Introduction to Talmud
This
year we will be studying the second chapter of tractate Bava Metziah. This chapter is traditionally the first
chapter taught to children who are first beginning to study Talmud. One should not understand that the
contents of this chapter are childish in any way. On the contrary, this chapter deals with
property law, specifically the laws pertaining to lost objects. In my opinion, ‘Elu metziot’,
as our chapter is called, is used as an introductory chapter for several
reasons. First of all,
traditionally the laws concerning monetary affairs (the laws covered in the Choshen
Mishpat section of the Shulchan Aruch, the Code of Jewish Law) are
considered to be the ‘meat and potatoes’ of a Talmudic
education. The breadth of understanding
and depth of analysis required for these subjects surpass all others. Our chapter is not an exception to this
rule, yet at the same time, the laws discussed in it can be understood through
the application of relatively few principles and concepts. Thus we have an opportunity to
experience authentic Talmudic reasoning without having to spend too much time
filling in the background. In
addition, the tradition of beginning from a chapter dealing with property law
has its own educational point.
Ritual law that we practice at regular intervals, like the laws of
Shabbat or the laws of blessings, may seem to be a more pressing item on the
Talmud curriculum. By beginning
with a chapter that is on the one hand applicable to our lives but at the same
time not part of its ritual aspect, we are sending a message to our
students and ourselves that the Torah demands integration.
The holiness demanded of us cannot be achieved solely through ritual or
conventional religiosity. We are
commanded to pursue holiness in our interpersonal dealings, as exemplified in
the commandment to return a lost object.
Finally, starting with ‘Elu metziot’ sends us another
message. Most of the legal
discussion that we will encounter is not directly applicable to our lives, even
if the general topic of returning lost objects is. By beginning with such a chapter, we
train ourselves in the value of Torah Le-Shma, of Torah for it own sake. We join in the community of learning for
whom the point of the learning is the fulfillment of the divine command to
learn. Learning becomes an end in
itself, and ultimately, one of the central ways in which a Jew worships the
Creator.
This year’s
course does not require having participated in last year’s course. In fact, all that is required is the
ability to read basic Hebrew, and the willingness to exert some effort on a
regular basis in order to attain the skills needed to set sail in the ‘
Chapter
Elu Metziot
As
mentioned above, the subject of our chapter is the laws pertaining to lost
objects. The Talmud, in its way,
does not introduce a topic in a logical order but rather dives right into a
discussion of particular cases and laws.
This discussion assumes the knowledge of the basic norms and concepts
that underwrite the specifics being discussed. In our case, the issue at hand is the
fulfillment of two commandments:
The first is the positive commandment to return lost objects. The second
is the prohibition to ignore a lost object so as not to be responsible for
returning it. These commandments
appear in the Torah in two places:
Shemot
(Exodus) 23:4
“If thou meet thine enemy's ox or his ass
going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again.”
Devarim (Deuteronomy) 22:1-3
1) Thou shalt not see thy
brother's ox or his sheep driven away, and hide thyself from them; thou shalt
surely bring them back unto thy brother.
2) And if thy brother be not
nigh unto thee, and thou know him not, then thou shalt bring it home to thy
house, and it shall be with thee until thy brother require it, and thou shalt
restore it to him. 3) And so shalt
thou do with his ass; and so shalt thou do with his garment; and so shalt thou
do with every lost thing of thy brother's, which he hath lost, and thou hast
found; thou mayest not hide thyself. (JPS
translation).
We can see that the Torah rejects the principle “finder’s keepers, loser’s weepers’. One is commanded to return lost objects to their rightful owner. If this is too difficult, then one must hold the lost object until it can be returned to its owner. The verses provide us with the general attitude of the Torah as related to lost objects, but much remains unsaid: Must all lost objects be kept for the owner? How is the owner to identify that the object is his or hers? How do we prevent someone from “collecting” a lost object does not really belong to him or her? What if it is impossible to identify the owner of the lost object? All of these questions and more are addressed in the Talmudic discussion of these mitzvot. At times this might not be obvious, as the Talmud generally deals with very concrete cases. As we proceed, part of what we need to learn how to do is to find how the specifics discussed in the Mishna and Gemara addresses the questions listed above. Now to work!
