difficulty setting aside the plain implication of
the Mishna because of the Gemara, and therefore sought other solutions. Already
Rashi proposes another possible explanation, this in light of what the Gemara
says regarding demai. The Gemara states:
"And they discharge
their obligation with demai and with first-tithe whose teruma has
been separated." Demai? But it is not fit for him! Since if he wishes he
can renounce his property, become a poor man, and eat demai, it is fit
for him now too. For we learned: The poor man may be fed with demai and
[Jewish] troops [in billets may be supplied] with
demai.
Regarding the Gemara's question, "But is is not fit for him," Rashi
writes:
And we say below: "With
that which is forbidden on account of
'You shall not eat leavened bread with it,' alone, you discharge the obligation
of matza this excludes that which is forbidden for
another reason." Alternatively: It is a mitzva the performance
of which is made possible through a transgression (mitzva ha-ba'a
be-avera).
Rashi was aware that there is a problem with fulfilling one's obligation
with food that is forbidden for consumption, by virtue of what the Gemara will
say in the continuation. Nevertheless, he argues that in this context there is
liable to be a more general problem: a mitzva whose performance is made
possible by a transgression.
Rashi's novel idea is echoed to some degree in the words of the Rambam
(Hilkhot Chametz u-Matza 6:7):
One does not fulfill his
duty if he eats matza that he is forbidden to eat, for example,
matza made of tevel or of first-tithe from which tithe-teruma
has not been removed, or stolen matza. The rule is as follows: If
birkat ha-mazon must be said when it is eaten, one may use it to fulfill
his duty; if birkat ha-mazon may not be said when it is eaten, it may not
be used to fulfill one's duty.
The Rambam rules in accordance with the Mishna, but adds two
points.
1) The Rambam mentions
also stolen matza, which certainly does not raise the problem of a
prohibition taking effect where another prohibition already exists, but only the
problem of a mitzva whose performance is made possible through a
transgression.
2) The Rambam draws a
comparison between the mitzva of matza and birkat ha-mazon.
In effect, the Rambam refers us to his ruling at the end of the first chapter of
Hilkhot Berakhot:
Whoever eats forbidden
food, willfully or in error recites no blessing either before or after. For
example, if one eats rabbinically-regarded tevel, or if one eats first-tithe whose teruma has not been separated, or second-tithe or
hekdesh that have not been properly redeemed, he
does not recite a blessing. It need not be added that no blessing is recited if
one eats of a nevela or a terefa or drinks of wine
of libation or the like.
Regarding this ruling,
the Ra'avad comments:
Regarding this he made a
great mistake. For they did not say that a blessing is not recited, but that the
zimmun blessing is not recited. For they do not have the importance of a
fixed meal, since they are eating forbidden food. It is like eating fruit which
is not fixed eating regarding the zimmun blessing. But why should they
not recite a blesing before and after? Surely they have derived benefit!
The problem with reciting a blessing over a forbidden food appears to be
that of a mitzva whose performance is made possible through a
transgression. This being the case, we should understand that in Hilkhot
Chametz u-Matza as well the problem is that of a mitzva whose
performance is made possible through a transgression.
In this context, two questions arise:
1) Is the law of a
mitzva whose performance is made possible through a transgression
relevant to our issue?
2) If we answer the
first question in the affirmative, we must ask why did the Gemara choose not to
mention the law of a mitzva whose performance is made possible through a
transgression. Several Rishonim explain that priority is given to a local rule
applying to the laws of chametz and matza over the general
principle regarding a mitzva whose performance is made possible through a
transgression. This, however, seems to be a technical and fairly arbitrary
determination,[3] and therefore it behooves us to try and find a more
fundamental explanation.
WHY DID THE GEMARA NOT
MENTION THE LAW OF "A MITZVA WHOSE PERFORMANCE IS MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH A
TRANSGRESSION"?
The aforementioned
question is raised by the Tosafot:
Nevertheless, there is a
difficulty, for in chapter Kol Sha'a, it is taught in a Baraita:
"One does not fulfill the obligation of matza with tevel." And
this is derived from a verse. Let it be learned from [the rule regarding] a
mitzva whose performance is made possible through a transgression! For he
eats a forbidden food and wishes to fulfill the obligation of eating
matza. (Sukka 30a)
The Tosafot propose no explanation as to why the Gemara chose to
omit such a fundamental rationale.
