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PARASHAT EMOR
By Rav David Silverberg
Parashat Emor presents the laws regarding ba'alei mum, animals
that feature a physical blemish that render them unfit as a sacrifice, and the
Torah instructs (22:23) that such animals may be donated as a "nedava"
but not a "neder." As Rashi
explains, the term nedava here refers to kodashei bedek ha-bayit,
donations made to the
The Gemara in Masekhet Temura (7b) infers from this verse that the
converse is also true. Namely, a
blemish-free animal, which qualifies to serve as a sacrifice placed upon the
altar, may not be donated to kodashei bedek ha-bayit, as a monetary
donation to the
Rav Avraham Pam (as cited in Rav Shalom Smith's Rav Pam on Chumash) understood this prohibition as stemming
from the simple reality that blemish-free animals are generally difficult to
obtain. The rules of ba'alei mum are particularly strict, such that even
seemingly slight imperfections disqualify an animal for use as a sacrifice. The Torah therefore demanded that an
animal that does satisfy the criteria for use as a korban not be "wasted" by being donated for other
causes – even for the
Rav Pam noted that the message underlying this prohibition transcends the
narrow context of donating animals to the Beit Ha-mikdash; it applies to the "consecration" of human
beings, as well. People who are
well-suited for the "altar," to serve Am Yisrael in capacities such as Torah education,
pesak, rabbinic leadership and community service, should be
encouraged to pursue these critical areas of involvement. Just as the Torah frowns upon "wasting"
a qualified animal by consecrating it for purposes other than a korban, so would it be a shame for qualified
individuals to channel their talents and skills towards areas other than
avodat ha-kodesh.
Of course, individuals who are unqualified for this work and nevertheless
insist on pursuing such a track will generally do more harm than good. Just as the Torah forbids bringing a
ba'al mum as a sacrifice, so should unqualified
individuals be discouraged from entering the fields of religious and communal
leadership. Conversely, however,
just as "blemish-free" animals should be used only as korbanot, rather than be consecrated for "kodashei bedek ha-bayit," so should people's talents be
"consecrated" towards the spiritual advancement of Am Yisrael.
******
Yesterday, we discussed the Torah's instruction regarding ba'alei mum, animals featuring a physical blemish that
are therefore disqualified for use as a korban.
The Torah states (22:23) about such an animal, "nedava ta'aseh oto u-le-neder lo
yeiratzeh" – "you shall make it a
nedava, but it shall not be accepted as a
neder."
As Rashi explains (based on Torat Kohanim), the term nedava here refers to a donation to the
The Ramban notes the obvious difficulty in Rashi's interpretation of the words nedava and neder in this verse. Generally, as Rashi himself cites from the Mishna (Kinim 1:1) in his commentary several verses earlier (22:18), these terms refer to two different kinds of voluntary sacrifice offerings. Nedava means the designation of a specific animal as a sacrifice, whereas neder denotes a vow taken to offer an animal sacrifice, without specifying any particular animal for this purpose. In the case of a nedava, if the animal dies or is lost the owner bears no obligation to offer a different animal in its stead, since he had consecrated that specific animal, rather than committing himself in general terms to offer a sacrifice.
In any event, the terms neder and nedava are thus both used in reference to sacrifices, and not to kodashei bedek ha-bayit donations. How, then, could Rashi (following Torat Kohanim) explain the term nedava in the context of the laws of ba'alei mum to mean donations to bedek ha-bayit?
The Ramban answers by citing many verses that corroborate Rashi's theory,
that neder at times refers to sacrificial offerings whereas nedava
denotes contributions to the Temple treasury. He suggests explaining this usage based
on the fact that nedava literally means "voluntary," and thus the theme of "volunteerism" is more powerfully
expressed in the term nedava.
This term is therefore used in reference particularly to kodashei bedek ha-bayit donations, which are always voluntary;
never is a Jew commanded to make a donation to bedek ha-bayit.