Open your gemara to
page 21a or click here. Read the mishna. When 
interpreting the mishna, you should make use of
the following technique: many
mishnayot(plural of mishna) that have legal content (and almost all of them do)
can be analyzed into component parts of a case, and the relevant law (din)
as applied to that case. The case
is the setting, the real world situation to addressed, while the din is
the normative response to that setting.
There will never be a machloket (disagreement) about a case
– that would make no sense, since the case is merely the description of a
situation. On the other hand, you
will find disagreements (machlokot – plural) about dinim
(plural of din) in nearly every mishna. The din, depending upon the
context, will be described usually using words with normative or regulative
content: Chayav (liable), patur
(not liable), asur (forbidden), mutar (permitted). Occasionally, you will come across
mishnayot that are not structured this way, either because they do not contain
legal content at all (e.g. Pirkei Avot) or because they are straight
descriptions of legal principles (e.g.the first two chapters of Bava
Kama). As you become more familiar
with the material, it will become easy to recognize which mishnayot fit this
model and when this analytical technique is appropriate. It is a good idea to train yourself to
automatically analyze a mishna (or other halachic statement) that is structured
in this way in terms of case and din. Let us apply this technique to our
mishna.
The
mishna begins with a generalization:
“Some finds belong to the finder; others must be announced.”
Subsequently the mishna lists articles belonging to the first category:
“These belong to the finder:
If one finds scattered fruit, scattered money etc.” This list continues to the end of the
mishna. The second category, of
things that must be announced, is not elaborated here; it is taken up in the
next mishna (see p. 24b) that begins “And these one is obligated to
announce…” Let us apply
our analytical technique to our mishna.
Which elements constitute the case(s)? Where would you say the language of the
mishna shifts from description of the case to the assertion of the din?
Take a moment and try to do this for yourself before you read on.
The case is the description
of a person who has found certain lost objects. “One who found scattered
fruit, scattered coins, small sheaves in a public area, round cakes of pressed
figs, a baker’s loaves, strings of fishes, pieces of meat, fleeces of
wool that have been brought from the country, bundles of flax and stripes of
purple colored wool.” The din
immediately follows: “all
these are his (the finder’s)."
This din, however, is not the consensus, as the mishna goes on
“so says R. Meir”.
We will come back to this list in a moment. The next part of the mishna seems to
diverge from the case/din structure. R. Yehuda asserts a general legal
principle: “Anything that has
in it something unusual must be announced.” along with an example
illustrating that principle:
“How? If one 
finds a round [of figs] containing a potsherd
or a loaf containing money.”
Subsequently, we are taught, in the name of R. Shimon ben Elazar a
different principle: “All klei
anforia do not need to be announced.
At this
point I want to look more closely at the case and the din mentioned in
the name of R. Meir. We will return
to the opinions of R. Yehuda and R. Shimon ben Elazar in a later shiur
(lesson). What are we to make of
the list of items that belong to the finder? Presumably, these items are ordinary 2nd
century C.E. consumer items. Why
does the finder get to keep them and why does he not need to fulfill the
commandment of “hashavat aveidah” (returning a lost object)
that we mentioned above? Before we answer, let us take a look at the next
mishna, which appears on p. 24b. As we can see, this mishna is the
continuation of our own, and completes the list begun in our mishna. Here we are told “These (found
objects) one is obliged to announce - If one finds fruit in a vessel, or a
vessel by itself, money in a purse, or a purse by itself, piles of fruit, piles
of coins, three coins one on top of another, bundles of sheaves in private
premises, home made loaves, fleeces of wool from the craftsman’s
workshop, jars of wine or jars of oil – these must be
proclaimed” In the following
table, you can see a comparison of the lists in the two mishnayot. Can you determine the defining
feature(s) of the list in the first mishna, such that these items do not need
to be returned while those listed in the second must be proclaimed (in order to
return them)?
|
Mishna 1 – items that belong to the finder |
Mishna 2 – items that must be proclaimed |
|
Scattered fruit |
Fruit in a vessel, piles of fruit |
|
scattered coins |
money in a purse, piles of coins, three coins one on
top of another |
|
|
vessel by itself, a purse by itself |
|
sheaves in a public area |
sheaves in private premises |
|
round cakes of pressed figs |
|
|
a baker’s loaves |
Home-made loaves |
|
strings of fishes |
|
|
pieces of meat |
|
|
fleeces of wool that have been brought from the
country |
fleeces of wool from the craftsman’s workshop |
|
bundles of flax |
|
|
stripes of purple colored wool |
|
|
|
jars of wine or jars of oil |
Make a note of what you have come up with.
