The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash

Special Holiday Shiur

The Torah's description of the mitzva of blowing shofar on Rosh Ha-shana is atypical in that a direct verb is not employed. The Torah writes that we must EAT ("tokhlu") matza, SIT ("teshvu") in the sukka and BIND ("u-keshartam") tefillin upon our arms. Yet, when describing the mitzva of shofar, no such verb appears. Instead of the expected commandment to blow the shofar, the Torah merely refers to the DAY of Rosh Ha-shana as "Yom Teru'a," a day of blowing, and "Zikhron Teru'a," a day of remembrance mediated through the shofar. This article will explore the ramifications of this phenomenon, particularly as it regards the definition of the mitzva.

The Rambam is quite explicit in altering the definition of the mitzva from what we would have expected. He consistently defines the mitzva as one of HEARING the shofar, rather than BLOWING it. This definition appears three times: in the Sefer Ha-mitzvot (positive commandment 170), in the heading of Hilkhot Shofar, and in Hilkhot Shofar (3:10). This definition affects the syntax of the blessing, as well. Since the mitzva is to hear the shofar, the Rambam formulates the blessing as, "lishmo'a kol shofar" (to hear the shofar sound), and not "litko'a ba-shofar" (to blow the shofar).

Another indication of the Rambam's position can be inferred from his comments concerning a shofar which was stolen and then used to perform the mitzva. In general, one cannot use a stolen item to perform a mitzva. The classic example of this principle can be found in the gemara concerning a stolen lulav (Sukka 30a). This principle is known as "mitzva ha-ba'a ba-aveira" - a mitzva whose performance was facilitated through the performance of a sin, such as stealing. A stolen item is invalid for use as the article of a mitzva. However, the Rambam (based upon a Yerushalmi in Sukka) permits using a stolen shofar, since "a sound cannot be stolen" (ein be-kol din gezel). Had the mitzva been viewed by the Rambam as one of blowing, the actual shofar itself would be considered the article of the mitzva. A stolen shofar would therefore be invalid. If, however, the mitzva is defined as hearing, then the ARTICLE OF THE MITZVA is the actual sound, and the shofar is merely the TOOL by which the article of the mitzva is manufactured; hence, a stolen shofar may be used to generate the sound. Ultimately, the sound which is the article of the mitzva is not stolen. This rule further establishes that the Rambam viewed the definition of the mitzva as hearing the shofar.

Though this position – that the mitzva is to hear and not to blow - stems from the aforementioned textual aberration, it has little foundation in the Gemara. The only Talmudic source which might support this position can be found in Rosh Ha-shana (27b) – a gemara cited by the Lechem Mishneh in his comments to the Rambam. The gemara addresses a situation whereby the shofar is blown in a pit while the audience stands above. Since they do not hear the actual sound of the shofar but only the echo, the gemara asserts that they do not fulfill the mitzva. Even the person blowing the shofar does not fulfill the mitzva if he hears only the echo - for example, if he blows into a cave while standing outside. One can conclude from this gemara that the shofar must be heard in order for the mitzva to be fulfilled. (It should be noted that this gemara does not prove that hearing is sufficient, only that it is necessary!)

Though most Rishonim follow the Rambam's lead and define the mitzva as hearing the sound of the shofar, there are those who dispute this notion. The Rif (Rosh Ha-shana 11a) cites a question which was presented in the contemporary academies of learning regarding talking between the blessing of shofar and the actual blowing. The question assumes that the blessing is worded "AL TEKIAT SHOFAR," as opposed to the aforementioned blessing of the Rambam - "lishmo'a kol shofar." Similarly, Rabbenu Tam (quoted by the Rosh in both Pesachim and Rosh Ha-shana) claims that the blessing should be recited upon the actual blowing ("al tekiat shofar"). Evidently, he felt that the mitzva consists of the ACT of blowing and not the actual hearing. The Semag, as well, rules that the mitzva consists of blowing and that a similar blessing should be recited.