Animal sacrifices, by contrast, are occasionally required by Torah law,
such as in certain instances of sin and ritual impurity. Hence, even voluntary sacrifices are
referred to as neder, a term in which the element of
volunteerism is expressed more subtly than in the word nedava.
(Later, however, the Ramban suggests an entirely different interpretation
of this verse.)
Rav Yaakov Mecklenberg, in his Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala, adds another factor that may have
contributed to this usage of these terms.
Virtually all korbanot are offered for the purpose of achieving
atonement. Even the voluntary
ola offering is brought – as Chazal comment – in order to earn
atonement for minor transgressions.
The one category of offering which does not serve the purpose of
atonement – the korban shelamim – is exceptional in that the individual
offering the sacrifice partakes of the meat. It thus emerges that in all instances of
a sacrificial offering, the individual receives something in return – either
expiation for sin, or a hearty meal.
Bedek ha-bayit contributions, by contrast, yield no
immediately visible "dividends."
These donations are not given as a means of earning atonement, nor does
the donor receive any share of the gift; it is given entirely to the property of
the
******
In Parashat Emor the Torah lists the physical blemishes that disqualify a
kohen from performing the rituals in the Beit Ha-mikdash. One such blemish is called charum
(21:18), which refers to a person with
a flat nose. Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni identify this term as etymologically
related to the familiar root ch.r.m. which refers to breaking or
destruction. In this context,
charum speaks of a "broken" face, in that the nose
does not protrude as it normally should.
The precise definition of charum is discussed in greater detail by the
Mishna and Gemara in the seventh chapter of Masekhet Bekhorot (43b). The Mishna states that the term
charum describes an individual who can "color his
two eyes as one," meaning, whose eyes are not separated by any obstruction. It appears that if the nose protrudes
even slightly, such that it would obstruct the horizontal stroke of a brush
coloring the eyes, the kohen is not deemed "blemished" and may perform
the
Rashi, in his Torah commentary, follows Rabbi Yossi's view, restricting
the charum disqualification to a kohen whose nose is completely flat between the
eyes. The Rambam, by contrast, in
Hilkhot Bi'at Mikdash (8:7), rules in accordance with the majority view, that
charum refers even to cases of a
disproportionately short protrusion.
The Kesef Mishneh raises the question of why the Rambam ruled
against the position expressed in the Mishna in Masekhet Bekhorot. Even though this view represents the
minority opinion, the fact that the Mishna records it as an undisputed halakhic
ruling ("setam Mishna") would seem to suggest that it is the
accepted position. Why, then, did
the Rambam choose to follow the majority view of the Chakhamim?
(Curiously, Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi, in his work on Rashi's Torah
commentary, raises the precise opposite question, wondering why Rashi sided with
the minority position of Rabbi Yossi, as opposed to the majority
view.)
The Kesef Mishneh suggests that the Rambam may have reached this conclusion on the basis of the Chakhamim's strong rejection of Rabbi Yossi's view. Rather than merely disagreeing and stating a different ruling, they dismiss and even ridicule Rabbi Yossi's position by exclaiming "Hiflagta." The Rambam perhaps inferred from this response that despite the Mishna's codification of Rabbi Yossi's position, his view did not earn acceptance as the final halakha.
The Chazon Ish explained differently, claiming – surprisingly
enough – that the Mishna did not, in fact, rule in accordance with Rabbi Yossi's
view. According to the Chazon
Ish, the Mishna intends not to present the halakha concerning this
type of deformity, but rather simply to define the term charum mentioned
in the Torah. It did so by
depicting this phenomenon's most extreme manifestation – a case where one can
color his eyes in a single stroke.
But this depiction is intended as but a general definition of
charum, not as a precise halakhic ruling. It is only in the berayta cited
by the Gemara where the Tanna'im address the specific parameters of this
halakha.
The Rambam thus naturally sided with the majority position, rather than
the view expressed by Rabbi Yossi.
******
As mentioned yesterday, the Torah in Parashat Emor presents the law
disqualifying for the
This halakha appears, at first glance, to unfairly
"shortchange" the kohanim who are qualified to perform the avoda.