In order to answer this question, most Rishonim restricted the scope of
the law of "a mitzva whose performance is made possible through a
transgression." A priori,
such a restriction is possible in one of two
directions:[4]
1) not every
mitzva is adversely affected when it is accompanied by a
transgression;
2) not every
transgression disqualifies the mitzva that it
accompanies.
For our purposes, we
shall focus on the first direction, that which is brought by the Ramban
(Pesachim 35a) in the name of the Tosafot:
And I have also found in
the Tosafot that they said that the rule regarding a mitzva whose
performance is made possible through a transgression does not apply to other
mitzvot, but only to a sacrifice and to a lulav, which are used
for praise. For surely regarding sukka, the word "lekha" was
necessary to exclude a stolen sukka (Sukka 27b), and it is not
excluded on the grounds that it is a mitzva whose performance is made
possible through a transgression.
The Ramban argues that,
according to the Tosafot, it is only mitzvot involving praise and
glorification of God that may not be accompanied by a transgression. Such
mitzvot are associated with the existential and experiential aspect of
Divine service, and that experience may not be tarnished by a transgression. A
similar proposal arises from the Tosafot of Rabbenu Peretz (Pesachim
35b):
It may be suggested that
lulav is different in that it is used to praise and laud God in order to
placate Him. And so too a sacrifice,[5] and so too [other] mitzvot that
come to placate. There we exclude a mitzva whose performance is made
possible through a transgression. But here, where it does not come for
placation, we do not exclude anything on the grounds that it is a mitzva
whose performance is made possible through a
transgression.
Rabbenu Peretz does not
speak of mitzvot that involve praise, but about mitzvot that
involve placation. Rabbenu David also adopts the same approach, basing it upon
the famous principle, according to which "the accuser must not be made an
advocate." He explains that when a person comes to placate God, he may not come
with hands soiled by sin.
Obviously, in order to
accept the aforementioned solution, we must make two
assumptions.
1) The argument in and
of itself is correct, namely, that the law regarding a mitzva whose
performance is made possible through a transgression is indeed limited to
mitzvot involving praise or placation.
2) The mitzva of
matza does not involve praise or placation, and therefore it is not
governed by the law of a mitzva whose performance is made possible
through a transgression.
Those who reject this
solution can, of course, disagree with either one of these two assumptions. The
Maharam Chalawa explicitly relates to the words of the Ramban and Rabbenu
Peretz, and argues that the first assumption is wrong. According to him, the law
regarding a mitzva whose performance is made possible through a
transgression is not limited to mitzvot involving praise or
placation.
The
praise of matza
Logically speaking, it is also possible to disagree with the second
assumption. While it is difficult to identify a dimension of placation in the
mitzva of matza, the dimension of praise is reflected in a number
of talmudic passages.
According to the plain
meaning of the biblical text, one must eat on the holiday of Pesach "bread of
affliction/poverty" ("lechem oni") bread that is eaten by the poor.
This designation has halakhic ramifications in that matza ashira
matza kneaded with eggs or fruit juices may not be used for the
mitzva, because it is not "the bread of the poor." The Gemara
(Pesachim 115b), however, adds another dimension to the law of oni
in the matza:
Shemuel said: "Bread of
oni" bread over which we recite [onin] many
words.
Shemuel connects the eating of matza to the reading of the
Haggada. The Haggada reaches its climax with the blessing
Asher Gealanu a blessing of praise. Hallel too is connected
to the praise of God. On another level, the entire retelling of the story of the
exodus from Egypt is essentially a song and praise of God for the miracles that
He performed for our ancestors in those days and in our
time.[6]
Thus, Shemuel establishes that there is a close connection between the
mitzva of matza and the praise and laudation of the
Haggada. Based on the words of the Ramban in his Milchamot at the
beginning of tractate Berakhot, R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik zt"l
explained in similar manner the position of Rabban Gamliel that whoever does not
mention the Paschal sacrifice, matza and maror on the Pesach
festival has not fulfilled his obligation. The simple understanding is that
whoever does not mention these three things has not fulfilled the obligation to
retell the story of the exodus. The Ramban, however, argues that he has not
fulfilled the obligations of the Paschal sacrifice, matza and
maror themselves. This only sharpens the fact that the reading of
the Haggada is an inseparable part of the mitzva of
matza.