We will now directly
address the question why the finder of the items listed in our mishna is not
required to fulfill the commandment of hashavat aveidah (returning a
lost object). We will do this by
looking in the most essential Talmudic commentary, that of Rashi. Ideally, you have the text of Rashi in
front of you, on the inside column (in this case, the right) of the page, in
Rashi script. If you don’t, or have trouble reading it, click here for
Rashi on the Mishna in Hebrew and English.
Read Rashi’s first comment now. Note how each comment is prefaced by a
quote from the text, called a “dibur hamatchil.” We will
follow the English convention and write s.v. (Latin for sub voce) to refer to
the opening quote of a commentary.
At the beginning of the chapter, Rashi writes the first words of the
chapter, in this case, “Elu metziot”. The first comment Rashi makes
directly addresses our question:
one
who found scattered fruit – the owners
have been mityaesh (despaired of recovering them), as it says in the
gemara, and they are hefker (ownerless).
Why is the finder in our mishna not obliged to
announce that he has found a lost object, and thus begin the process of its
return? Rashi explains that in the
case of scattered fruit, we can presume that the owners have undergone yeush;
they have despaired of ever getting their object back. Once the owners have despaired, claims
Rashi, a lost object becomes hefker, ownerless. Thus, there is no obligation on the part
of the finder to return this object to its owner, since there is no owner.
The
question remains, however, as to why there is a presumption of yeush
regarding scattered fruit (and presumably the other items listed in our
mishna) and not about the things listed in the next mishna. What is it about the items on our list
that gives rise to the presumption that the owners’ of these objects were
mityaesh? Rashi addresses
this question in his next comment.
Read s.v. maot mefuzarim (scattered coins) now and try to
pinpoint how Rashi answers our question.
Click here
for Rashi.
Rashi points out that
the defining feature of the list in our mishna is that none of the objects
therein have a siman (recognizable sign). Why does this matter?
Before we address
Rashi’s answer, let us consider the alternative. How would one go about returning some
standard consumer good and such like, indistinguishable from others of its
type? How does the owner to
identify himself to the finder? If
I announce that I have found a ten dollar bill, how can I distinguish between
the real owner, to whom I want to return it, and the cheat who wants to make an
easy ten bucks? One could propose
that in the absence of simanim, of ways to identify the lost object as
his own, the owner has no way to prove that it belongs to him and thus the
finder gets to keep it by default.
This is not the halacha’s attitude to this question. One does not gain the right to take
possession of someone else’s property merely from his inability to prove
his ownership. In order for the
finder to gain access, the owner must withdraw his connection to his
property. We have explained,
with Rashi’s help, that finder’s keepers only when there is yeush,
which causes the original owner to fall out of the picture. Our problem then becomes determining
whether or not yeush in fact took place.
Rashi makes the
connection between simanim (plural of siman) and yeush. When one loses something that is not
identifiable, that has no simanim, one despairs of getting it back and
thus makes it hefker (According to
Rashi). Since you have no way of
proving to the finder that it is your lost object, we can presume that you have
given up hope, that you were mityaesh. Thus, the finder of a lost object
without simanim can presume that yeush has taken place and keep
the object. Our list of items in
the mishna is a list of typical lost objects that do not have simanim,
and therefore, “Elu metziot shelo” – these
found objects are the finder’s.
Conclusion.
In our discussion of
the mishna, we have encountered the two central concepts that are going to
occupy us for the foreseeable future:
yeush and simanim.
We have seen that the finder can keep the lost object only when the
owner has been mityaesh. We
have also learnt that regarding an object that has no simanim,
there is a presumption of yeush on the part of the owners. The gemara, which we will begin learning
next week, will discuss these two concepts and the relationship between them at
great length. For next week, we will study the gemara that begins after the mishna on p.21a until
the second to last word on the page, “teiku”.
Things
to think about until the next shiur:
1.
If you go back to the comparison
between our mishna, containing the list of things the finder can keep, and the
next mishna, which lists items that must be announced and returned, you will
notice that in one case, the
identical object (crichot (small sheaves), appears on both lists. The difference between them is only
their location: if they are found
in reshut harabim (a public thoroughfare) they belong to the finder
while if they are found in a reshut hayachid (private space), they must
be announced. What is the
explanation for this difference?