Recall that the kohanim did not receive agricultural land in
Eretz Yisrael, as they were to dedicate their lives to
their responsibilities as officiates in the Beit Ha-mikdash.
In exchange for their service, they were supported by the gifts required
of farmers and the food from sacrifices.
Seemingly, once the Torah saw fit to disqualify ba'alei mum (those with a blemish) from the avoda, it should have denied them entirely of
their priestly status, so that they could own land and be self-supporting. Instead, they remain entitled to a share
in the limited resources available for the kohanim who perform the service in the Mikdash and thus rightfully earn these goods. Why did the Torah choose such a
system?
Rav Shraga Pollack, in his work Tishbi (
******
Parashat Emor begins with the prohibition of tum'at kohanim, which forbids kohanim from contracting tum'at meit – the tum'a that results from contact with a dead body. An ambiguous passage in Vayikra Rabba (26:6) seeks to provide the background to this prohibition: "Because of the fear that Aharon felt before the Almighty, he merited to have this parasha given to him, which does not depart from him or his children or grandchildren, for all generations."
The Maggid of Duvna suggested explaining this Midrash on the basis of the Gemara's famous comment in Masekhet Berakhot (5a) advising that one recall the yom ha-mita, his eventual death, as a means of triumphing over his sinful impulses. One of the purposes underlying the mitzva to tend to the remains of a deceased is that such involvement humbles and subdues a person by reminding him of his own mortality. However, the Maggid notes, this should not be seen as the ideal. Preferably, a person struggling with negative tendencies should employ the other means enumerated by the aforementioned Talmudic passage, particularly the study of Torah, which heightens a person's religious sensitivity and refocuses his attention onto his spiritual duties. The Midrash thus comments that Aharon was issued this prohibition – to refrain from involvement in burial – because of his unique level of yir'at Shamayim. For his and his descendants, it sufficed to engage in Torah and mitzvot to resist the machinations of the yetzer ha-ra, and there was no need for them to involve themselves in burial for this purpose.
In the ideal world of the Mikdash, man is driven and inspired to
serve God not out of fear of retribution, but rather out of a natural sense of
love, devotion and duty. In the
Later in Parashat Emor we read the laws concerning the festivals,
including the shalosh regalim – the three pilgrimage festivals of Pesach,
Shavuot and Sukkot, when the entire nation would gather in
******
Parashat Emor begins with a number of laws relevant to the kohanim, including the command, "Ve-kidashto" (literally, "You shall sanctify him" –
21:8), which is understood as an obligation to treat kohanim with honor and distinction. (See Rambam, Sefer Ha-mitzvot – asei 32.)
The Magen Avraham (282:6) asserts that this obligation is
limited only to adult kohanim; one bears no obligation to show honor and
distinction to child kohanim.
He infers this limitation from the verse's presentation of this command:
"You shall sanctify him for he offers the 'bread' of your God" ("Ve-kidashto ki et lechem Elokekha hu
makriv"). The Torah explicitly associates this
obligation with the kohanim's role to officiate in the Beit Ha-mikdash.
Hence, minors, who are not qualified for service in the
A number of Acharonim questioned the Magen Avraham's reasoning in light of a passage in
Torat Kohanim that explicitly includes ba'alei mum – kohanim with a physical defect – under the
obligation of ve-kidashto.
Despite the fact that a ba'al mum is disqualified from performing the service
in the Mikdash, he nevertheless retains his status of
kedushat kehuna ("priestly sanctity") and therefore
deserves expressions of honor no less than regular kohanim.
This would appear to prove that the ve-kidashto obligation does not hinge on a kohen's status with respect to performing the
Rav Meir Ha-kohen of
It thus emerges that although a ba'al mum is barred from performing the rituals in the Mikdash, he is nevertheless included in the avoda process in that he receives a share in the sacrificial meat. And lest one contend that he receives meat only as a kind of gesture, but his consumption does not constitute a "ritual" as does that of the other kohanim, the Imrei Kohen draws proof to the contrary from the Gemara's discussion there in Bava Kama (110a). The Gemara at one point suggests that a certain passage in the berayta refers to distributing sacrificial meat to ba'alei mum. As mentioned earlier, the berayta employs the term avoda in reference to the consumption of the sacrificial meat, and it thus clearly emerges that even a ba'al mum's consumption of sacrifices constitutes an avoda.