Thus far, we have seen
how the mitzva of matza is connected to the mitzva of
Haggada. The connection, however, is in two directions: the mitzva
of Haggada is also connected to the mitzva of matza.
The Mekhilta says that the mitzva of Haggada does not apply
during the day or already from Rosh Chodesh, but only "when
matza and maror are before you." While it might be possible that
we are dealing here with a sign for the proper time of reading the
Haggada, it seems that we are dealing with a more fundamental
explanation, according to which matza and maror are an integral
part of the mitzva of Haggada. A possible application of this is
the position of R. Acha bar Ya'akov (Pesachim 116b) that a blind person, who cannot
see the matza or maror, is exempt also from the mitzva of
Haggada. We can only understand this position if we assume that
matza and maror are conditions for the fulfillment of the
mitzva of Haggada.
Thus, we see that the
verbal recitation of the Haggada and the eating of matza are
intertwined, and therefore, it is certainly possible to argue that the
mitzva of matza is a mitzva involving praise and laudation,
and for this reason it may not be fulfilled through a transgression. In light of
this, the solution offered by the Tosafot and Rabbenu Peretz may be
rejected, and thus we are left once again with the difficulty as to why the
Gemara did not mention the principle regarding a mitzva whose performance
is made possible through a transgression.
footnotes:
[1] The Rishonim
and Acharonim have raised the question whether, according to R.
Shimon, the second prohibition does not take effect, or perhaps it takes effect,
but its violation does not lead to flogging.
[2] It seems that there
may have been room to introduce an entirely different consideration into the
discussion the positive precept of matza sets aside the negative
precept of tevel. See Rabbenu David, ad loc., who enters into a thorough
and comprehensive discussion of this issue. Of course, were we to invoke the
principle that a positive precept sets aside a negative precept, it would be
possible to permit the eating of forbidden matza even lekhatchila.
This is especially true according to the understanding that in a situation
of a positive precept setting aside a negative precept, the prohibition does not
take effect whatsoever.
[3] The Ramban offers
another technical solution: The law regarding a mitzva whose performance
is made possible through a transgression is only by rabbinic decree, and
therefore it could not have been invoked in our case. Most Rishonim,
however, maintain that this law is of Torah authority (even though the source
"Offer it now to your governor" is from Malakhi 1:8). Thus, we are once
again left with our question.
[4] These two directions
find expression in Sukka 9a. The Gemara there brings a specific verse
("You shall observe for yourself the festival of booths"), which teaches
that a stolen sukka is disqualified. The Tosafot there note that
this verse is superfluous and dispensable, in light of the rule regarding a
mitzva whose performance is made possible through a transgression. The
talmudic passage can be understood according to both directions proposed above.
It may be argued that sukka is a mitzva that requires a special
verse, the general principle not sufficing. Alternatively, it may be argued that
the mitzva of sukka is no different than other mitzvot, but
the transgression of theft is not so severe, and therefore a special
verse is necessary to teach us that it too interferes with the fulfillment of
the mitzva. This second understanding, however, is problematic, for the
theft detracts from the physical sukka itself, the means through which
one fulfills the mitzva. It seems more logical to say that the less
severe transgressions are those that are not connected to the object of the
mitzva, but to the person fulfilling it. For example, matza that
is tevel the tevel itself is not problematic, but rather the
person is forbidden to eat from it, and this is the reason that by logical
argument there would be room for leniency. The Yerushalmi (Shabbat
13:3) explicitly proposes a similar distinction someone who fulfills a
mitzva with stolen property faces the problem of a mitzva whose
performance is made possible through a transgression, but someone who tears on
Shabbat, thus violating a prohibition governing his person, does not face
the problem of a mitzva whose performance is made possible through a
transgression.
[5] Rabbenu David (in
the aforementioned passage) explains that not only does a lulav parallel
a sacrifice, but it itself is regarded as a sacrifice with respect to the
placation achieved through its taking.
[6] A parallel model is
found in the passage read when bringing first-fruits and expounded in the
Haggada the story of Arami oved avi serves as an introduction to
the thanksgiving offered to God.