See Rashi on our mishna, s.v. bereshut harabim.
1.
What counts as a siman? Can you imagine situations in which
there is yeush despite the presence of simanim?
Introduction
to the Study of Talmud
01:
Introduction
Having an introductory lesson to a
course entitled "Introduction to the Study of Talmud" might seem
redundant. The answer, however, is
embedded in the title of the course.
This is not an introduction to the Talmud, but an introduction to the
STUDY of Talmud. If I were writing
an introduction to the Talmud, we could easily reach an entire year's worth of
introductory lectures, which I think would in fact be interesting and
informative, without ever reaching the actual learning of the text. However, most of the important
information included in those lectures would not really be appreciated until we
got down into the workings of text itself.
In fact, for nearly all of the history of Talmud study, the only way one
learned "how to learn" was by jumping into the text, a text which for
thousands of years has been called the "
For this course, I am assuming no
background at all, a clean slate, so to speak. Some of these points may be known to
many of you, and for that I beg your forbearance.
1. A word or two on text.
Talmud consists of two distinct primary
texts, the Mishna and
the Gemara. Surrounding these two,
there exists a huge literature, spanning 1800 years and thousands of books, of
commentaries, summations, and extended discussions, which continues to this
day. When we study Talmud, we are
in fact addressing that entire literature, though obviously much of it must
wait for advanced levels of learning.
But even on the beginning level of this course we are not studying a
BOOK, but rather a literature, which in fact precedes the actual Talmud, and of
course extends beyond it. From a
literary point of view, the Talmud is the basis and core text, most importantly
because it is authoritative, and hence is the starting-point for any subsequent
discussion.
The Mishna is printed as a
distinct work, and often studied separately. In editions of the Talmud, the Mishna is
printed together with the Gemara as a unit, and that is the way we shall be
studying.
The Mishna is a halakhic
code. It presents a set of rulings
on all halakhic matters, in all areas of life. True to the nature of the Oral Law, it
is not generally written in a monolithic manner, but rather preserves
controversies and disagreements, hundreds of them, from the authorities of the
Mishnaic period, roughly the first century and a half of the Common Era. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the head of
Palestinian Jewry, compiled the present form of the Mishna and thereby
summarized and codified the halakhic rulings of the previous centuries. This was the first code of Jewish law.
The Gemara is the record of two
centuries of discussion, argument, elucidation, and controversy surrounding the
text of the Mishna, first in the
The previous paragraph has
illustrated, inter alia, an important technical aspect of our study. The Mishna is written in Hebrew (in a
dialect that is called by the linguists, not surprisingly, Mishnaic
Hebrew). The Talmud is written in a
mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic. Both
are filled with hundreds of technical terms, both legal and logical, which are
often difficult to translate. I
shall of course translate or explain them as they come up, but we shall prefer
the use of the original terms even in an English-language lecture. Our goal, again, is to study text, and
to enter into the world of Talmudic study.
Every Talmudic discussion consists of a "hava amina,"
literally, "I would have said," and a "maskana," a
conclusion. A standard question
when reading a position that is rejected by the Gemara is to ask, "what
was the hava amina?"; i.e., what was the (ultimately rejected)
understanding of the subject that underlay the opening position expressed in
the gemara. Once you answer that
question, the teacher asks the opposite question - "now tell me what is
the maskana," meaning not the conclusion itself, but the change in logic
that caused the change in position.
I assume that Aramaic, and perhaps
Mishnaic Hebrew is not a language in which most of you are fluent. All editions of the Talmud are
accompanied by running explanatory commentaries, the most important of which is
that of Rashi (R. Shlomo Yitzchaki, 11th century
(The Talmud as a whole is usually printed in 20 very large
volumes. The Schottenstein
translation is much larger, with each normal volume of the Hebrew original
divided into three translated volumes with commentary. Buying the whole set will make a
significant dent in your bank account, but will enrich you immensely. For the purpose of this course, buying
ONE volume will suffice. In any
event, each page of Talmudic text will be posted on the web, so you can manage
to get by without spending a penny.)
While I recommend a translation,
and will translate myself as we continue and provide a glossary, the text we
are studying will be the original.