This easily accounts for the discrepancy implicitly drawn by the Magen Avraham between ba'alei mum and minors. When the Torah speaks of giving honor to a kohen "because he offers the 'bread' of your God," it refers even to ba'alei mum, who participate in the sacrificial process through their consumption of korbanot. Minors, however, do not receive a share of the sacrifices among the kohanim, and therefore do not participate at all in the sacrificial process. Understandably, then, the mitzva of ve-kidashto includes ba'alei mum, but not child kohanim.
******
Yesterday, we discussed the claim of the Magen Avraham (282:6)
that the obligation of ve-kidashto (Vayikra 21:8), which requires
treating kohanim with honor and distinction, does not pertain to child
kohanim. The Magen
Avraham contended that since the Torah associates this obligation with the
fact that the kohanim perform the sacrificial rituals in the Mikdash, it excludes minors, who are not qualified
to perform the
The work Imrei Kohen suggests – in addition to the approach cited yesterday – that the Magen Avraham perhaps distinguished between two categories of ba'alei mum. The basis for such a theory is a remark by the Peri Megadim, in his work Teivat Gome (Parashat Vayelekh), where he cites this ruling of the Magen Avraham excluding minors from the ve-kidashto obligation. The Peri Megadim then comments – surprisingly enough – that a kohen with a physical blemish, such as if he is blinded in one eye, would likewise be excluded from ve-kidashto, just as the Magen Avraham claimed with regard to minors. This comment seems very difficult to understand on several counts. For one thing, it directly contradicts the passage in Torat Kohanim (which we mentioned yesterday) which explicitly applies ve-kidashto even to ba'alei mum. Furthermore, why did the Peri Megadim find it necessary to give an example of a ba'al mum, and specify the case of a kohen who is blind in one eye? The Torah presents the list of disqualifying defects in Parashat Emor; why must the Peri Megadim provide a specific example?
The Imrei Kohen explains that the Peri Megadim – and the Magen Avraham – perhaps distinguished between two different kinds of physical defects. As the Rambam rules (Hilkhot Bi'at Mikdash 6:6), if a ba'al mum performed the sacrificial rituals in violation of the Torah, the status of the avoda he performed depends on the nature of his disqualifying blemish. If his blemish is of the type that would disqualify an animal from being offered as a sacrifice, then his avoda is invalid and must be repeated by a qualified kohen. If, however, his blemish is unique to human beings, and in an animal would not constitute a disqualifying blemish, then after the fact his avoda is accepted and need not be repeated.
Apparently, the Peri Megadim and Magen Avraham understood that when Torat Kohanim extends the obligation of ve-kidashto to ba'alei mum, it refers only to the second kind of blemishes – those that are unique to human beings. Since this obligation stems from the kohen's role in offering sacrifices, any kohen who could potentially offer a valid sacrifice is included under this obligation. Ve-kidashto therefore applies to those ba'alei mum whose sacrificial service is accepted be-di'avad (after the fact), since these kohanim indeed have the potential to perform a valid avoda. By contrast, kohanim featuring a blemish that would disqualify animals are entirely excluded from the avoda, as even after the fact any rituals they performed are deemed invalid; hence, the mitzva of ve-kidashto does not apply to these ba'alei mum. The Peri Megadim therefore addresses the particular case of a kohen without vision in one eye, as this defect disqualifies animals, as well, and therefore, by extension, the mitzva of ve-kidashto does not apply to such a kohen.
This easily resolves the difficulty that was raised against the Magen
Avraham's position concerning the
status of child kohanim.
Minors are disqualified from the avoda even be-di'avad; any rituals they perform are deemed
invalid and must be repeated.
Hence, they, like kohanim with a blemish that would disqualify an
animal, are excluded from the obligation of ve-kidashto.