Though the biblical verse containing a weak verb seems to support the position of the Rambam, there exist two gemarot which would appear to bring his theory into question, since they suggest that the mitzva is BLOWING and not just HEARING. The mishna in Rosh Ha-shana (29b) invalidates a cheresh, shoteh ve-katan (a deaf-mute, a mentally handicapped person, or a minor) from blowing the shofar on behalf of others. Had the mitzva consisted merely of hearing a shofar blast, why would we disqualify a minor from providing this sound? The blowing is merely the manufacturing of the sound rather than the actual performance of the mitzva and, in theory, could be performed by a minor. For example, the gemara in Shabbat (23a) cites an opinion that the mitzva of Chanuka candles is to see the lit menora and not necessarily to perform the act of kindling. According to this position, a minor can light and another person can see these lit candles, recite a blessing and fulfill the mitzva. According to the Rambam, the same should apply to shofar. Since the mitzva is merely experiencing the sound (parallel to experiencing the light), a minor should be allowed to blow while others hear and thereby fulfill their mitzva. From the rule that the shofar must be blown by an adult, we might deduce that the actual blowing comprises part of the mitzva. (This question was first posed by the author of the "Kapot Temarim" in his commentary to Rosh Ha-shana, entitled "Yom Teru'a.")

In defense of the Rambam, we might claim that the manufacture of a shofar blast is not as effortless as lighting a candle. Since the shofar blast is not meant to be a bare sound but rather a symbolic note comprising various experiential moments of Rosh Ha-shana, it must be generated by someone who is sensitive to these facets. Though the mitzva consists of hearing, the listener must hear a halakhically viable shofar sound, which can be generated only by an adult.

A second halakha which might pose a challenge to the Rambam's position is the question of kavana (intention). Generally, we rule that "mitzvot ein tzerikhot kavana" – mitzvot can be performed without intent to fulfill them. For example, if a person eats matza on the fifteenth of Nissan without any intention of performing the mitzva, he still fulfills the mitzva. Yet, with regard to shofar, the gemara claims that some form of kavana is indispensable (see Rambam, Hilkhot Shofar 2:4). Particularly puzzling is the rule that the blower must intend to include the listener and the listener to hear from the blower. If the mitzva is merely hearing a shofar blast, we might not be able to justify this kavana requirement. If, however, we claim that the mitzva entails the act of blowing, we might better understand the need for the person blowing to blow with some consciousness of what he is doing, as well as intention to include others (who are also obligated to blow) within his blowing. (This question [and proof] was posed by the Sha'agat Aryeh, siman 6.)

The full range of options for solving the kavana requirement according to the Rambam are beyond the context of this article. A related issue, though, should be examined and might, ironically, support the Rambam's position: the very fact that Reuven's blowing can be considered fulfillment of Shimon's obligation - the kavana requirement notwithstanding. The Rambam wrote a responsum (Teshuvot Ha-Rambam, Blau edition, 1:142) in which he reiterated his opinion that the mitzva consists of hearing. Had the mitzva consisted of blowing, it would not have been possible for one person tblow for many. Just as Reuven cannot sit in the sukka on Shimon's behalf or put on tefillin for him, similarly, he should not be able to blow for him. Evidently, the Rambam inferred, the mitzva is not to blow but to hear.

The Beit Ha-Levi provides a very interesting concept which might resolve this issue of Reuven blowing for Shimon according to those who perceive the mitzva as blowing. In the end of his second volume of responsa, the Beit Ha-Levi includes several "derashot." In his fifteenth derasha, which discusses the prayer experience of Rosh Ha-shana, he questions the efficacy of prayer offered with the same mouth which committed sins during the course of the year. To solve this dilemma, he cites the gemara (Rosh Ha-shana 16b) which instructs us to recite verses of "malkhuyot" and "zikhronot" on Rosh Ha-shana. The gemara asks, "With what should these verses be recited?" The gemara replies, "With the shofar." In other words, according to the Beit Ha-Levi, a shofar represents more than just a formal act of blowing. It also entails a non-verbal form of prayer - and, according to the Beit Ha-Levi, a purer form of supplication, unencumbered by sin. If, indeed, shofar constitutes a form of prayer, we might better understand the possibility of one person blowing on behalf of another. Though Reuven cannot perform mitzvot for Shimon, he can read texts or pray on behalf of a listener. Such scenarios are called "shome'a ke-oneh" - whereby the listener is considered as having recited the words himself. This phenomenon applies only to mitzvot which entail text-recitation. According to the Beit Ha-Levi, the shofar is a non-verbal manner of expressing the text of the Rosh Ha-shana prayer. As such, even though the mitzva is defined as blowing, since it is a form of prayer, one person's prayer can include others.

[For more on the subject of shofar as prayer, see the accompanying shiur by Rav Daniel Wolf.]

This shiur is provided courtesy of the Virtual Beit Midrash, the premier source of online courses on Torah and Judaism - 14 different courses on all levels, for all backgrounds.

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