The ability to read the Hebrew words is assumed. I shall be constantly referring to the
Hebrew and Aramaic text (with explanation and translation), for again, the
purpose is to introduce you to the study of Talmud as all students of Talmud
study it, which is the original, with the traditional commentaries (all of
which are not available in translation in any event).
2. The "daf"
- a page of Talmud
The Hebrew word "daf"
means page. In the tradition of
Talmudic learning, it means a leaf; i.e., a physical page, which of course has
two sides. To distinguish the two,
we use a postscript, so that the page we are beginning on is daf 114a.
[This year, we
will begin from Bava Metzia, 21a. The following has been changed to reflect
that fact(JA)]
Take a look at this daf. Click
here to see Bava Metzia 21a.
You will see up on the left-hand corner the letters kaf - alef which
means 21. In all standard editions
of the Talmud (but not the Schottenstein), the first side (21a) always is on
the left side of the open volume.
The reverse side (21b) does not have any Hebrew page number at all, but
for several centuries has had an Arabic numeral, in this case "42"
(Notice that the Arabic numerals refer to sides, while the Hebrew ones to full
pages. Why? That's just the way it
is!).
Running down the middle of the
page, in block Hebrew letters, is the text of the Talmud. On the page we are examining, in large
block letters, appear the words “Hadran Alach Shenayim Ochazim.” This is the conventional ending to the
previous chapter, in which we say “Hadran Alach” “We shall
return to you”, “Shanayim Ochazim”- the name of the first
chapter of Bava Metzia, after the first two words of the first mishna. Subsequently, there is a mishna which
begins with the enlarged letters spelling “Elu”. That is how the beginning of a chapter
of Talmud appears. Later on, when
we come across a mishna that is not in the beginning of a chapter, the mishna
will be marked with the enlarged letters spelling "Matni," which is
an abbreviating for "matnitin," which is the Aramaic for "our
Mishna." After the few lines
cited from the mishna, we find the letters "gimel-mem", which is the
abbreviation for "gemara." This is where the gemara discussion of
this mishna begins. Sometimes, but
most often it will encompass several pages.
On either side of the main text
are two commentaries. On the right
side is the running commentary of Rashi, R. Shlomo Yitzchaki, who lived in
On the left side is a commentary
consisting of several extended comments, each beginning with the Talmudic text
to which it refers marked in bold letters.
This is the "Tosafot," which simply means addenda. In true talmudic tradition, the Tosafot
do not have one particular author, but record the discussion in the French (and
German) schools of Rashi's disciples for the next four or five
generations. Very often, the
starting point for these discussions was the commentary of Rashi, and most
often they will begin with a question which will give rise to an alternate
explanation.
Gemara with Rashi and Tosafot is
the bread-and-butter of Talmudic study.
We are aiming at reaching that level.
The page contains an additional
outer ring of various glosses of later authorities, citations to halakhic
codes, and cross-references to other Talmudic passages. Aside from this, there are thousands of
books that continue the discussion.
In our study, we shall examine, occasionally, some of the more important
of these additional commentaries.
An extensive and detailed account
of these and other features of the talmudic daf can be found at:
http://www.acs.ucalgary.ca/~elsegal/TalmudPage.html
which probably
has even more than you might want to know at this stage. If you take a look at the daf presented
on Professor Segal's webpage, you will see that it looks exactly like the one
we are studying, even though it is from a completely different section of the
Talmud. The page layout has been
standard for nearly five hundred years, with some additions.
Click here to go back
to this year’s Introduction to Talmud.
Rashi on the misha, daf 21a
רש"י
מסכת בבא
מציעא דף כא
עמוד א
אלו
מציאות, מצא
פירות
מפוזרין -
נתייאשו
הבעלים מהן,
כדאמר בגמרא,
והפקר הן.
מעות
מפוזרות -
הואיל ואין
להם סימן ניכר
- איאושי מיאש,
והוו להו
הפקר, וזהו
טעם כולם.
כריכות -
עומרים קטנים,
כמו מאלמים
אלומים
ומתרגמינן
בירושלמי:
מכרכן כריכן
(בראשית לז).
ברשות
הרבים - שהכל
דשין עלייהו,
ואם היה סימן
נקשר עליהן -
הרי הוא נשחת.